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Series editor’s preface 
There is now a considerable amount of expertise nationally and internationally in the social 
scientific and cultural analysis of sport in relation to the economy and society more generally. 
Contemporary research topics, such as sport and social justice, science and technology and 
sport, global social movements and sport, sports mega-events, sports participation and 
engagement and the role of sport in social development, suggest that sport and social 
relations need to be understood in non-Western developing economies, as well as in 
European, North American and other advanced capitalist societies. The current high global 
visibility of sport makes this an excellent time to launch a major new book series that takes 
sport seriously, and makes this research accessible to a wide readership. 
The Globalizing Sport Studies series is thus in line with a massive growth of academic 
expertise, research output and public interest in sport worldwide. At the same time, it seeks to 
use the latest developments in technology and the economics of publishing to reflect the most 
innovative research into sport in society currently under way in the world. The series is multi-
disciplinary, although primarily based on the social sciences and cultural studies approaches 
to sport. 
The broad aims of the series are to: act as a knowledge hub for social scientific and cultural 
studies research in sport, including, but not exclusively, anthropological, economic, 
geographical, historical, political science and sociological studies; contribute to the 
expanding field of research on sport in society in the United Kingdom and internationally by 
focusing on sport at regional, national and international levels; create a series for both senior 
and more junior researchers that will become synonymous with cutting-edge research, 
scholarly opportunities and academic development; promote innovative discipline-based, 
multi-, inter- and trans-disciplinary theoretical and methodological approaches to researching 
sport in society; provide an English language outlet for high-quality non-English writing on 
sport in society; publish broad overviews, original empirical research studies and classic 
studies from non-English sources; and thus attempt to realisethe potential 
for globalizing sport studies through open-content licensing with Creative Commons. 
At the Royal Liverpool Golf Club in Hoylake in 2014 the Open Championship organiser, the 
Royal and Ancient (R&A), installed free Wi-Fi access at a championship course for the first 
time. Concerns were raised that the innovation might disturb a key aspect of golf etiquette: 
spectators maintaining silence whilst the players focus on their game. Partly to deal with this 
problem there was ‘a strict ban on making or receiving calls on the course other than in 
“mobile device zones”’. Peter Dawson, the Chief Executive of the R&A, commented that 
‘technology is something golf has to embrace and people are going to feel a great benefit this 
year’ (Financial Times, 17 July 2014, p. 4). 
In Sport and Technology Roslyn Kerr does not explicitly discuss these developments in 
championship golf, but she does provide us with a distinctive way to think about and 
understand the complex relationships between technologies and a variety of sports – the 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) perspective. Rather than simply introducing a sport readership 
to ANT, Kerr demonstrates why such an approach is significant. Specifically, ANT provides 
a detailed methodology as well as a theoretical basis for understanding the relationship 
between the human and non-human in sport. 
The book begins with a discussion of critiques of ANT, how ANT defines technology and 
how ANT connects with the work of social theorists such as Haraway, Foucault, and Deleuze 
and Guattari. It then illustrates the utility of ANT through rich case studies, based on original 
fieldwork, of the use of technologies in sports such as kayaking, competitive swimming, 
Australian rules football, cricket and tennis, as well as analyses of doping, refereeing and 
media broadcasts of sport. Sport and Technology is a distinctive contribution to debates about 
sport in a global context, an introduction to the Actor-Network Theory way of thinking about 
sport and a demonstration of the insights the perspective can yield that have value for sport 
scientists and others involved, or those simply interested, in the development of sport. 
John Horne, Preston and Edinburgh, 2015 
  
 Introduction 
When, in 2013, Lance Armstrong confessed to having adopted 
a range of doping practices, there was no question that he had 
ingested banned substances in order to enhance his cycling 
performance. However, when asked whether he felt any guilt 
over his behaviour, Armstrong curiously replied that he did 
not. While several authors have explained Armstrong’s lack of 
guilt by arguing that the Tour de France has been dominated 
by a doping culture for many years (see, for example, 
Brewer, 2002; Strulik, 2012), the existence of further 
examination and discussion of Armstrong’s actions indicates 
that the simple explanation that athletes’ decisions to use 
banned technologies are based purely on enhancing 
performance is insufficient for understanding the use of 
technology in sport. 
Lance Armstrong’s case also concerned the immense 
amount of money that he obtained through sponsorship and 
other commercial arrangements, with fans raising questions 
about the continuation of those arrangements once his doping 
history was known. With the professionalisation of sport, 
athletes face increasing pressure from sponsors not only to 
perform but also to use particular technologies or equipment 
produced by their sponsors. The use of some technologies can 
therefore be explained by athletes’ experiencing pressure from 
sponsors or other commercial bodies; and, by extension, 
athletes’ desire to win can be explained by their wish to benefit 
commercially. 
At the same time, athletes also make deliberate decisions 
not to use particular technologies or not to dope because of 
their desire for purity, to keep their bodies and sport clean and 
untainted. For example, US 5000m athletics champion Lauren 
Fleshman publicly criticised Lance Armstrong on the grounds 
that he undermined fair play, which she believed defined 
sporting practice (see Fleshman, 2013). Fleshman’s stance 
assumes an amateur ethos that places fair play ahead of 
winning, and harks back to a romanticised view of sport as 
historically free from overly competitive practices. 
There is no doubt that the explanations of performance 
enhancement, commercial pressure and a desire for purity are 
valid in terms of athletes’ own individual motivations for using 
or not using particular technologies in sport. But one of the 
most controversial aspects of Armstrong’s case was the 
revelation of just how widespread his doping network was, 
and how many individuals and technological implements, 
such as syringes and and other equipment necessary for 
performing blood transfusions, were involved in facilitating 
his doping. This revelation demonstrated that individual 
motives are only one aspect of understanding the use of 
technology in sport, with athletes also utilising a variety of 
other processes and enrolling many other actors to facilitate 
their use of technology. 
In this book, I argue that singular explanations such as 
quest for performance, commercialisation or quest for purity 
are insufficient explanations in themselves for understanding 
the use or non-use of technology in sport. I do not argue that 
these explanations are not valid, and indeed I use cases where 
these explanations come into play. But this book argues that 
these explanations do not encapsulate the myriad of processes 
that contribute to the use of technology in sport. Instead, I 
argue that in order to understand which technologies become 
enrolled in sport, we must examine the processes of enrolment, 
and seek out the various actors that affect the enrolling or non-
enrolling, and acknowledge that there are multiple issues and 
decisions at play. This involves a shift in focus from much other 
work that has been done on technology in sport. It involves 
attending to enactment, and to process, rather than to 
regulations, philosophies or cultural meanings. Yet these latter 
aspects can also be important, since the enrolling process can 
include deploying the philosophies or cultural meanings held 
by those involved in the enrolment processes. 
Indeed, enrolment processes can be highly complex, 
although their complexity is often obscured by the dominant 
narratives used by influential sporting bodies (Goldsher-
Diamond, 2014). Once a technology is enrolled and its use 
becomes normalised, the process that produced the stability 
becomes concealed from view and can therefore be difficult to 
ascertain (Law, 1992). For example, all sports have rules that 
outline which technologies are permitted or not permitted to 
be used, but this is the extent of the information that appears 
in the rules and regulations. The controversies or decisions that 
resulted in those rules are not recorded in the same public 
manner and therefore become erased. Thus, in attending to 
how technologies come to be enrolled or not-enrolled, I also 
aim to bring to light the complex processes that produce 
particular rules or decisions. 
Attending to complexity is particularly important in the 
light of the rapid increase in technological change that we are 
currently experiencing. Where, in the past, many technologies 
were reasonably simple and it was possible for many laypeople 
to understand their workings, the complexity and number of 
technologies have now increased exponentially, and only 
experts can fully comprehend them. Within such an 
environment, it is necessary to develop and adopt approaches 
that acknowledge complexity and are designed to examine 
multiple strands. While philosophers such as Deleuze and 
Guattari (2004) have argued for the need to see the world as 
consisting of assemblages in order to examine the current fluid 
and unstable environment, they did not extend their ideas to 
encompass methodology. By contrast, the approach adopted in 
this book, Actor-Network Theory (ANT), was designed as a 
methodology to examine scientific practices and technological 
change while acknowledging the complex and multiple 
strands that affect change, including human and non-human 
actors. 
The earliest uses of ANT involved the examination of the 
processes of producing scientific knowledge, with detailed 
ethnographic practices revealing a complex network of factors 
that produce science (see, for example, Latour, 1987, 1993b; 
Latour and Woolgar, 1979). In this book, it is the network of 
sport that I am interested in following in order to trace 
similarly the factors that lead to the enrolment or non-
enrolment of technology in sport. To date, there has been no 
other extensive study of sport using an ANT approach. 
ANT is not the only approach well designed to trace the 
enrolment of technologies in sport. The social construction of 
technology (SCOT), as developed and adopted by Pinch and 
Bijker (1984), has similarly been utilised for the same goal and 
is more commonly used for examining sport (see, for example, 
Goldsher-Diamond, 2014; Pinch and Henry, 1999; Rosen, 1993; 
Varney, 2002). In examining how technologies come to be used, 
SCOT’s focus is on identifying the relevant social groups that 
contribute to the use of the technology. For example, in their 
analysis of the bicycle in the nineteenth century, Pinch and 
Bijker (1984) determined that the so-called ‘ordinary’ bicycle 
was deemed too risky and unsafe for use by women, whereas 
it was highly attractive to young men precisely because of that 
same riskiness. Thus, different social groups interpreted the 
ordinary bicycle differently (in an example of the concept of 
interpretive flexibility), which affected whether each group 
chose to use the bicycle. 
ANT’s focus differs from SCOT’s through its emphasis 
on the technologies, and other non-humans, as actors that 
affect and influence enrolment processes. In SCOT, as in most 
sociological approaches, the focus remains purely on the 
human actors: in particular, on social groups. In ANT, humans 
and non-humans are understood as equally important, and this 
is reflected in the preference for the term ‘actant’ over ‘actor’ to 
refer to anyone or anything that affects the enrolment process. 
Other scholars interested in ‘things’ have similarly argued 
that non-human artefacts can hold agency and act as 
significantly as people (Harvey and Knox, 2014). 
Determining how ‘things’, and particularly technologies, 
act is particularly important in sport, where international 
sporting bodies are constantly in the position of having to 
regulate the use of technology based on the ability of the 
technology to affect sporting performance. Sporting bodies 
must determine a technology’s level of agency in order to 
decide how to regulate it. This was illustrated particularly well 
in the case of Oscar Pistorius, where it took several years for 
the International Association of Athletic Federations to 
determine whether his prosthetic legs had greater running 
capacity than human legs. The crucial point was whether the 
actions available to the prosthetic legs were greater than those 
available to human legs. It was decided that they did not have 
greater capacity, but it took a substantial amount of time to 
determine this was the case. 
In claiming that non-humans can hold agency, ANT has 
attracted critics who argue that agency can only exist through 
deliberate intent and therefore agency can only be the domain 
of humans, as non-humans do not possess the consciousness to 
decide to act. In emphasising the ability of non-humans to act, 
ANT has been criticised for anthropomorphising non-humans 
(see, for example, Elder-Vass, 2008; Hearn, 2012). While this 
point will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1, it is a point 
that has been recently considered by a range of researchers 
interested in what Fox and Alldred (2015) term ‘new 
materialism’. 
Essentially, discussions around agency revolve around 
conceptions of power. Rather than viewing power as 
incorporating deliberate intent, ANT views power as an effect. 
Utilising such a definition, anyone or anything that affects 
action can potentially hold power. The form this action may 
take varies depending on the individual study, but a simple 
example of the way that technology in sport can affect the 
action comes from my own ethnographic work in the sport of 
gymnastics, which utilised an ANT approach. In this excerpt 
from an interview with a gymnast, Malcolm, he discusses how 
the equipment holds power through directly affecting his 
gymnastics performance: 
Malcolm: The high bar is always different, bouncier or harder. And the rings, sometimes 
they shake more. 
Researcher: Is that the same here? When you compete at [another club] is it different? 
Malcolm: At [another club] the high bar is a bit bouncier than I like it, and the rings, the 
rings are pretty good actually. The floor’s a bit harder than here, so you can get a bit more 
bounce if you put more into it. 
Researcher: So you know what to expect? If you got sent to the US or something, I guess 
you’d be thinking, ‘I wonder what I’ll get here?’ 
Malcolm: Yeah, because you get used to the floor you train on every day. If you have a 
soft floor at home and go to a hard floor somewhere else, you end up going ‘Oh no!’ And 
some floors are really bad, they’re soft on the top and hard underneath and you end up 
tearing your achilles and stuff. 
This excerpt from Malcolm’s interview reveals how he has 
learnt how to ‘be affected’ (Latour, 2004, p. 210) by the 
apparatus, and therefore the apparatus holds the power to 
affect his gymnastics performance. His comment about the 
bounciness of the high bar makes it clear that he realises a 
certain amount of manipulation of the equipment is required 
to produce optimum results, but that the type of equipment 
directly affects what he must do. He is aware that his 
gymnastic routine will occur only if he manages to work as 
an assemblage with the equipment and describes how he ‘puts 
more into’ the floor to make a harder floor work more 
effectively. 
The notion of the ‘assemblage’ is central to ANT. 
Essentially, ANT encapsulates the notion that ‘the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts’ through arguing that 
combining humans and/or non-humans can create 
assemblages that have vastly different qualities and capacities 
from singular parts. This is easily understood in the case of 
sport, where athletes can be understood as possessing 
particular and often impressive qualities owing to the athlete-
assemblage, consisting of a human plus a variety of 
technologies and training that transform the human into 
something surpassing normal human ability. For example, 
neither a human nor a pole is capable of independently 
jumping five metres into the air, but once a human with 
training uses a pole, they are transformed into an athlete-
assemblage called a pole-vaulter, who can accomplish this task. 
Viewing athletes as assemblages of humans and 
technologies creates a significant shift in thinking for the sports 
policy-maker. For example, at times, policies in sport attempt 
to ban or limit the use of particular technologies, seeing them 
as entirely separate from individuals. As previously discussed, 
seeing the two as separate was shown to be problematic in the 
case of Oscar Pistorius, whose legs are so interconnected with 
his ability to run at all that he epitomises Donna Haraway’s 
(2004) notion of the cyborg, with no discernible differentiation 
between human and technology. It is also problematic with 
regard to doping, where vast sums of money are spent in 
attempting to determine whether an athlete has ingested 
banned substances. Doping policy-makers could instead, if 
they adopted the ANT notion of the athlete as assemblage, 
simply have an upper limit of the amount of whatever 
substance they are testing for and disregard whether it arrived 
in the body by natural or artificial means. This has occurred at 
times. For example, in order to test for the presence of the 
banned artificial substance Erythropoietin (EPO), some sports 
organisations used the method of testing hematocrit levels in 
order to ensure that no athletes went beyond the limit of 50 per 
cent. Their reasoning for choosing a level of 50 per cent was 
related to the health issue of blood thickening that occurs 
beyond this level (Böning, Maassen and Pries, 2011). This 
testing method ensured that athletes were safe and healthy, but 
was unable to determine whether athletes reached hematocrit 
levels below 50 per cent by human or artificial means. This 
policy assumed that athletes were assemblages made up of a 
range of hormones and chemicals. In the language of policy-
makers, such a stance ensured safety and produced a level 
playing field. However, this method has now been replaced by 
a definitive test for the use of artificial EPO, along with a range 
of other mechanisms as detailed in Chapter 4, which consider 
the human as needing to remain separate from any 
technological interventions. 
The concept of the ‘assemblage’ also reflects the use of 
the word ‘network’ within ANT. To remain with the example 
of the pole-vaulter, implying that a pole-vaulter is simply an 
assemblage of a human plus training and a pole is 
oversimplifying the network that produced the performance. 
If we were particularly intent on determining how the pole-
vaulter achieves this outcome, we would need to identify the 
myriad of other components that contribute to the pole-
vaulter’s success. We would expect that the pole-vaulter would 
use an expert coach and other sports science experts, along 
with possibly specialised shoes and maybe particular mats for 
training. The pole-vaulter would also need funding, and 
competition experience. The pole-vaulter’s ability to jump high 
is thus made up of the assemblage of all these aspects, and it is 
this assemblage that ANT refers to as ‘the network’. 
It may seem that listing these components in this way is 
simply repeating the components that make up elite sporting 
success, as identified in studies such as that by De Bosscher et 
al. (2006), who produced a model of factors that determine elite 
sporting success. The ANT approach differs from these kinds 
of studies in assuming that networks are individualised, rather 
than universal, and highly unstable. This assumption stems 
from the ANT view of the world as existing as a network of 
assemblages that changes over time. For example, at the 
moment I am involved in a project examining the experiences 
of older elite gymnasts. One of the findings from this project is 
that, as gymnasts reach adulthood, their coaching and training 
requirements change considerably from when they were 
younger. Some gymnasts question whether they even need a 
coach as an adult, given that they have already acquired the 
necessary knowledge to train themselves. In this study, it is 
apparent that the assemblage of fifteen-year-old gymnast + 
hands-on coaching + heavy training can produce the same level 
of success as a twenty-five-year-old gymnast + occasional 
coaching + light training. Therefore, I argue that examining the 
exact networks that make up elite sporting success can be 
valuable in understanding the myriad of processes that may 
contribute to success, but it does not acknowledge that they are 
also always changing. While the above example referred to the 
change in age of the gymnast that resulted in a different 
network being effective, change is also important when 
discussing technology because of the constant production of 
new technologies and improvements to current technologies. 
As Harvey and Knox (2014) note, viewing non-humans as parts 
of assemblages involves acknowledging that the range of 
actants involved is bound to cause instability, and that 
therefore constant care is required to obtain stability. 
Attending to how stability is achieved, or not achieved, is at the 
core of the ANT approach (Law, 1992). 
In attempting to capture the range of processes that 
produce stability, a criticism that has been levelled at ANT is 
that the concept of the network is problematic owing to its 
nature as ‘never-ending’ (see, for example, Lee and 
Stenner, 1999; Strathern, 1996). For example, to return to the 
pole-vaulter, if we were truly examining every aspect of the 
pole-vaulter’s network, then we would also need to examine 
the network of each pole-vaulting coach, each sport scientist 
and each technological implement, which would lead to yet 
more strands, leading to more networks that would indeed be 
impossible ever to examine properly in a single researcher’s 
lifetime. ANT’s response to this critique is a pragmatic one. 
ANT theorists acknowledge that no research account can ever 
be complete and so do not suggest that researchers should 
continue to examine a network indefinitely (Law, 1992). 
Instead, Latour (2005) suggests that researchers should simply 
stop examining the network either where the participants in 
the study determine that the network ends, or when the 
requirements of their particular article, book or thesis are met. 
For example, in my own ANT study of gymnastics in New 
Zealand, I stopped examining the network at the point where 
the participants in my study were adamant that I was no longer 
examining gymnastics, such as when I came across competitive 
aerobics. In this scenario, one type of aerobics was deemed to 
be ‘gymnastics’ as participants explained that it was regulated 
by the International Gymnastics Federation, but another type 
of aerobics was not, as it was instead regulated by an 
international dance federation that was not associated with 
gymnastics. 
 
A note about method 
ANT is somewhat unusual in that it is both a method and a 
theory. Theoretically, ANT makes use of a number of concepts, 
such as enrolment, translation, mediators, intermediaries and 
others, which will be introduced throughout this book. 
Methodologically, ANT espouses an ethnographic approach 
that is closer in nature to ethnomethodology both in 
emphasising a high level of detail and in attending to 
processes. ANT assumes that data is wide-ranging and ‘messy’ 
(Law, 2004), and argues that ethnography is best placed to 
encompass the mess that a researcher is likely to find upon 
entering the field. In order to trace the mess, Latour (2005) 
describes the methodology of ANT as ‘following the network’, 
where the researcher does not have a clear path planned at the 
outset but follows particular strands as they are revealed. 
Farnsworth and Autrin (2005) describe the ANT following 
process as being akin to the work of the detective, where the 
researcher follows up on clues dropped by participants and 
occurrences in order to determine the workings of the 
particular situation of their interest. 
In line with ANT’s theoretical position, which 
emphasises non-humans as actants, the ANT ethnography also 
pays attention to the role that non-humans play within the field 
of study. This can be difficult, given that things do not speak 
(Penley, Ross and Haraway, 1990) and so cannot be 
interviewed, but Latour (2005) suggests that this can be 
accomplished in a number of ways. First, he states that the 
creation or innovation of new innovations or knowledge 
within a laboratory can be examined, as they were by him 
in Laboratory Life (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) and Pandora’s 
Hope (Latour, 1999b). Second, they can be studied at a distance: 
for example, historically. Throughout this book there is some 
element of historical analysis, as the history of some sports and 
technologies are traced in order to demonstrate the socio-
technical nature of sport. Third, Latour argues that they can be 
studied when they break down or become controversial. This 
final option is the approach primarily adopted in this book, 
which examines cases where technologies have caused 
controversy in a range of scenarios and contexts. 
While ideally it would be most effective if all the cases 
discussed in this book used the ethnographic method of 
‘following the network’, as espoused by Latour, there is 
unfortunately very little ethnographic work in sport that uses 
an ANT approach. My own ethnographic work on gymnastics, 
which used an ANT approach, is drawn upon for two cases: 
the use of sports scientists by gymnasts and the 
implementation of a video replay system at the Artistic 
Gymnastics World Championships. These two cases use 
ANT’s ethnographic method directly, as I obtained my data 
through ‘following the network’ of elite gymnastics in New 
Zealand. 
Other cases are chosen because they illustrate a 
particular theoretical point and because, like this book, their 
focus is on how technologies came to be enrolled or not 
enrolled within particular sports environments. These include 
Patrick Trabal’s study of the attempted implementation of new 
kayak technology in France, Elizabeth Pike’s examination of 
rowers’ use of sports doctors and Limin Liang’s analysis of the 
role of new production technology in the broadcasting of the 
2008 Olympic Games. The remainder of the cases use a 
combination of historical analysis and Latour’s (2005) entry 
point of the controversy, where I follow the history and debate 
around the use of that particular technology through previous 
research, policy documents, media releases, newspaper reports 
and personal communications. 
The method of following the network has been 
advocated by ANT theorists as being significant for bridging 
the gap between the ‘micro’ and the ‘macro’. There are several 
ANT studies that demonstrate the way that ANT allows the 
connections between these two levels to be made apparent (see, 
for example, Callon, 1986; Latour, 1988, 1995, 1996; Law, 1992). 
Critics have suggested that ANT’s ethnographic methods 
mean that ANT studies are too strongly focused on the micro 
and ignore social structures (Elder-Vass, 2008), but ANT 
theorists explain that the point of the following process is to 
identify and examine the connections between wider societal 
aspects and micro-level occurrences. For example, in my ANT 
study of gymnastics, previous studies had determined that 
there were a range of macro-level bodies, such as the 
International Gymnastics Federation and the New Zealand 
Olympic Committee, which determined selection for the New 
Zealand national team (see, for example, D’Amico, 2000); 
however, I found that selection was also affected by other 
aspects of a gymnast’s network, such as the views of the 
parents and coaches, or finance to pay for elite training. Thus, 
my ANT analysis determined that, although the New Zealand 
Olympic Committee has the final say in the make-up of 
gymnastics teams, there were other processes (which would 
normally be termed micro-level) that influenced the final 
selection, demonstrating the significant links between the 
micro and macro levels of action. 
Kellner (2002) calls for the use of approaches, such as 
ANT, that incorporate both the micro and macro, or local and 
global, within the globalisation literature. Indeed, most of the 
globalisation-of-sport literature is understandably focused on 
the global, and while connections with the local are noted, they 
remain primarily at the national or regional level and not at the 
level of individual action. By contrast, ANT’s following process 
allows connections to be made from global occurrences to the 
micro level of individual interaction. The book is structured in 
order to highlight the movement in scale that is possible with 
ANT. 
The structure of the book 
Following this chapter, I begin with a discussion of the ANT 
understanding of technology. The most significant point is the 
view of technology as a heterogeneous assemblage rather than 
a singular, complete object. It is made up of a variety of 
components, plus it works within a particular actor-network. 
The understanding of technology as made up of multiple 
strands and as sitting within multiple strands is significant for 
examining how and why technologies are used in sport. Later 
chapters of the book include several examples of technologies 
being only partially implemented or utilised as a result of 
sporting bodies focusing on enrolling one strand of the 
technology and not realising at the outset the multiple 
connections that must be in place in order for the technology to 
be fully utilised. Chapter 1 also recognises that technologies 
can work as stabilising devices to ensure a particular outcome, 
and argues that technologies have agency. 
Chapter 2 begins with the assumption that technology is 
constituent for sport, with all sports utilising a range of 
technologies, such as bats and balls, in order for the sports to 
exist. Within this context, the technologies used within sports 
are frequently improved or enhanced, either by individual 
athletes or by international sporting federations. This chapter 
essentially questions the role of an enhancement’s functionality 
in the enrolment process. Through case studies on kayaks and 
swimsuits, the multiple strands of an athlete or sport’s network 
are found to heavily complicate what might seem at the outset 
to be a simple case of using an enhanced form of technology. 
While Chapter 2 remains within the network of sport 
through examining enhancements of technologies already 
used in sport, Chapter 3 moves outwards to examine 
technologies that are not traditionally part of sporting practice 
but which have been introduced into the actor-network in 
sport. The first case, GPS units in Australian-rules football, 
introduces the notion that technologies frequently produce 
unexpected outcomes, and shows how following technologies 
can reveal the power relations between different parts of the 
network. This case is particularly focused on the National 
League, with the network of a team sport being understood as 
very different from an individual sport. The second case 
examines the use and regulation of technologically constructed 
hypoxic environments (TCHEs), commonly known as altitude 
chambers. This case reveals the connections between global 
understandings of sport and race, and how understandings are 
incorporated into the network of a technology and influence its 
use. 
Chapter 4 continues to acknowledge global connections 
through examining doping. This chapter chronicles a variety of 
groups that have attempted to maintain control of doping, 
including the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the East German 
government. In all cases, I unpack the extensive actor-networks 
that each organisation has put in place in order to regulate and 
attempt to minimise or eradicate doping. This chapter draws 
attention to the role of inscriptions within power relations and 
demonstrates how Latour’s (2005) concept of the oligopticon is 
valuable for understanding the way that institutions retain 
power through a networked arrangement of humans and non-
humans that is quite different from the institutional 
arrangements described by Foucault (1977). 
In Chapter 5 the book moves to examine a somewhat 
peripheral yet very important part of competitive sporting 
practice: the use of sports science and sports medicine. This 
chapter investigates the processes used by athletes and coaches 
to integrate sport scientists into the sporting context. While it 
would be easy to assume that enrolment would easily take 
place owing to athletes, coaches and scientists all having the 
common goal of improving performance, the two cases in this 
study demonstrate that the integration process is more 
complex and encompasses a range of perspectives and 
understandings, as well as specific actants, that contribute to 
enrolment or non-enrolment. 
Chapter 6 moves to the competition arena and the 
workings of officiating technologies. This chapter considers the 
actor-network of various sports that have enrolled 
technological devices for assisting with umpiring or judging. 
The cases of cricket, tennis and artistic gymnastics are drawn 
upon to examine how the actor-network of each sport is 
affected by the new technology. The focus in this chapter is on 
following the actor-network beyond the initial 
implementation. Each sport is followed beyond the point at 
which the governing bodies introduce the new technology, to 
examine how the new assemblage affects other, often 
unexpected, parts of the actor-network. 
Chapter 7 considers one of the most important 
relationships within sport: the sport media connection. 
However, this chapter is different from much of the other 
literature written on the topic as it focuses not on media 
representations but on the processes by which these 
representations are produced. It considers how humans and 
technologies work together to produce what we view to be a 
seamless television broadcast. In this chapter, the global nature 
of sporting coverage is considered through Collier and Ong’s 
(2005) concept of a global assemblage, an ANT concept created 
to examine the creation of stable global forms. 
Chapter 8 concludes by reflecting on sport as a socio-
technical actor-network. I emphasise the way that the concept 
of the actor-network moves beyond singular explanations such 
as functionality for understanding how technologies come to 
be integrated into sport. I also reiterate how ANT considers 
technologies to hold agency, and consequently as being able to 
cause unexpected occurrences in other parts of the actor-
network, a point which is particularly important for sports 
bodies when considering adopting new technologies. This 
chapter also refers to the cases and examples in the book to 
respond to some of the critiques of ANT. 
As sport evolves to include an ever-increasing number of 
technologies as part of its actor-network, it is important that 
those studying sport adopt approaches that encompass 
multiplicity and provide ways to grapple with the potentially 
far-reaching effects that technology can produce. In this book, 
I show how ANT is well up to this challenge through 
examining a range of cases and examples that have caused 
controversy within sport. In line with ANT methodology, 
controversies provide an effective point of entry to allow the 
examination of the myriad of actors that assemble to produce 
sport. 
  
1 
What is technology? 
Some of the most famous ANT cases have investigated the role 
of a range of technologies, including aeroplanes, ships, 
microscopes and a personal rapid-transport system. 
Technologies are frequently forefronted in ANT work in a 
reflection of the equal emphasis ANT places on humans and 
non-humans, with technologies often taking the form of 
significant non-human actants. In this book I am similarly 
interested in the non-human actants in sport and take these as 
my starting-point when investigating technologies. I am 
particularly interested in the way that the physical properties 
of the technology, and its precise material forms, can facilitate 
or produce particular effects and actions. At the same time, in 
line with the ANT approach, it is impossible to confine any 
discussion of technology to purely material forms. Instead, I 
consider the network that produced and utilises the technology 
to be of equal interest. 
This chapter investigates three ways that technology can 
be understood through ANT, all of which are drawn upon at 
various times in the book. First, technology is considered as a 
multiple, heterogeneous assemblage; second, it is seen as a 
stabilising device; and third, it appears as an actant. This 
chapter considers how these three views of technology are 
highly relevant to understanding the role of technologies 
within sporting practice. 
Technology as a heterogeneous assemblage 
One of the most famous philosophers to write about 
technology, Martin Heidegger (1977, p. 1), argued that it is both 
a ‘means to an end’ and a ‘human activity’. These combined 
definitions suggest that technology is something that humans 
utilise in order to achieve particular goals. Heidegger (1977) 
emphasised that human use of technology entailed mastery 
and that mastery was particularly important in order to avoid 
humans losing control of it. 
Heidegger’s position has been adopted by several 
authors writing on sport and technology. For example, Van 
Hilvoorde, Vos and de Wert (2007, p. 175) echoed this position 
when describing technology in sport, arguing that technology 
is part of the artificiality that defines sport, including ‘mastery 
of technological equipment or the body [in order] to achieve 
the particular goals of a specific contest’. Similarly, Loland 
(2002, p. 3) claimed that the view of technology as ‘human-
made means to reach human interests and goals’ is the 
definition used most frequently within writings on technology 
in sport. Both these definitions acknowledge that in sport there 
are particular goals that must be met, and that technologies act 
as artificially created ways by which these goals can be 
realised. 
Latour (1999b) derives his own definition of technology 
through framing it in opposition to Heidegger. Latour 
disagrees with Heidegger’s definition of technology as 
incorporating mastery, even though he notes that technology 
is both something that can master nature and humans and 
something that can be mastered by humans. Latour rejects 
Heidegger’s view of technology, instead arguing that, when 
humans and technology assemble together, a third actor is 
created that has different properties from the separate 
components. He emphasises that it is the combined potential 
of disparate parts that produces a working piece of technology. 
Riis (2008) argues that Latour’s and Heidegger’s views are not 
that different, with Latour misinterpreting Heidegger. She 
argues that Heidegger, far from arguing for the existence of 
total mastery by either humans or technology, acknowledges 
that the acts of humans are influenced by technology and vice 
versa. Her interpretation suggests that both Heidegger and 
Latour emphasise the heterogeneous nature of technology and 
see technology as working with multiple actors in order to be 
effective. 
In taking this argument further, Latour and Venn (2002, 
p. 248) use the term ‘fold’ to describe how they see the various 
heterogeneous actors that make up technology combining 
within it. Using the example of the hammer, they describe how 
the hammer exists as an accumulation of various histories, 
including the ‘antiquity of the planet’ through the mineral form 
of the aged oak in the handle, along with ‘the forests of the 
Ardennes, the mines of the Ruhr, the German factory, the tool 
van which offers discounts every Wednesday on Bourbonnais 
streets, and finally the workshop of a particularly clumsy 
Sunday bricoleur’ (Latour and Venn, 2002, p. 249). The 
example of the hammer demonstrates the notion of technology 
as an assemblage, or actor-network, of heterogeneous histories, 
both human and non-human. The ANT approach emphasises 
the relationships between things, acknowledging that 
technologies can work to connect actants together (Harvey and 
Knox, 2014, p. 6). For example, the quotation above describes a 
range of different actants that are brought together through the 
hammer, with the hammer existing as a network encompassing 
all these disparate components that make it into a distinct 
object. 
In order to emphasise the view of technologies as 
networks, Latour (1999b, p. 191) posits that this position is 
easier to understand through the use of the word ‘technical’ 
rather than either of ‘technology’ or ‘technique’. He gives four 
reasons for this argument. First, he suggests that ‘technical’ 
implies that numerous programmes are in action. For example, 
when we say ‘this is a technical point’, the phrase is used to 
denote a deviation from, or a section of, a larger project. 
Therefore the word ‘technical’ acknowledges the existence of 
multiple programmes, or sections of the network. Second, 
Latour notes how ‘technical’ highlights the existence of non-
humans as actors, in influencing and affecting the social world 
and therefore connected to and part of it. Third, he argues that 
‘technical’ can also refer to a hitch in the programme, implying 
that technology can act to inhibit action, but that the technology 
is also part of the programme. This definition mirrors the 
concept of the mediator, which will be discussed below. 
Finally, ‘technical skill’ can refer to a specialised skill which 
produces action when combined with particular technologies 
in a network arrangement, therefore again encompassing the 
notion of technology existing as a network. 
In defining technologies as networks, further discussion 
of the term ‘network’ is necessary. Latour (1999a) argues that 
the term ‘Actor-Network Theory’ is a misnomer, since these 
three words, and the hyphen, suggest an alternative meaning 
to what Latour and other ANT theorists originally envisaged. 
In terms of the word ‘network’, Latour (1999a) describes how 
this word came into use in ANT studies prior to the invention 
of the internet, yet with the ubiquity of the internet the word 
has come to be understood as the creation of instantaneous ties 
and connections. Latour (1999a) argues that this is the exact 
opposite of the original intention. He argues that the use of the 
word was intended to refer to a concept similar to Deleuze’s 
‘rhizome’, which refers to ‘a series of transformations’ 
(Latour, 1999a, p. 15), meaning that the connections between 
the disparate parts connect the network together and transform 
its use and its meaning. 
There are strong connections between the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari and some of the central concepts in ANT. 
As per above, Latour prefers the concept of the rhizome to the 
word ‘network’, as this concept acknowledges that every point 
can potentially connect with any other point and that these 
connections can result in transformations. Throughout this 
book, several examples demonstrate how the rhizome, or 
network, operates. In several cases, sporting bodies of all kinds 
introduce new technologies with a particular goal in mind, but 
in all cases, unexpected consequences are generated owing to 
the technology connecting, interacting and transforming an 
unanticipated part of the sporting network. 
Like Latour, Deleuze and Guattari opposed the notion of 
singularity, instead emphasising that all things exist as 
multiple through their use of the term ‘assemblage’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 2004), a word also used at times by Latour. Like 
Latour, they argued against stability, claiming that 
assemblages are not made up of discrete, bounded bodies, but 
rather that things are made of disparate parts while also 
making up parts of other things (Currier, 2003; Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004). This is akin to Latour’s example of the 
hammer, which, as described earlier, has a number of historical 
and geographical components folded within it in order for it to 
be stabilised and be recognised as a hammer. At the same time, 
the hammer is also part of a variety of other networks, which 
include human builders, businesses selling tools and other 
larger manufacturing organisations. 
In sport, any piece of technology can be similarly 
examined. For example, at the material level, a basketball is 
made up of the disparate components of rubber or leather, air 
and an inner bladder. When combined with the flesh of a 
human, who is also composed of particular chemicals, 
hormones, bones and muscles as well as training and 
knowledge, the basketball is transformed into something that 
can bounce on the ground or pass through the air. The need for 
a ball made of rubber that can bounce with ease while a player 
is walking or running came about owing to the particular 
circumstances of the invention of the game of basketball. The 
inventor of the game, James Naismith, was limited to using a 
flat indoor space to create a game to be played during the cold 
Massachusetts winter. He used the indoor gymnasium, peach 
baskets and a soccer ball (Rust, 2003), which were all easily 
available. Naismith found that versions of soccer or rugby were 
impossible in the indoor environment because kicking the ball 
smashed windows while tackling caused bruises on the 
athletes’ bodies because of the hard wooden floor. He recalled 
a game from his childhood called ‘Duck on a Rock’, which 
involved ‘lobbing small stones up at a softball-sized rock on a 
boulder about 20 feet away’ (Cantwell, 2004, p. 1076) and 
altered it to become a game playable in the flat indoor 
gymnasium. The peach baskets were nailed to the walls at each 
end and a soccer ball used for play, as these were the only items 
to be found that would work for his idea. To get the ball out of 
the peach baskets, someone had to climb a stepladder or use a 
pole. Naismith quickly wrote a set of thirteen rules, which 
involved no carrying of the ball, integrating bouncing instead, 
and these rules formed the basis of what became known as 
basketball (Cantwell, 2004; Rust, 2003). 
This popular story of the creation of basketball is an 
excellent example of how sport works as a heterogeneous 
network where humans and non-human technologies are 
equally important. While it is agreed the idea for basketball and 
the rules were Naismith’s (Cantwell, 2004; Rust, 2003), the 
game was created through the assembling of humans and non-
humans. First, one non-human actant, the weather, created the 
circumstance where a new indoor game was required. If 
Naismith had been living in the tropics, this would not have 
been necessary. Second, the availability of the peach baskets, 
the round soccer ball and the indoor gymnasium with a flat 
floor were all crucial in being able to play the game. But at the 
same time the network included human input. Naismith’s own 
knowledge of a game he enjoyed as a child was an important 
part of the creation of the game. Following the network further, 
the sports commonly played in North America at the time – 
football, track and baseball – left a gap in the calendar which 
had to be filled. Therefore the network included aspects that 
may be considered by some theorists as micro actors, such as 
the individual school situation, together with what may be 
termed macro actors, such as the yearly sports calendar. All 
these heterogeneous components are folded within the 
network of the technology that we refer to as basketball. 
Currently, to consider the modern basketball network, 
the humble game of basketball is now the centre of a large, 
commercialised league that consists of a huge number of 
courts, hoops, players, teams and sponsors, all of whom are 
also assemblages of various disparate components and 
combine together in a multitude of ways. The word ‘basketball’ 
refers to every aspect of this network, including human 
components such as players, coaches and managers, and non-
human components such as balls, wooden floors, shoes, 
backboards and hoops. 
While the above demonstrates how non-humans play a 
role in sport, their importance can be understood further 
through paying attention to the way the human body works 
with non-humans in order to create sport. As the philosopher 
of sport Loland (2002) describes, technologies are not merely 
instruments utilised in sport; they are also constituent in 
producing sport. Or, as Thorpe and Rinehart (2010, p. 1273) 
argue, objects such as surfboards and skateboards, as used in 
alternative sports, ‘are not merely objects that participants 
throw, kick, swing or push; these are objects that define the 
very activity itself’. They describe how alternative sports 
participants do not see themselves as separate from the objects 
they use but, in participating in the activity, become one with 
it. For example, using the examples of surfing and 
skateboarding, Thorpe and Rinehart (2010, p. 1273) write: 
Acknowledging the significant role of equipment in surfing, Ford and Brown refer to the 
board as a ‘hybrid extension of the body’, while Borden describes the skateboard as ‘a 
prosthetic device, an extension of the body as a kind of fifth limb, absorbed into and 
diffused inside the body-terrain encounter’. 
In describing the surfboard in this way, the surfer resembles a 
form of cyborg, with the material form of the surfboard feeling 
to the surfer like part of their body. Introna (2009, p. 26) notes 
how the use of a theory acknowledging the interconnection 
between humans and technologies is particularly relevant as 
the world moves to becoming more technologically mediated 
and ‘cyborgian’. In sociology of sport, a growing number of 
authors are examining the way athletes negotiate the 
connections between the natural and the artificial (see, for 
example, Butryn, 2003; Butryn and Masucci, 2003; Butryn and 
Masucci, 2009; Chapman, 1997; Cole, 1993, 1998; Miah, 2004; 
Shogan, 1999; Wesley, 2001). As Butryn and Masucci (2009, p. 
287) note, there is a debate over whether twenty-first-century 
sport is transgressing the natural/artificial boundary, and there 
is a wish revealed by some sporting participants to keep sport 
‘pure’ or solely human, and untarnished by the introduction of 
artificial technologies. 
One of the unique and somewhat controversial points of 
ANT is the argument that boundaries such as the 
natural/artificial divide have never existed. In one of his most 
famous works, We Have Never Been Modern, Latour (1993a) 
confronts this divide. He notes that, while many theorists argue 
that modernity marks a shift towards a focus on humanity 
which was seen as separate from the natural, this view is a 
particular interpretation that does not stand up to detailed 
analysis. As Venn and Featherstone (2006) explain, if one were 
to start making a list of all the features of a modern society and 
then try to identify whether individual societies match the list, 
it would quickly become evident that very few societies, if any, 
would definitely do so. Instead, they argue that most societies 
have a range of features that may be argued to be modern and 
some that are not. They use the example of the USA, which may 
be argued to be a quintessential modern society, with its 
emphasis on capitalist progress, and argue that it does not fit 
the categorisation of a modern society entirely, owing to the 
dominance of religious views within it, which is argued to be 
the hallmark of a traditional society. Societies are instead a mix 
of ideas that may be termed either modern or traditional 
depending on interpretation, with no definitive boundary 
existing between the two. 
Sport is no exception. As Jonasson (2014) argues, sport 
has both modern and traditional components. On the one 
hand, as Guttmann (1978) argues, sport includes a list of 
features that would generally be considered to indicate 
modernity, including rationalisation, secularisation, 
specialisation and others. From this viewpoint, technologies 
are acknowledged as a necessary component in the enactment 
of sport (Jonasson, 2014). On the other hand, some sporting 
regulations seem interested in retaining a level of purity that 
harks back to the traditional amateur understanding of sport. 
This is particularly the case with doping regulations, which (as 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4) have banned doping and 
therefore aim to retain the separation between the natural and 
the artificial. 
Within the study of sport, the use of the natural/artificial 
binary has meant that, at times, examinations of sport and 
technology have revolved around the question of whether the 
natural creates the artificial or the artificial creates the natural. 
In terms of sporting performance, this includes the question of 
whether a human performance inspires the creation of new 
technological devices or whether new technologies create the 
human performance. With technological determinism at one 
extreme end, it has been argued that technology develops 
separately from the social context where it is used, but that, 
once used, it then determines social practice (Roe Smith and 
Marx, 1994). At the other extreme end, it is theorised that 
technology and its resulting consequences are initiated entirely 
by social actors, a theory that falls under the vague category of 
the social shaping of technology, or SST (Bijker and Law, 1992; 
Mackenzie and Wajcman, 1999; Rosen, 1993; Varney, 2002). For 
example, Rosen (1993) argued that the specific design of the 
mountain bike resulted from the environment around where 
the bikes were being made. He described how one bike design, 
the clunker, became popular in Marin County, California, both 
because it was suited to the terrain and because the users had 
positive cultural associations with the Schwinn Excelsior bike 
frame that the clunker was made from. Similarly, Varney (2002) 
described how the creation of women’s artistic gymnastics 
equipment was a result of the social position of women. She 
argues that each apparatus was designed to require less 
strength and more grace and flexibility than the previously 
existing men’s apparatus. She theorised that this was a 
response to the predominant male/female binary that assumes 
females to be less physically capable. Further, Eichberg (1982) 
argued that the stopwatch developed as a result of behaviour. 
He describes how it came about because of a change in thinking 
about physical exercise, from purely exercise or ‘exercitia’ to 
that of a quantified competition in the form of ‘sports’ (p. 47). 
Eichberg (1982, p. 44) opens up the question of whether 
‘behaviour is derived from objects or from behaviour’ by 
concluding that answering this question is unnecessary for 
understanding the relationship between technology and sport. 
Instead, he argues that the natural/artificial binary has never 
been clear. 
The overall argument that the natural/artificial binary is 
overcome through a concept encompassing multiplicity has 
been raised by several authors. Deleuze and Guattari (2004) 
preferred the term ‘assemblage’ but referred to the same 
phenomenon. Haraway (2004) similarly adopted this idea 
through her work on the cyborg, while ANT theorists Latour 
(2005) and Law (1994) used the term ‘network’ and Mol (2002) 
‘multiple’. For all these authors, the common thread is the 
argument that the make-up of the world makes it impossible to 
separate the natural from the artificial or the human from the 
non-human because they are intertwined in our everyday lives. 
Similarly, writing on sport, Tangen (2004, p. 16) uses the 
word ‘system’ to describe the network that makes up sport. 
While most researchers who examine technology investigate 
specific improvements or implements, Tangen argues that 
facilities are an equally important part of the sporting network. 
He notes that the facility forms a significant role in determining 
how the sport will be played, and in allowing sport to be 
played: 
The facility is not only a sufficient structure of sport. It is a necessary structure; a structure 
of embedded expectations. Without a facility there will be no sport. The sport and the 
facility are two sides of the same coin. 
In acknowledging the equal importance of the structures of 
sport and the facilities, Tangen approaches the perspective 
adopted in ANT in arguing that the social and the 
technological should be treated symmetrically. 
Also within the study of sport, Butryn and Masucci 
(2009), following Ihde’s (2010) perspective, move towards 
understanding athletes as actor-networks through their use of 
the concept of a cyborg. They identify three forms the 
relationship between human athletes and technologies can 
take: first, technology as mediator; second, technology as 
embodied or an extension of the body (which most closely 
resembles Haraway’s concept of the cyborg); and third, 
technology as providing an alternative or other-world 
experience (Butryn and Masucci, 2009). The distinction 
between humans and technologies remains, and the focus is on 
understanding the relationships that humans have with 
technologies (Verbeek, 2005). By contrast, this book, in line 
with the aims of ANT, is interested in tracing the workings of 
sport as an assemblage of human and non-human 
(technological) actants and in unravelling the networks that 
produce sport. What the two approaches share is an 
acknowledgement of the central position of non-humans in the 
production of sport; however, ANT argues against any concept 
of the purely human existing as distinct from the non-human. 
Instead, ANT argues that social relations are always socio-
technical and that humans and non-humans should be treated 
as equally able to produce action (Latour, 2005). 
Technology as society made durable 
Latour argues that technology ‘is society made durable’ 
(Latour, 1991, p. 103). This obscure statement refers to his 
argument that nothing in the world is able to stabilise without 
the presence of non-humans. He argues that no purely ‘social’ 
world can ever exist, but the world works through the 
heterogeneous network of humans and non-humans, and that 
it is the way that the two are assembled together that produces 
stability. 
In order to illustrate his argument that the world is 
always socio-technical but stabilises through the combining of 
human and technological entities, Latour (1992) uses the very 
simple example of a door. He argues that one way of 
understanding the equal importance of the social and the 
technical in society is to imagine the work that must be done 
by a human if the non-human were to be removed. In the case 
of the door, he describes how a hole would have to be made in 
a wall and then bricked back up in order to fulfil the same 
purpose as a door. If the door were removed and the hole left 
open, outdoor weather such as rain and wind would be able to 
enter indoors, making it pointless to be inside at all. With the 
door present, it is through the combined efforts of a human and 
non-human that one is able to walk through. The human has 
been involved in the creation of the door, in walking through 
and pushing or pulling the door open and closed. But this is 
only possible through the physical properties of the door being 
combined in a particular way. The door is hinged, allowing it 
to move freely, and made of a robust, hard material that means 
it will prevent weather such as wind and rain getting through. 
With the door in place, the method of entering and 
exiting the building without allowing rain or wind inside 
becomes stabilised. Humans and the physical components of 
the door are disciplined to work together to allow entering and 
exiting to occur, and this behaviour is now stabilised as the 
dominant way in which actors enter buildings. 
In sport, we can similarly see the same stabilisation of 
behaviour through technology as sports become stabilised 
networks that utilise particular pieces of technology. Many 
sports are now stabilised as including particular balls, bats, 
boats and many other technologies as part of their normalised 
form of operation. For example, van Hilvoorde, Vos and de 
Wert (2007) note the stabilisation of the high jump as including 
a bar, mats and the technique of the ‘Fosbury Flop’. They 
discuss how it has been assumed that in the sport of high-
jumping the now common technique of the ‘Fosbury Flop’ 
developed as a result of the creation of foam mats for high-
jumpers to land in. However, Dick Fosbury actually created the 
‘Flop’ prior to the introduction of mats. Rather, the mats 
allowed the ‘Flop’ to become the norm for high-jumpers after 
Fosbury first performed it with great success. Therefore it was 
the assemblage of the mats together with Fosbury’s success 
that produced the current norm of the Fosbury Flop being the 
normal way to high-jump. The behaviour of the high-jumpers, 
in utilising the Fosbury Flop technique, has become stabilised 
as a result of the high-jump network, including landing mats 
and the exact technology used to hold the bar to the side 
supports. With regard to the latter, Dick Fosbury described 
how he experimented with working out which parts of his 
body were causing the bar to fall and created the ‘Flop’ as a 
way to avoid those body parts knocking against the bar (van 
Hilvoorde, Vos and de Wert, 2007). Fosbury’s experimentation 
suggests that the particular technology of the bar itself, and 
how it was attached to the stand and falls off, were also 
significant in determining what would cause it to fall. If the bar 
had been attached through different means, it is possible that 
the Fosbury Flop would not have been as effective, and a 
different method of jumping might have stabilised as the norm. 
The example above demonstrates how the 
heterogeneous or multiple aspects of a particular technique or 
technology can become concealed from view once it stabilises. 
The way that multiplicities become understood as singular and 
stabilised has been of particular interest to the ANT researcher 
Annemarie Mol, whose work on atherosclerosis demonstrated 
the way that the disease existed in multiple forms and 
incorporated multiple meanings despite being assumed to be 
singular (Mol, 2002). In sport, a similar example can be found 
through the example of doping, where the very different acts 
of finding banned substances in a person’s blood, taking a pill 
or injecting oneself are singularly considered to be doping, 
even though these practices are very different and are 
undertaken by different groups in different contexts. 
Once a network has stabilised, Latour (1991) uses the 
term ‘black boxed’ and Law (1992) ‘punctualised’ to refer to the 
way that the network becomes understood as referring to that 
particular concept and therefore the network that created it 
becomes lost from view. The best example of ‘black boxing’ 
(Latour, 1991) in sport occurs through rules and regulations. 
All sports now have countless rules and regulations in place 
that exist in written form as inscriptions. These have been 
produced in order to ensure that the sport runs effectively and 
that a winner can be determined fairly and appropriately, but 
they were not created arbitrarily. Many rules have come into 
effect because of occurrences of inappropriate behaviour or 
similar circumstances that required sanctions against 
particular behaviour to be included in the rules to prevent it 
happening again. However, the actual behaviour behind the 
decision to change the rules is now concealed from view. The 
sport stabilises, or becomes black-boxed, with particular rules 
in place that remain an unquestionable part of the sport. For 
example, in sprinting, the International Association of 
Athletics Federations (IAAF) introduced the rule that the 
winning athlete is the one whose chest moves over the finish 
line first because of the problem of determining which athlete 
was the winner (Inizan, 1994). I consider a more detailed case 
in swimming, where particular regulations were introduced to 
counter problematic behaviour, in Chapter 2. 
Technology as actant 
The above discussion of the high jump highlights the way that 
technologies can ‘act’ to alter or influence sport. One of the 
most extensive and controversial debates within both ANT and 
wider literature is about how it is that non-humans such as 
technologies, incapable of conscious decision-making, are able 
to act (Sayes, 2014). Arguably ANT’s most extreme critics, 
Collins and Yearley (1992), claim that ANT overstates the 
importance of non-humans in the social world and suggest that 
the study of technologies is better left to the physical sciences 
than the social sciences. Given this controversy, it is to the 
question of how technologies can act that I now turn my 
attention. 
In sport, there can be no doubt that technologies have 
had a significant impact. At the simplest level, we know that 
improvements in technology can contribute to enhanced 
athletic performances. For example, in attempting to determine 
the effects that technology can have on sport, Haake (2009) 
used statistical analysis specifically to examine the effect of 
new technology on the sports of sprinting, pole vault, javelin 
and cycling. He historically tracked the performances of 
athletes together with changes in technology. He found that in 
pole vault and cycling there were clear historical ‘jumps’ in 
performance as a result of improved pole or bike technology. 
Conversely, in javelin, he found that in 1984 the rules for the 
technology permitted in the javelin itself were restricted, and 
as a result performance levels actually declined in the years 
following. His 2009 study is interesting as it acknowledged 
that rules can have the same power as new technologies. In 
making this acknowledgement, he called attention to the 
heterogeneous nature of sport and the way that sporting 
performances are affected by a variety of different facets. He 
argued that both the technology and the rules acted to 
influence performance. 
Haake (2009) was particularly interested in the way that 
technologies had a causal effect on sporting performance. In 
the sports he chose to examine he found a very direct 
relationship. This kind of work is important in understanding 
technologies, and a statistical methodology allows the 
numerical identification of direct effects in sports where 
measurements are key. The ANT methodology allows the 
investigation of a wider range of complexities, including cases 
where it can be difficult to identify numerical effects. Indeed, 
Latour notes that in terms of causality, there are: 
many physical shades between full causality and sheer inexistence. In addition to 
‘determining’ and serving as a ‘backdrop for human action’, things might authorise, 
allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid and so 
on. (2005, p. 72) 
In this passage Latour highlights the many different roles that 
technology can hold beyond direct causality as identified by 
studies such as Haake’s (2009). 
In order to determine the role that a particular 
technology has played, Latour (1999b) argues that in many 
cases we become aware that a technology has acted through 
the existence of controversies. If technologies were simply 
instruments, as he accuses Heidegger of suggesting, then there 
would be little controversy about them. Instead, the use of 
technologies is constantly debated. As Matthewman (2011) 
chronicles, technologies as diverse as bridges, baby bottles and 
computers have all caused immense controversy in terms of 
their design, use and placement. They still hold value through 
the functions they can perform, but functional value is only one 
aspect of their existence. 
There have been a range of controversies with regard to 
the use of technology in sport. While this book examines some 
of them in detail, such as doping and the use of the 
polyurethane swimsuit, there have been other landmark cases, 
including the case of Oscar Pistorius. Pistorius became caught 
in a controversy because his artificial legs were accused of 
acting too strongly and thus providing him with an advantage. 
To Pistorius himself, his artificial legs were his only means of 
locomotion and, given the choice, he would have preferred to 
be able to use flesh and bone. But to others, his artificial legs 
were seen as providing him with an advantage over other 
athletes. Pistorius’s case highlights how, in comparison with 
Haake’s (2009) study above, it can be extremely difficult to 
determine the effects that a new technology may have on sport. 
It took years for a verdict to be reached, which determined that 
Pistorius’s artificial legs did not provide him with any unfair 
advantage. 
One of the arguments for why technologies can create 
controversies is their transformative potential. The addition of 
a new technology, or object, to any environment can create 
extensive new possibilities, particularly when assembled with 
a human (Harvey and Knox, 2014). When a hammer is 
combined with a human, the human becomes capable of action 
that could not previously be performed. The human is 
transformed into a new assemblage, or a new network is 
created (Latour and Venn, 2002). 
In the sporting context, it is precisely this notion that 
makes sport so appealing. The ability for an athlete to perform 
feats that might normally be seen as super-human can be very 
attractive to both observers and practitioners. It is the athlete 
combined with numerous different types of technology that 
allows them to transform from a ‘normal’ human into one 
capable of performing impressive physical achievements. As 
described earlier, a human in possession of a pole vault is 
suddenly transformed into a person capable of jumping several 
metres up into the air. A swimmer wearing a specially 
designed swimsuit swimming in a carefully designed pool 
having been trained by a scientific process is transformed into 
a person capable of moving through the water at astonishing 
speeds. It is these transformations that make sport enjoyable to 
watch. 
The difficulty for the researcher is in determining the 
exact way that the technology has acted to create such a 
transformation. Haraway, in an interview with Penley and 
Ross (1990), frames this as a problem of language, where 
scholarship has developed a vocabulary for describing and 
explaining the actions of humans, who can use language to 
describe their actions, but no such vocabulary is available to 
non-humans, who are unable to speak. 
As discussed in the introduction, much of this book is 
designed to follow sport and technologies that have been 
particularly controversial in the last decade. Latour (2005) uses 
a particular term to designate those technologies that behave in 
a controversial or unexpected manner: mediators. He defines 
mediators as objects whose outcome cannot by assured by their 
input. By contrast, he describes the opposite as 
‘intermediaries’: non-controversial things which behave in a 
particular, predictable way (Bencherki, 2012; Latour, 2005). For 
example, in the context of sport, a stopwatch which accurately 
recorded the time an athlete takes to do a particular thing 
would be a common intermediary. The stopwatch would 
obediently begin recording when a certain button was pressed, 
and would stop when the button was pressed again. However, 
many things do not behave so obediently, including some 
stopwatches which may refuse to display any numbers at all, 
or refuse to acknowledge that the stop button has been pressed. 
Stopwatches that behave like this would be described by 
Latour (2005) as mediators: unpredictable objects where the 
outcome is not assured. These distinctions are significant, as 
mediators demonstrate how it is that non-humans can act to 
prevent, change or inhibit action, while intermediaries act to 
facilitate action. Latour argues that in all contexts humans 
work together with non-humans in order to function, and that 
therefore both the human and non-human can cause action. In 
the use of the stopwatch, a human pressing the wrong button 
and the plastic button not working have the same effect, of not 
causing the correct number to be displayed. Agency is shared 
between the human and the stopwatch in creating this outcome 
through the assemblage of the two (Bencherki, 2012; 
Latour, 2005). 
Such a view reverses the standard sociological 
conception of agency. For ANT theorists, agency is produced 
through a heterogeneous network rather than individually. In 
the stopwatch example above, agency is produced through the 
combination of plastic and electronics that is the stopwatch 
working together with a human and their knowledge of which 
button should be pressed. Latour emphasises that it is the size, 
shape and scope of the network that determines what is 
produced. Different kinds of actor-networks produce different 
kinds of effects (Edwards and Nicoll, 2004). 
One particular effect that Latour (1992) argued 
technologies can have is a moralising effect. He argues that 
technologies are increasingly utilised in order to discipline 
humans into behaving in a moral manner. This argument 
relates strongly to Foucault’s work, which acknowledged the 
way that physical technologies and architecture, such as 
cameras or prison structures, are part of the process of 
disciplining individual humans to behave in particular ways 
(Foucault, 1977; Kerr, 2014). The example that Latour uses to 
demonstrate his argument is the network of the car. He 
describes how the law decrees that, when humans are in a car, 
they should wear a seatbelt in order to ensure their own safety 
and points out that modern cars have disciplining mechanisms 
to ensure drivers and passengers do so. He notes how cars 
commonly make a beeping sound, or flash a light, if a seatbelt 
is not worn. The beeping sound or the flashing light then acts 
as a device to discipline the driver to behave according to the 
law and wear a seatbelt. 
In sport there are countless examples of sporting bodies 
and regulations using technologies to ensure that athletes 
behave according to the rules. For example, at the beginning of 
skiing and snowboarding races, the racer must wait for a 
barrier to open before they can begin the race, to discipline 
athletes to begin at the correct time. Similarly, in sprinting, the 
starting blocks contain sensors to ensure that the athletes do 
not begin racing (in a ‘false’ start) before the official start of the 
race. In both these cases, the technologies act to discipline 
athletes into behaving according to the rules. 
Technologies can also act to discipline spectators. All 
major sporting events include a range of infrastructure that 
disciplines those attending the games. For example, the lack of 
parking provided at the Olympic stadium disciplines visitors 
into travelling by train to arrive at the venue. Similarly, 
stadiums for many major sports are constructed to ensure that 
different groups of people are restricted to different areas. For 
example, in his examination of facilities, Tangen (2004) 
describes how a Premier League football stadium is 
demarcated to allow only certain individuals into particular 
areas. Players, managers and coaches are permitted in some 
areas, fans with tickets in another, and fans without tickets are 
not allowed in at all. In this example, it is clear that ‘tickets’ and 
other credentials transform the individuals into assemblages 
who can enter particular spaces. It is not the individual who is 
permitted into the area, but rather a credential that allows 
access. The credential acts as an inscription, containing the 
information about who the individual is that transforms them 
into someone who can enter that area or not, and works as a 
disciplinary mechanism to ensure that only particular people 
can enter particular areas. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the notion of technology and sport 
as consisting of actor-networks made up of heterogeneous 
components. This book does not view technology as having 
any particular, clearly defined roles in sport; instead I adopt the 
position that each technology exists as its own unique actor-
network within a broader actor-network that constitutes 
sporting practice. There are no particular qualities held by any 
technology that makes it definable as a technology; rather, it is 
the network of the sport, and what is brought into the network 
as part of the sport and recognised by the network as a 
technology, that makes a technology definable as such. This is 
in line with the ANT view that researchers should be learning 
from the actors about their world (Latour, 1991). As Latour 
(2005) describes, any societal group spends a great deal of time 
defending its status as a particular group and policing the 
boundaries of the group. Sport is no exception. Those involved 
in sport are greatly concerned with what constitutes sport, and 
certain objects are accepted as technologies which are 
embraced within sport while others are banned. One of the 
goals of this book is to track the trajectories of these 
technologies, some of which allow new technologies to be 
easily integrated into sport and some of which do not. 
The following chapter takes up the notion that 
technologies are not always easily enrolled in sport. Through 
specifically examining technological enhancements, the book 
now moves to consider how functionality is an insufficient 
reason for the adoption of new enhancements in sport. 
  
2 
Enhancement: which technologies are improved, and 
how? 
When watching sport on a regular basis, it can feel as though 
the many pieces of technology used in sporting competitions 
are constantly improving. Commentators draw attention to 
athletes using the newest type of aerodynamic helmet or 
carbon fibre bicycle. Sometimes, the technological changes can 
be so enormous that the sport may barely be recognisable, such 
as when the America’s Cup sailing competition altered their 
rules to allow catamarans rather than only single hulls. At 
other times, it is the contrast between the technologies used by 
different teams that we notice, perhaps owing to personal 
preference or perhaps highlighting economic differences 
between various nations. Richer nations and sports are more 
likely to have the most up-to-date technologies than those with 
fewer resources. 
The technologies that this chapter focuses on are those 
that are constituent for sport. They are not technologies that are 
external to the sport but utilised by athletes or coaches for 
training or other purposes; they are technologies that are used 
by athletes every time they train or compete. These kinds of 
technologies include balls in football, boats in rowing or 
yachting, bicycles in cycling and shoes in running. As these 
form necessary parts of each sport, it is understandable that 
improving these technologies has become another avenue for 
athletes to attempt to achieve an advantage over their 
competitors. At times, we have seen athletes adopt some 
unusual technologies, such as Australian Cathy Freeman’s 
choice to wear a full-body suit including head cover in the 2000 
Olympic Games, which contrasted markedly with the very 
brief attire worn by many of her competitors. 
This chapter examines how constituent technologies 
come to be enhanced or improved. It may seem obvious that all 
athletes would be constantly seeking the best technological 
options, but, as this chapter notes, determining the best option 
for an individual athlete can be very difficult. Further, the cases 
in this chapter show that the actor-network of sport includes 
many other actants that can influence athletes’ and/or coaches’ 
choices to enrol a newly enhanced technology. Overall, the 
central question explored throughout the chapter is why some 
technological enhancements are easily integrated, or enrolled, 
into sport while others are resisted. 
The goal of improvement 
As Guttmann (1978) described, there is an undisputed link 
between the goal of sport and that of scientists, with both 
groups searching for greater human achievement. In sport, this 
is often achieved through improving and enhancing already 
existing equipment and technology. As Trabal (2008) notes, 
following this logic would assume that any new technological 
advances that have been shown to improve sporting 
performance would be enthusiastically adopted by athletes 
and coaches. However, as I argue throughout this book, this is 
far from the case. Through cases studies in kayaking and 
swimming and a range of other examples, this chapter 
examines how enhancements to already existing sporting 
technologies are both adopted and rejected. 
Brohm (1978) argued that the quest for improvement 
caused competitive sports training to became ‘Taylorised’. He 
described how the body came to be treated as a machine and 
training was structured to produce maximum efficiency. 
Interestingly, Frederick Taylor, the originator of scientific 
management in the workplace, was also one of the first to 
introduce efficiency into sports training and sport 
technologies. While Taylor is best known for his work in 
conserving resources and producing maximum efficiency 
throughout the workplace (Taylor and Bedeian, 2007; 
Tenner, 1995), what is less well known about him is the way he 
applied these same principles to sport. Through applying his 
principles to the sports of tennis and golf, he invented and 
patented a number of new technological innovations (Taylor 
and Bedeian, 2007). Taylor was ahead of his time in 
determining that the design of the equipment utilised in sport 
could strongly influence one’s ability in the game. He believed 
that ‘there is a best way of doing everything’ (Taylor, 1912, 
cited in Taylor and Bedeian, 2007, p. 196) and applied this 
principle to sport in exactly the same way that athletes, coaches 
and scientists approach competitive sport today. Taylor 
patented two different tennis rackets, one with a spoon-shaped 
handle to allow very low or high shots to be returned more 
easily and one with double thickness in the middle of the 
strings to prevent fraying (Taylor and Bedeian, 2007). In golf, 
Taylor has been credited with inventing a number of features 
that have become commonplace in clubs today. He crafted 
himself an ‘extra-long, large-headed driver’ (Taylor and 
Bedeian, 2007 p. 199) and invented the concept of placing 
ridges on the face of clubs, allowing the golfer to produce 
backspin. 
Taylorist methods became popular in sport during the 
early twentieth century, with coaches and athletes quickly 
seeing the potential for improved performance through 
adopting Taylor’s efficiency-focused practices (Tenner, 1995). 
Accordingly, the related concept of enhancing the 
technological implements and equipment used to play sport in 
order to improve results has now become commonplace. 
However, what this chapter addresses is the way that many of 
these new innovations are not seamlessly introduced into 
sporting practice. Instead, many new enhancements are either 
rejected outright by athletes or organisations, or create 
immense discussion and controversy between sports 
participants. Even as early as 1909 Taylor had one of his 
inventions, the Y-shaped putter, banned from golf on the 
grounds that it went against the rules of the sport, which had 
to be upheld in order to keep it pure (Taylor and 
Bedeian, 2007). 
Butryn (2003) provides an excellent summary of 
literature examining resistance to technology. First, he 
describes how some theorists have raised concerns over the 
impact of new technologies on athlete autonomy (see 
Sage, 1998). The argument here is that if sport becomes 
dominated by technology, then athletes will have fewer 
opportunities for personal expression, and the workings of 
sport will be determined by the limits of the technologies rather 
than by the athletes themselves. Similarly, he notes how one 
unintended consequence of some new technologies has been 
an increase in injuries (see also Tenner, 1995). There is also an 
understanding of technologies adding to the ‘dehumanisation’ 
of sport (see Rintala, 1995; Simon 1994). In terms of 
dehumanisation, it is argued that athletes and spectators desire 
sport to be a contest of human endeavour, not a competition 
about who has the most effective technology. 
Butryn himself argues against the technological 
determinist stance adopted by the above authors. Instead, he 
takes the cyborg-athlete as a given. Butryn (2003, p. 18) 
describes: 
Viewing elite athletes as cyborgs who are inextricably tied to a range of sport technologies 
helps to alleviate the tension between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ athletes and performances, 
because it carries with it the recognition that elite athletes do not simply enter into 
competitions as technological tabulae rasae. Rather, athletes have interacted with and 
been shaped by various technologies since birth. 
This quote is similar to the ANT stance on the technologisation 
of athletes. From an ANT perspective, the notion of a human 
body that is non-cyborgified does not exist. ANT emphasises 
that in all sports the human body is assembled with various 
equipment in order for the sport to take place. The 
runner assembles with shoes and a running track, and the 
basketballer with a basketball, backboards and a wooden court. 
These items form as much a part of each sport as the players. 
Butryn (2003), in his study of elite athletes and their attitudes 
towards athletic equipment, found that, although the above 
fears of having their bodies corrupted exist in relation to 
doping and medical equipment, their attitudes to what he 
terms implement technologies (those technologies used in the 
act of playing the sport) ranged from embracing innovations in 
line with the goal of improvement, to discarding them, to 
complete indifference. Butryn expresses surprise that athletes 
chose not to adhere to the ‘win at all costs’ philosophy in not 
utilising all the implements or rehabilitative technologies at 
their disposal, despite these athletes competing at the very 
highest level. This is one of the questions examined in this 
chapter, with the case study of kayaking offering a possible 
explanation for why athletes are not always immediately keen 
to utilise new technological improvements. 
Other studies of technology in sport have emphasised 
the influence of the human or social in determining whether 
new technological enhancements are adopted. For example, 
Pinch and Henry (1999) use an SSK (sociology of scientific 
knowledge) approach to examine the process of technological 
innovation in motor sport. They describe how the difference 
between SSK and ANT approaches is the weighting given to 
non-humans in the innovation process. ANT emphasises the 
importance of treating humans and non-humans in a 
symmetrical manner. While SSK acknowledges the importance 
of non-humans, those working from this approach accuse ANT 
of tending too far towards technological determinism. 
Regardless of this difference in the approach, Pinch and 
Henry’s (1999) work provides an excellent example of how 
technological decisions are not always made to enhance 
performance, but rather are subject to ideas from a huge 
number of groups with a variety of agendas. 
Pinch and Henry describe a large number of groups who 
have shaped the technological innovations utilised in motor 
sport, including ‘the teams, their sponsors, the television 
companies, and the regulators of motor sport’. For example, 
they describe how the sponsors are torn by the desire to make 
the sport more exciting while also keeping it safe. The pressure 
to keep sponsors happy results in those involved directly in the 
sport feeling that it is external bodies without any technical 
knowledge of motor sport who end up directing the trajectory 
of innovations. For example, it is surprising how the design of 
the cars can be altered for a reason completely external to the 
racing, such as the ‘wings’ in the car being made larger in order 
to accommodate a larger area to place advertising (Pinch and 
Henry, 1999, p. 667). However, in order to resist pressure from 
external groups, the racing teams were revealed to be 
unexpectedly collaborative: 
The majority of teams will group together to block a radical solution from one 
manufacturer if it threatens to produce cars that are much faster than all the other designs. 
Hence, there have been certain approaches (such as active suspension systems or turbo 
charging) that have been killed off, either in their infancy or at some later stage, through 
the regulative processes surrounding motor sport. (Pinch and Henry, 1999, p. 668) 
This statement reveals how the teams are aware of the 
importance of retaining a close competitive race in order for 
their sport to continue to be viable and attractive to spectators. 
Like Butryn’s (2003) study, it shows how teams do not 
deliberately enhance their cars in order to gain an advantage, 
even though it is commonly assumed that gaining an 
advantage in performance is the ultimate goal of every athlete. 
A central theme in Latour’s (1987) work is how 
innovations are not created as inventions by a single individual 
but instead come into practice through a number of iterations 
involving large numbers of humans and non-humans. This 
idea is shared by SSK and discussed by Pinch and Henry 
(1999), who describe how, although there are individual 
designers who are respected for their design abilities, the 
designer’s role is more about being part of a team than acting 
individually. 
Similarly, ANT and SSK share an interest in the trajectory 
of innovation, in how technology comes into existence through 
an unpredictable pathway in which some avenues are closed 
down and others followed through (Pinch and Henry, 1999). 
Both approaches acknowledge that the trajectory that an 
invention follows is not necessarily the result of technical input 
but may depend on a variety of social and economic factors. In 
being interested in trajectories, the central question then 
becomes why are some technological enhancements easily 
adopted and become part of a sport, while others are never 
used. To examine this question, ANT theorists have generally 
deployed the concept of enrolment. 
Enrolment 
The central question tackled in this chapter, and discussed in 
other chapters of this book, is the question of why certain 
pieces of technology are enrolled or not enrolled within the 
sports environment. This question is one that ANT 
is particularly well designed to answer, as the notion of 
enrolment is one of its central concepts. 
Callon (1986) developed the concept of enrolment to 
examine precisely the mobilisation process that involves actors 
being integrated into a network working towards a common 
goal. In his heavily cited article examining the domestication of 
the scallops of Saint-Brieuc Bay, Callon describes the enrolment 
process as occurring in three phases: 
problematisation, intéressement and finally enrolment. The first 
step, problematisation, involves defining the problem and 
identifying potential actors to be introduced to create a solution 
(Callon, 1986; Tatnall and Davey, 2005). For the solution to be 
reached, an ‘obligatory passage point’ must be negotiated, 
which involves the alignment of the viewpoints of those 
involved, also known as ‘intéressement’ (Callon, 1986; Tatnall 
and Davey, 2005). ‘Intéressement’ consists of individual actants 
reinterpreting the problem in the context of their own concerns 
thereby motivating them to assist with a solution (Star and 
Griesemer, 1999). Latour (1991) describes this process as the 
alignment of points of view through using the example of a 
hotel manager and hotel guests aligning their goals to ensure a 
hotel key is returned. In this example, Latour describes how the 
addition of a heavy weight to the hotel key ensures the keys are 
returned to the hotel desk to the manager’s satisfaction and 
removed from the pockets of the guests to their immense relief, 
leading to a solution which satisfies both parties. Although in 
his landmark article Callon (1986) describes the process 
of intéressement as the researchers or scientists attempting to 
impose their point of view on the scallops and fishermen, Star 
and Griesemer (1999) argue that intéressementis wider than the 
imposition of one point of view on the other: that it is the 
alignment of goals from multiple viewpoints which cannot be 
understood from a single viewpoint. The third phase, 
enrolment, involves the stabilisation of the roles of the parties 
involved where all are working effectively towards a common 
goal (Callon, 1986; Tatnall and Davey, 2005). 
A central component of the enrolment process is the 
concept of translation. Latour (1991) argues that the only way 
for intéressement to be achieved (or for points of view to be 
aligned) is for each actant to translate, or reinterpret, the 
situation into one which they were prepared to be part of the 
solution of. In order for enrolment to occur, it is not necessary 
for all actors to agree, but they must agree that a particular 
outcome is desirable. They agree on this by translating and 
understanding the situation in different ways. For example, the 
hotel manager’s desire that the hotel keys are returned to the 
hotel is translated by the hotel guests as them wanting to rid 
themselves of the heavy weight attached to the keys 
(Latour, 1991). Both result in the desired outcome of the keys 
being returned to the hotel, but for very different reasons. 
Callon and Law (1982, p. 618) describe the necessity of actors 
pursuing the ‘imputed interests’ of others to enrol them 
successfully. Actors make their case through translating their 
own interests into the perceived interests of others. The goal is 
for the others to be successfully enrolled into the project and 
thereby fall into line in assisting with the project’s success. In 
translating their interests into their perceived notions of the 
interests of others and therefore attempting to enrol them, 
actors are essentially attempting to impose their version of 
order on the world. 
A discussion of how new technologies may be rejected 
despite their effectiveness is provided by Trabal (2008), who, 
through adopting some ideas from Latour, describes how new 
kayak designs failed to be used by the top kayakers in France. 
Case study: kayaking in France, Patrick Trabal 
Trabal (2008) examined the introduction of a new flatwater 
single-seater kayak (K1) designed to offer the athlete greater 
stability in the water and therefore potentially faster times. A 
technician involved in the creation of the boat questioned 
whether the boat would actually be used by identifying two 
potential areas of resistance. First, the organisational body, the 
French National Canoe and Kayak Federation, was argued to 
be slow to change. Second, the top athletes were identified as 
being in opposition to change. Overall, the policy seemed to be 
that the preferred course of action was to use what had worked 
elsewhere rather than developing innovations. The results of 
this policy, as described by one technician, were that the French 
team was ‘one Olympiad too late’ (Trabal, 2008, p. 314). 
While the above paragraph identifies certain groups as 
resistant or in opposition to new developments, Trabal (2008, 
p. 317) describes how, just like Latour, he wishes to be 
‘symmetrical’. He aims to avoid judging groups as for or 
against, instead acknowledging that a range of actors can affect 
the adoption of new technological developments. In order to 
understand why a new design of boat could not easily be 
adopted by the kayaking community, Trabal used three 
methods. First, he conducted a questionnaire of all the top 
kayaking athletes at the time. He then conducted thirteen 
interviews with coaches and technical staff. Finally, he visited 
training sites and talked informally with athletes, coaches and 
technicians. 
Overall, Trabal describes how the questionnaire found 
that the athletes’ attitudes to new technologies were generally 
positive. The majority expressed an interest in technical 
improvements in their sport, as well as being comfortable with 
and happy using common technologies such as computers. 
However, as Trabal (2008, p. 322) points out, these are ‘only 
words’. By contrast, in one of the interviews, the complexity of 
the situation beyond these positive words begins to be 
revealed: 
Researcher: To come back to the latest K1, if it was suggested that you use it here on this 
site, would you agree or not? 
Coach 1: Well, yes! If we are told: OK, you’ve got this boat to test, here’s the construction 
protocol, here’s the means to do it, and here are two or three extras, well yes! 
Researcher: And you think that the athletes would agree? 
Coach 1: Yes, but, well … in the end … 
Coach 2: They have to realise that it’s an opportunity! 
Coach 1: But how are we going to sell it to them? What is clear is that it should have been 
sold to us before. But even if it’s been sold to us, we will need the means to be able to sell 
it to others. 
This extract is a good example of Latour (1991) and Callon’s 
(1986) notion of enrolment or, as is often the more common 
case, lack of enrolment. Three groups are identified here: the 
Federation, the coaches and the athletes, and all three groups 
come to the boat issue with different attitudes. The difficulty of 
groups working together who come to an issue with different 
points of view is one that has been investigated extensively by 
ANT theorists, as in the example of Callon’s (1986) study of the 
domestication of scallops. In this case, Trabal explains that the 
different views on the boat come about through each group 
focusing on a different way of testing its effectiveness, and their 
belief in the boat. Some use an artificial testing tank, others 
argue for races, but the other ingredient is always the belief. 
Trabal (2008, p. 326) explains: 
Scientific justifications based on curves and readings, a metrology spanning over the 
number of medals, sensations of the athletes in the grips of dealing with the boat, cannot 
separately suffice. Belief or non-belief in the project is a matter of adjusting to all these 
arguments. ‘It needs to be sold’ said the coach. Just like a sales representative in the throes 
of trying to convince his client must mobilize all the resources at his disposal (a ‘product 
brochure’ containing the measurements, understanding of the psychology of the person 
opposite, subjective descriptions of its uses, etc.), it is through a range of approaches that 
the conviction can be fostered. 
This description clearly outlines why enrolment and adoption 
of the boat, have not occurred. The arguments for the 
improvements the boat offers had not been explained to the 
athletes and coaches in a way that allowed these two groups to 
see the benefits offered to them. Instead, the athletes and 
coaches trusted their own knowledge and understanding of 
what would improve their performance over that of the 
technicians who developed the boat. For example, some of the 
athletes tested the boat by sitting at the front, despite the advice 
of the technicians that improved results would be obtained by 
sitting further back. The athletes did not heed the advice of the 
technicians because their own experience led them to believe 
they knew best about where in the boat one should sit for 
maximum effect. The technicians may have had the knowledge 
of the boat and its physics, but the athletes’ understanding 
came from their own experiences and feeling of being in boats, 
and the two groups had difficulty reconciling their different 
views. 
The survey performed by Trabal (2008, p. 322) also 
reveals the different understandings of what was the best boat. 
Table 1 demonstrates the very wide range of views held 
by athletes and a lack of agreement about what the most 
effective boat would be. This was even before discussions 
around the technical qualities of the boat. It also illustrates the 
breadth of the network involving in boat-building. The athlete, 
coach, laboratory and current world champion are all raised as 
potential influences in the creation of a new boat. 
Table 1 
Participant responses regarding the best boat 
 
Line 
racing 
(n = 29) 
Slalom 
(n = 
31) 
Descent 
(n = 27) 
The best boat … is the current world champion’s boat 3.96 2.93 2.59 
The best boat … is mine! 4.86 6.12 6.31 
The best boat is the one I will have built in collaboration with a 
constructor 
5.37 6.61 5.11 
The best boat is the one studied in the laboratory 4.30 2.97 4.00 
The best boat is the one my coach will recommend 4.19 3.47 4.30 
I am not very informed of the latest technological 
developments in boat-building 
4.25 3.29 3.37 
There is no such thing as the right boat; it is the right athlete 
that counts 
6.22 6.90 5.58 
All competitors should have the same boat 3.61 0.77 2.80 
Source: Trabal, 2008, p. 322 
The high result achieved by ‘There is no such thing as the 
right boat, it is the right athlete that counts’ also suggests that 
athletes do not rate the boat as highly significant for success, 
which could be another contributing factor to why a new boat 
was not enrolled easily. This indicates the relative importance 
of the boat in the minds of the athletes, with it appearing that 
athletes ranked the boat as not as important as their own 
training. While, at times, other authors have been surprised at 
athletes’ lack of knowledge or interest in new technology (see, 
for example, Butryn, 2003), Trabal comes to the realisation that 
whether an athlete or coach is interested in technology is 
almost the wrong question. Instead, he reveals how the 
network of elite sport contains a huge number of components 
and it is impossible for athletes/coaches to spend all the time 
they would like on every one of these. For athletes, time is a 
commodity, and they must be careful how they use this 
important resource (Woodward, 2013). Lack of time means 
they must choose to focus on those components they feel will 
result in the most success. For some athletes and coaches, 
technology is one of these components; others might see other 
factors, such as strength training or psychology training, as a 
higher priority. Either way, athletes and coaches make 
deliberate choices about how to spend their limited time and 
so do not adopt technological enhancements easily simply 
because a technician or scientist says they work. Many other 
options also work effectively, but athletes have limited time, so 
must choose the combination of options that works best for 
them within the time they have. Consequently, their particular 
actor-network may or may not include enhanced technology. 
Emphasising elite sport as existing as a socio-technical 
network demonstrates how it is inaccurate to frame athletes 
and coaches as for or against new technological developments. 
Rather, elite sport training is a constant process of weighing up 
which aspects can create the most effective performance, and 
new enhancements or technologies are merely one variable 
that athletes must consider. Viewing athletic performance as a 
network ensures that the enrolment or non-enrolment of a 
piece of technology can be understood in relation to the other 
aspects of the sport. This is an important point for elite sport 
programmes and for technology manufacturers to be aware of. 
Managers or manufacturers often focus purely on the 
effectiveness of a piece of technology and thus make the 
assumption that athletes and coaches will enrol the technology 
because scientific tests reveal it to be effective. But as Trabal’s 
(2008) study shows, athletes may already have their own 
network that they believe to be effective for themselves, and 
lack the time or inclination to investigate alternatives, and it is 
only through understanding the athletes’ actor-networks that 
this can become apparent. 
The case of the kayak highlighted two particularly 
important aspects for understanding how and why 
technological enhancements are not necessarily seamlessly 
adopted by athletes and coaches. First, viewing the athlete as a 
network emphasises how each athlete has their own very 
particular actor-network and their own individual views on 
what will be most effective for enhancing their own network. 
Therefore, an athlete is not likely to enrol any new 
technological enhancements without careful consideration of 
how it may affect their network as well as their performance. 
Second, determining whether a new enhancement will 
improve performance can be surprisingly difficult. There may 
be several ways that technologies can be tested in order to test 
their value, and different groups see different methods as 
valuable. Nevertheless, the final decision comes down to how 
athletes assemble with the new enhancements. I will now 
explore these aspects and others through examining the 
prominent case of the competitive swimsuit. 
Case study: the competitive swimsuit, 1992–2010 
One of the roles of international sporting federations is to set 
the rules for their sport. Rules perform a number of roles, 
including determining that the winner of the event is the 
participant(s) who performed most effectively at the particular 
activity deemed necessary in that sport. But in many cases 
technologies can perform sporting activities more effectively 
than humans can. For example, a boat can travel much faster 
through water than a human. Therefore, it is up to sporting 
bodies to ensure that each sport remains a contest of human 
abilities, with technologies generally regulated to limit the 
effect they have on the human body. In this sense, sporting 
federations and ANT theorists are interested in the same thing: 
how do you determine whether technology has acted? The 
following case study examines the International Swimming 
Federation’s (FINA) efforts to answer this question in relation 
to setting swimsuit regulations for World and Olympic 
competition. 
FINA’s swimsuit regulations 
In 2009 FINA rewrote the competitive swimming regulations, 
to take effect from 1 January 2010. The new rules required that 
swimsuits met double the number of criteria that they had in 
2009 in order to gain FINA approval, which included passing 
fourteen distinct tests. These tests were developed with the aim 
of determining whether the swimsuit had the capacity to 
‘affect’ swimmers’ performances in a way that was illegal 
based on the rules of the sport. They include multiple tests for 
buoyancy, body compression, body coverage, roughness and 
thickness. Undertaking the tests requires the use of a variety of 
equipment, including scanners, measuring tools and an 
underwater camera (Manson, 2010), demonstrating that the 
addition of the new rules included the expansion of the 
swimming network to include a variety of test mechanisms 
that were not previously required. This expansion of the 
swimming network was deemed necessary owing to FINA’s 
determination that a particular type of popular swimsuit – the 
full-body, polyurethane suit – had impacted on swimming 
results in a significant way for several years, culminating in the 
World Championships in 2009. 
A brief history of controversial swimsuit designs 
Several authors, including Magdalinski (2009) and Craik 
(2011), have chronicled the development of what are 
sometimes referred to as ‘plastic’ suits from their beginnings in 
the 1990s. Both Magdalinski and Craik agree that the first 
swimsuit that created any controversy was Speedo’s 
Aquablade, worn by 77 per cent of the winners at the 1996 
Atlanta Olympic Games. This was the first time that suspicions 
were raised that a swimsuit might be having too much ‘effect’ 
by providing athletes who wore the suit with an unfair 
advantage, owing to the high percentage of gold medal 
winners who wore the suits (Magdalinski, 2009). The next suit 
to cause controversy was the Speedo Fastskin, developed in 
1999. This suit differed from all other previous swimsuits, 
owing to the way it covered the whole body. Prior to this, suits 
had consisted of relatively brief attire, and Craik (2011) argues 
that the appearance of swimmers now swathed in black, was 
shocking to many spectators and contributed to suspicions 
about the suit. The suit was also different in deviating from the 
traditional nylon-based fabrics used to make swimsuits, with 
its surface designed to resemble sharkskin. 
The next revolution in swimsuit technology has been 
identified as occurring in 2008, with the launch of the Speedo 
LZR Racer (Berthelot et al., 2010; Magdalinski, 2009). In 
contrast to the Fastskin of 2000, the Speedo LZR Racer included 
quite a different global network. At the production level, 
Speedo boasted of the use of NASA’s wind tunnels, Ansys 
fluid flow analysis software, the water flume at Otago 
University, New Zealand, and scientists from NASA, Otago 
University, the University of Nottingham and Iowa State 
University (Barak, 2012; Craik, 2011; Matthews, 2008). The suit 
was produced through first identifying that a particular blend 
of elastane nylon significantly reduced friction in comparison 
with shaved human skin. Next, it was established that certain 
parts of the human body produced large amounts of drag, and 
that these were reduced if polyurethane panels were placed 
over those body sections. Finally, in order to minimise both 
friction and drag, the suit was not sewn together, but rather 
‘bonded by acoustic vibrations’, resulting in a seamless suit 
(Matthews, 2008, p. 32). 
Following the Speedo LZR Racer in 2008, a range of suits 
using similar technology appeared in 2009, the most popular 
being the Jaked J01 and the Arena Powerskin X-Glide (Neiva et 
al., 2011). The major difference between the new suits and the 
LZR Racer was that the new models were 100 per cent 
polyurethane, rather than only 50 per cent. 
At the beginning of 2009, FINA’s ruling was that suits 
could only be a maximum of 50 per cent non-permeable 
material, using the argument that the material traps air, 
thereby increasing a swimmer’s buoyancy. However, swimsuit 
manufacturers Arena, BlueSeventy and Jaked argued that 
there was no proof that buoyancy was increased and 
threatened to sue FINA if they banned the suits. Consequently, 
at the World Championships in Rome, 2009, all types of suits 
were legal, and an unprecedented forty-three world records 
were broken (Harvey, 2009; Neiva et al., 2011). The 2009 World 
Championships have now become notorious in swimming 
history, owing to the allowance of the wide range of swimsuits 
and the high number of records broken. 
In 2009 FINA finally voted against the use of fully body 
suits, with the new rule introduced on 1 January 2010. As 
previously noted, the new rules expanded the swimming 
network to include fourteen new tests and their respective 
testing equipment in order for swimsuits to be approved for 
world and Olympic competition (Mason, 2011). 
 
The enrolment of swimsuits by swimmers 
From 1999 onward many swimmers enthusiastically enrolled 
the full-body swimsuits, in the belief that wearing them would 
produce faster performances. This argument is consistent with 
the ‘classic’ argument discussed earlier in the chapter that 
technology is primarily enrolled in sport in order to enhance 
performance. For example, multi-Olympic gold medallist from 
Australia Grant Hackett described how ‘You feel so 
streamlined through the water. It’s like you’re cutting through 
the water like a hot knife through butter’ (cited in Craik, 2011, 
p. 72). This quote demonstrates Hackett’s belief in the 
improvement in his performance that resulted from wearing 
the Speedo Fastskin. 
Hackett’s quote suggests that the Fastskin was easily 
enrolled into the sport because intéressement was easily 
achieved. The goals of the swimmers, in wanting to achieve 
faster times, were met. The goals of the manufacturers, in 
wanting the most successful swimmers to wear their 
swimsuits, merged perfectly. The goal of the international 
swimming regulatory body FINA to raise the profile of 
swimming was also met through the possibility of more world 
records being broken as a result of the suits, making the sport 
more exciting for spectators to watch. There suits were 
available from a range of manufacturers. While prior to the 
Sydney Olympic Games there were some issues regarding 
availability, which almost led to the suits being banned from 
the USA Olympic trials owing to the unfairness of not all 
athletes being able to access them (Magdalinski, 2009; 
Newberry, 2000), by the time the games took place there were 
a range of manufacturers offering this style of suit, all keen for 
the top athletes to wear their suits. The suits also acted as a 
perfect intermediary (see Chapter 1) through ensuring that 
they improved athletes’ speed every time they were worn. 
These points of view were all in agreement, and thus this style 
of suit was adopted and soon became the norm. 
Nonetheless, consistent with the kayakers in Trabal’s 
(2008) study, not all swimmers immediately adopted the 
wearing of what were understood to be the ‘best’ suits at the 
time. Instead, the networks of many swimmers included 
sponsors who acted to complicate what may appear on the 
surface to be a simple case of performance enhancement. The 
connections between individual swimmers, swimming teams 
and their sponsors all strongly affected the enrolment of 
various swimsuits. 
Leading into the 2008 Olympic Games, the Speedo LZR 
Racer was believed by swimmers to be the most effective suit 
on the market. The media, who followed this controversy 
closely, reported that teams who were sponsored by Speedo, 
such as the already strong USA and Australian teams, were 
believed to be at an advantage by having easy access to the 
Speedo LZR Racer. Other national teams were felt to be at a 
disadvantage, which led to some swimmers and teams 
switching allegiances. Japan dropped its contracts with 
Mizuno 8022 and other firms in order to wear the LZR Racer. 
Italy, sponsored by Arena, agreed to allow its athletes to wear 
the LZR Racer as long as they paid a fine. But German 
swimmers were required to retain their links with Adidas and 
therefore were not allowed to wear the LZR Racer. Arena also 
accused Speedo of producing a culture of uncertainty and 
confusion through pressuring athletes over the need to wear 
their swimsuits (Matheson, 2008). These arrangements 
therefore strongly affected which swimmers were able to wear 
the LZR Racer, with sponsorship deals both facilitating and 
preventing enrolment. These examples demonstrate how the 
networks of the swimmers, in holding particular sponsorship 
arrangements, was of much greater significance in determining 
the enrolment of swimsuits. The belief in their performance 
enhancement value may have contributed strongly to 
swimmers’ desire to wear the suits, but the reality of the 
network of swimming, by including very particular 
sponsorship arrangements, did not make enrolment possible. 
At the same time there was an actant with the power to 
disrupt this arrangement: FINA. In 2008, in an attempt to level 
the playing field, FINA responded to the concerns by insisting 
that all swimwear manufacturers must make their suits 
available to all Olympic competitors. On the one hand, this 
allowed the enrolment of the LZR Racer by all swimming 
competitors. On the other, it severely disrupted the swimming 
network by providing Speedo with an advantage. One 
journalist (Matheson, 2008) argued that the ruling only 
benefited Speedo, with the belief in the superior nature of their 
suits being so strong that 90 per cent of swimmers opted to 
wear the LZR Racer at the 2008 Olympic Games – albeit many 
of them with the Speedo logo blacked out, to avoid breaking 
sponsorship agreements. 
In following the swimming network further through the 
extensive media coverage, to encompass the position of 
swimming manufacturers, we find that there is no doubt that 
Speedo benefited financially from FINA’s ruling. One news 
report claimed that after 2008, Speedo’s market share of men’s 
swimwear rose from 64 per cent to 76 per cent (Lloyd, 2008). A 
different journalist argued that this was due not just to the 
suits, but partly to Speedo’s actor-network, including the 
sponsorship of swimming phenomenon Michael Phelps. The 
same journalist estimated that Phelps’s airtime produced US 
$3.6 million for Speedo (Matheson, 2008). 
At the 2009 World Championships a year later, the 
situation had changed. With other manufacturers following in 
Speedo’s lead and creating their own high-technology suits, 
swimmers had a range of options available to them. The suits 
believed to be the most effective in 2009 were not those 
produced by Speedo; they were instead the 100 per cent 
polyurethane suits such as the Jaked J01 and the Arena 
Powerskin X-Glide. However, not all athletes chose to wear 
these suits. Journalists noted how Michael Phelps opted to stick 
with the LZR Racer despite its being only 50 per cent 
polyurethane (Diaz, 2009), as did British 2008 Olympic gold 
medallist Rebecca Adlington (Hart, 2009). 
The decisions made by Phelps and Adlington to stick 
with Speedo rather than moving to a 100 per cent polyurethane 
suit demonstrate that the decisions of athletes to work with 
particular technologies are based on a wide network rather 
than simply being based on which is the superior product. In 
the case of both these athletes, their network included a long-
standing close association with Speedo, which meant that 
media reports such as the one by Hart (2009) interpreted their 
stance as demonstrating loyalty to the brand. It is 
understandable that swimmers who are earning significant 
amounts of money from their sponsors may wish to remain 
loyal to them because of that financial incentive. It could 
therefore be argued that there are two conflicting 
understandings of professional swimmers making such 
decisions: on the one hand, that of the swimmer as a competitor 
who wishes to win the race at all costs; on the other, that of the 
swimmer as a member of a sport not renowned for large 
potential earnings wanting to continue to benefit financially. 
Most of the time these two understandings align, but not 
always. In the case of swimming, this conflict appears through 
the non-human entity of the swimsuit. The swimsuit acts as the 
publicly visible proof of the swimmer’s network. The brand 
and style of the swimsuit are easily identifiable and clearly 
demonstrate the swimmer’s choice. There were a range of 
choices that swimmers made based on national or financial 
loyalties. 
For example, while Phelps and Adlington remained 
loyal to Speedo, the American Dara Torres switched suits from 
the LZR Racer to a Jaked with the logo blacked out because she 
did not qualify for the semi-finals in her first event wearing the 
Speedo suit. In a media interview she described blacking out 
the logo to avoid causing any difficulties with her Speedo 
sponsor, but said she believed wearing the Jaked would make 
her more competitive: 
I don’t want to get myself in trouble … Obviously I’m sponsored by Speedo. But everyone 
here is wearing these suits and they seem to be going fast. The times are kind of 
outrageous, what’s going on here. I feel like if you want to be on par with everyone, you 
have to do what they’re doing. (Torres, cited in Newberry, 2009, para. 8) 
Torres here articulates the conflict between the desire to 
succeed and the pressure of sponsorship. Ironically, sports 
journalist Karen Crouse (2009) argues that, far from the suits 
providing an unfair advantage, the rules that 
required manufacturers to make all their suits available to all 
competitors created a more level playing field. Crouse (2009, p. 
B11) claimed: 
The suits had a democratizing effect on the results, levelling the playing field for countries 
that have long been playing catch-up to the United States and Australia. At the 2007 World 
Championships, those two countries accounted for 30 of the 40 victories. In Rome [the 
2009 World Championships], they finished with 13 as swimmers from 17 countries won 
gold medals. 
While Crouse does not provide any evidence that it was the 
swimsuits alone that accounted for these results, it is an 
interesting explanation in the light of the usual assumption that 
new technologies can make sport unfair by giving those with 
access to them an unfair advantage. This is quite different from 
the more common situation where new technological 
advancements are only available to those with the economic 
power to access them, such as the case of altitude chambers, 
which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
The enrolment and non-enrolment of swimsuits as facilitated 
by FINA 
Like all international sports federations, FINA’s role in its sport 
takes multiple forms. FINA is required to promote swimming 
and ensure the financial viability of the sport, which, as with 
the swimmers, includes negotiations with sponsors on a 
constant basis. But FINA is also responsible for setting the 
rules, and for ensuring that the rules are followed. With regard 
to this second point, FINA’s primary role was to determine 
whether the swimsuits had acted to improve performances in 
an illegal way. As discussed in Chapter 1, determining whether 
non-humans have acted can be extremely difficult, and the case 
of the swimsuits proved to be particularly challenging for 
FINA. 
The discussion of the potential banning of full-length 
swimsuits began as early as 2000, with questions being raised 
about the full-body suits. At the time the regulations set by 
FINA stated: 
FINA rule SW 10.8: ‘No swimmer shall be permitted to use or wear any device that may 
aid his speed, buoyancy or endurance during a competition (such as webbed gloves, fins, 
etc). Goggles may be worn.’ (FINA, cited in Craik, 2011, p. 73) 
Following the 2000 Olympic Games there was considerable 
debate about whether the Fastskin suit was a ‘device’ that 
aided ‘speed, buoyancy or endurance’. Given that FINA was 
unable to produce any definitive evidence that the suit did aid 
speed, buoyance or endurance, the argument in this area 
centred on whether this suit was a device or a costume. As 
fashion theorist Jennifer Craik (2011) argues, the swimsuit was 
unsettling because it contrasted so strongly with the swimwear 
as worn over the last century. While swimsuit debates had 
historically centred on the accusation of swimwear being too 
brief, this suit instead covered the entire body. As such, the 
swimmer was transformed into a completely different figure 
from what the public was used to seeing. This example 
demonstrates Latour’s and Venn’s notion of how ideas can be 
folded into new technologies and how their effect can vary as 
a result of what is folded within (Latour and Venn, 2002). In 
this case, the idea of a swimmer having a very visible body was 
so strongly folded into the idea of competitive swimming that 
the appearance of a swimmer swathed in a black suit from 
wrist to ankle was alien and shocking. Therefore it is 
understandable that it would be easy for the audience to see 
the suit as a device rather than a normal swimming costume, 
even though FINA did not seen any grounds to ban the suit at 
the time. 
Craik’s (2011) argument is a good example of the way 
ANT can draw attention to what is elsewhere termed ‘affect 
theory’. Thrift (2008) argues that a weakness of ANT is that it 
does not allow for the consideration of human emotions, since 
emotions are a purely human phenomenon and ANT argues 
against the existence of a ‘pure’ human. By contrast, I argue 
that the above example demonstrates how emotional affect can 
potentially be ‘folded’ into a technology as part of the network 
that makes up that particular technology. In this case, Craik 
(2011) argues that the reaction to the appearance of swimmers 
swathed in black full-body suits was one of shock, which 
suggests that that shock then becomes part of the network of 
this style of suit. 
Nonetheless, despite the reactions of shock that 
spectators experienced, at this point FINA did not see any 
grounds to ban the suit. They could not find any evidence that 
the suit broke any particular swimming regulation. As a result, 
swimmers very quickly adopted it as their preferred style of 
suit, and it soon became the norm for the competitive 
swimming body to be seen covered in a full-body black suit. 
In 2008, with the invention of the 100 per cent Speedo 
LZR Racer, the question of whether full-body suits should be 
banned was raised again. The large number of world records 
broken in 2008 and 2009 created a belief that the suits must 
produce some sort of unnatural assistance, and should 
therefore be banned. Yet the effects of the suits were not equal 
for everyone. Some swimmers benefited more from the new 
suits than others. Some swimmers posted spectacular times 
while wearing the full-body suits and far slower times without, 
while others posted similar times in both scenarios. For 
example, in the 200m breaststroke, Rebecca Soni is one of the 
few swimmers whose times have improved since 2010 despite 
the suits being banned. Journalist Karen Crouse (2010) 
described her as being renowned for having a very unusual 
breaststroke technique, including possessing a very strong 
core, meaning the suit would not be of as much benefit to her. 
Similarly, in an interview with Crouse (2009, p. D1) Soni’s 
coach, Dave Salo, explains that the suits give all swimmers an 
ideal physique, rather than one created by hard work and 
athleticism: ‘A lot of kids who aren’t in very good shape can 
put on one of these suits and be streamlined like seals.’ In a 
different media interview, retired Olympic gold medallist 
Duncan Armstrong argued that the suits compress the body 
and therefore allow it to sit higher in the water: ‘That’s why 
you do thousands of hours in the pool, working on your hand 
pitch and your strength, to be able to sit higher in the water. 
Once you sit higher, you swim across the water – not through 
it. Once you swim across it, you’re faster’ (Harvey, 2009, p. 61). 
Kainuma et al. (2009, p. 69) agreed with Salo and Armstrong 
by arguing: 
the corset-like grip of the suit supports and holds the swimmer so they can maintain the 
best body position in the water without losing flexibility of movement. Furthermore, this 
high-speed swimsuit makes the surface of the swimmer’s body very flat and smooth, thus 
reducing water resistance. 
The second point made by Kainuma et al. (2009) describes the 
suit’s ability to compress the body. Similarly, multi-Olympic 
gold medallist Grant Hackett reported in an interview that he 
was surprised to see some swimmers wearing more than one 
suit in order to maximise the effect of the compression (Millar, 
2008). Kainuma et al. (2009) additionally propose that the 
tightness of the suit, in restricting blood circulation, could be a 
significant factor in improving performance, observing that the 
LZR Racer was particularly effective in short course events but 
not in events longer than 400m, where greater blood circulation 
is required. 
These explanations reveal how the swimsuit technology 
cannot be considered separately from the athletes’ bodies, and 
that therefore swimming must be viewed as an assemblage of 
body and suit. The different bodies of the athletes have as much 
to do with the effectiveness of the suit as the suit’s design. 
According to Salo, bodies that are less strong and toned can 
reap greater benefit from the suits. This argument is confirmed 
by the popularity of the suits at the Masters swimming level, 
where media reports claim that athletes in their forties or fifties 
have been found to swim faster than they did in their twenties 
by wearing the suits (see, for example, Sataline, 2009). The use 
at Masters level demonstrates how the swimsuit and the body 
acts together as a network assemblage in order to produce 
faster times. Rebecca Soni’s success in improving her times 
after the polyurethane-suit era, including breaking the world 
record at the 2012 Olympics, demonstrates how she has found 
a way to substitute the effect of the suit herself through her own 
training. 
The question of whether the polyurethane suits 
increased buoyancy could not be answered because of the 
different ways that different bodies assembled with the suits. 
The suits had been accused of breaking the rules because they 
increased a swimmer’s buoyancy through trapping air. 
However, sports journalist Harvey (2009) claimed that this was 
unable to be tested because the ability of air to be trapped was 
entirely dependent on the shape of an individual swimmer’s 
body and the fit of the particular suit. Harvey’s claim suggests 
that the determining factor is the network assemblage of body 
and suit, not the swimsuit alone. 
As FINA struggled to determine conclusively whether 
the suits increased buoyancy or aided speed through 
examining the suits themselves, its decision eventually to ban 
the suits was based on different criteria entirely. A report by 
Manson, presented to the FINA Bureau in 2010, details the 
approach that led to their decision to ban full-body swimsuits. 
FINA took the approach of analysing the improvement in 
world record times that occurred between 1992 and 2009. They 
noted that over the long term there were a variety of 
explanations for the constant improvement in times, including 
technique shifts, professionalisation, accessibility of the sport 
for a larger population and technology. But in the short term 
they determined that the number of world records broken at 
the 2009 World Championships (forty-three) was so much 
larger than any previous individual competition that a specific 
factor was almost certainly responsible. They then matched 
this up with the fact that this was the only championships in 
which 100 per cent polyurethane, full-body swimsuits had 
been permitted. Consequently, FINA determined that from 
2010 onwards new types of technology would be enrolled into 
the sport in order to test swimsuits to ensure they met the 
criteria of the new rules. 
The rules prevented swimmers from using any non-
textile material (Craik, 2011; Manson, 2010). Additionally, it 
also banned the use of suits that were fully body-length, with 
men being allowed suits from waist to knee, and women from 
shoulder to knee (FINA 2011). With the introduction of these 
rules, journalists presented doubts about whether any world 
records would be broken in swimming ever again (see, for 
example, Partridge, 2011). However, at the London Olympic 
Games in 2012 eight swimming records were broken, exactly 
the same number as at the Athens Games in 2004, suggesting 
that swimmers are still able to improve their times without 
wearing full-body suits. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has confirmed the value of viewing the athlete, 
and sport, as an actor-network. From this perspective there is 
no doubt that the enrolment of new enhancements to 
technology and equipment is not a simple matter. The 
functionality of the particular enhancement is not necessarily a 
reason for athletes to enrol it. Instead, the athletic process exists 
as a carefully balanced actor-network where athletes have 
limited time and must therefore weigh up the impact of any 
new enhancement on all aspects of their network. For example, 
various swimmers weighed up the impact of using a 
polyurethane swimsuit on their performance as well as on their 
sponsorship agreements. In some cases these two aspects 
aligned, so enrolling the new suit was therefore an easy 
decision. But in others they had to choose between these two 
aspects of their network. At the same time, the athletes’ bodily 
network – their make-up of bones and muscles etc., along with 
their training – determined whether their bodily assembled 
with the suit in a significant way. In some cases the body 
assembled with the suit to produce a far better performance, 
but not in every case. Similarly, in the case of the kayakers, a 
crucial point was the necessity for the athletes to sit further 
back in the boat in order for the new boat to work most 
effectively. But the athletes’ training meant that they were 
familiar with sitting in a particular position in the kayak, and 
changing it might have changed other aspects of the network, 
including how they moved carefully trained body parts. 
Both these examples illustrate Latour’s insistence that 
actor-networks should be understood as rhizomes through 
emphasising the way that every point in the network can 
potentially affect any other point. It is particularly important 
that sports managers, coaches and manufacturers are aware of 
this. Enrolling new enhancements is not as simple as the 
coaches in Trabal’s (2008) study assume, when they argue that 
they need to be sold to athletes in order for athletes to try them. 
The coaches’ assumption oversimplifies the complexity behind 
athletes’ use of technological enhancements. 
Viewing athletes as actor-networks also explains the 
results of Butryn’s (2003) study, which found that athletes 
ranged from enthusiasm to indifference in their discussions of 
implement technologies. For some athletes, technological 
enhancements are of great importance and a significant part of 
their network. For example, Dara Torres explained to the 
media how she felt the need to wear the polyurethane swimsuit 
in order to keep up with other athletes, regardless of her 
sponsorship agreements. For her, ensuring she was using the 
most up-to-date technology was of great importance. By 
contrast, Michael Phelps did not opt to wear the fully 
polyurethane swimsuit; this was clearly a less important part 
of his actor-network than it was for Dara Torres. 
The cases in this chapter also reveal the difficulty of 
determining whether a particular enhancement was effective. 
In kayaking, Trabal’s (2008) survey revealed a variety of ways 
to determine which boat was the most effective, with no clear 
evaluative criteria being identified. Determining how a 
technology acts to affect performance can be extremely 
difficult. This was strongly emphasised by FINA, who could 
not identify particular tests to identify whether the 
polyurethane swimsuits broke any swimming regulations, and 
instead decided to ban the suits purely on the grounds of 
statistical analysis. The rapid increase in times and world 
records set were the only evidence that FINA had for the effect 
of the swimsuits. 
Nonetheless, the evidence was sufficient for FINA to add 
fourteen new tests to their swimsuit requirements. The 
increased complexity of the rules illustrates the way that actor-
networks are continually shifting and expanding, depending 
on the actions of humans (such as swimmers, coaches and 
manufacturers) and technologies (swimsuits) but particularly 
owing to the way these combine to have a transformative effect 
on performance. The result of the transformative action is a 
new inscription in the form of new rules as part of FINA’s 
regulations. The story of the polyurethane swimsuits thus 
becomes folded into these regulations, but the regulations will 
soon become black-boxed, meaning the story of how and why 
such strict regulations came to be required will be obscured 
from view, and perhaps eventually forgotten. 
Both cases discussed in this chapter include technologies 
that were publicly visible. In the two cases the type of boat or 
the type of swimsuit was easily observable. This contrasts 
sharply with other technologies in sport that are either utilised 
only in a training context or used under clothing or in the body, 
rendering them invisible. The following two chapters now 
focus on far less visible technologies: altitude chambers, GPS 
units and doping. 
  
3 
The integration of ‘foreign’ technologies into sporting 
practice 
In 1999 I was employed as a gymnastics coach in the USA, and 
one of the gymnasts I coached was trying to obtain a college 
scholarship. So I enrolled a device foreign to the gymnastics 
environment, a video camera, and brought it to the gymnasium 
to film her performing her routines. Following this exercise, 
she made numerous copies of the videotapes and posted each 
tape to a different college. In this example the enrolment of the 
video camera allowed the performance of the gymnast to be 
made mobile. Indeed, the performance was transformed from 
a live moment in time to one that could be watched as many 
times as desired, through the enrolment of a video camera and 
tape. The video camera and tape acted as intermediaries, in 
allowing the gymnast’s performance to be captured and 
mobilised. 
I am no longer a gymnastics coach, but I continue to be a 
gymnastics fan. As a fan, I particularly enjoy the existence of 
YouTube, in allowing me to view routines that I would not 
otherwise be able to watch from my remote location in New 
Zealand, where elite gymnastics is rarely televised. But my 
searches on YouTube have revealed more than merely elite 
routines; I also come across numerous YouTube sites by 
athletes such as the one I coached in 1999, set up to display their 
performances in order to entice colleges to provide them with 
scholarships. So I am aware that the process of college selection 
has altered since 1999. In one sense it is the same, since the tool 
of video is still utilised to stabilise the routine and to make it 
mobile. However, it is also fundamentally different, as the 
necessity of posting out tapes is no longer required. College 
selectors can instead simply trawl through applicants’ 
YouTube sites in order to view their footage and use it to make 
their decisions. The laborious process of sending out individual 
tapes to each college no longer needs to take place. 
These examples illustrate some of the central concepts of 
this chapter. First, the introduction of foreign technologies into 
sporting environments can act to change sporting processes in 
a variety of ways. The presence of YouTube has changed the 
way that athletes can now make their performances visible to 
college selectors. At the same time, the basic application 
process remains the same, and both the videotape-and-postal-
service method and YouTube act in the same way, as 
intermediaries that make the performances of the gymnasts 
mobile to the selectors. 
As in the above examples, sporting performances and 
processes can be strongly influenced by technology and 
equipment that are not considered a standard part of sport. 
This chapter focuses on the introduction of ‘non-sport’ 
technologies into the sports training environment. It includes 
two case studies: a study of the use of global positioning 
systems (GPS) in Australian rules football (AFL) and an 
examination of the use of technologically constructed hypoxic 
environments (TCHEs), commonly known as altitude 
chambers. The previous chapter introduced the concept of 
enrolment, an ANT idea employed to determine how an actant 
comes to be part of an actor-network, which is also drawn upon 
in this chapter. In particular, both cases highlight the difficulty 
of creating equal opportunities for enrolment. In the case of 
GPS, the difficulty concerns equalities between all teams in the 
league, while for TCHEs the inequalities are reflective of global 
economic disparities. 
This chapter also continues the theme of sport as a socio-
technical network, which runs throughout the book. 
The previous chapter argued that an athlete’s network 
contains a myriad of factors that influence whether athletes 
utilise new enhancements, and this chapter expands on this 
notion by considering how it is that technologies can act to 
produce particular outcomes. GPS units are found to act as 
intermediaries, mediators or as methods of surveillance, all of 
which have very different outcomes. Also included in the 
understanding of a socio-technical network is the argument 
that it is not merely physical objects and humans that make it 
up, but that it has a range of ideas ‘folded’ (Latour and 
Venn, 2002) within it. The incorporation of historical and 
current discourses as part of the network is considered through 
the case of TCHEs. With TCHEs I argue that the range of 
discourses connected to an understanding of these 
technologies together with an athlete’s individual network 
strongly influences enrolment and use of the devices. 
The ANT conception of power 
One focus of this chapter is the notion of ‘technologies as 
actants’ within the socio-technical network that makes up 
sport. The chapter therefore illustrates how examining the 
network reveals the power relations within it, often through 
the production or prevention of action. 
The ANT perspective conceives of power as an action or 
effect that occurs through interactions within the network 
(Latour, 1996; Law, 1992; Matthewman, 2011). Through 
understanding power as an effect, ANT shows how both 
humans and non-humans can equally cause action but also, 
more importantly, that action occurs through humans and non-
humans working together. For example, Latour (2009) 
describes how the statement ‘guns kill people’ is flawed in the 
sense that it is neither the individual gun nor the individual 
person that performs the killing, but a third actant, what Latour 
refers to as a ‘citizen-gun’ that causes the action. ANT theorists 
emphasise that agency is shared between humans and non-
humans and that it is the way the actants assemble as a network 
that creates the action. As such, power flows through the 
network. The gun and the person do not necessarily have to 
assemble to kill someone, but killing is one effect that the 
network can produce. 
In acknowledging that effects are produced because of 
the make-up of the network, ANT is interested in following the 
strands of the network to understand the way that local agency 
is enacted at every level of an apparent hierarchy 
(Matthewman, 2011). This notion resembles Foucault’s 
conception of power, which described it as existing in a 
‘capillary-like network’ where every point in the network can 
affect other points in a flat, rather than hierarchical, structure 
(Markula and Pringle, 2006, p. 36). Latour emphasises that it is 
the size, shape and scope of the network that will determine 
what is produced. Different kinds of actor-networks, or 
assemblages, will produce different kinds of effects (Edwards 
and Nicoll, 2004; Kerr, 2014). 
As noted in the Introduction, Latour (2005) argues for the 
existence of what he terms intermediaries and mediators. He 
describes intermediaries as non-controversial actants that 
behave in a particular way each time (Bencherki, 2012; 
Kerr, 2014; Latour, 2005). By contrast, a mediator is an actant 
that behaves unpredictably and disrupts the network. For 
example, in the context of sport, a competitive cyclist consists 
of a particular network assembled from a person and a bicycle 
plus numerous other components, such as a helmet and skin-
tight suit. If the bicycle propels the cyclist at a fast rate, it is 
behaving as an intermediary as expected. However, the cyclist 
may be prevented from cycling as fast as desired through the 
presence of mediators. In cycling, hair acts as a mediator 
through creating wind friction which slows the cyclist down, 
so intermediaries such as shaving and an aerodynamic helmet 
are introduced to suppress the hair. 
These distinctions are significant, as mediators 
demonstrate how it is that non-humans can act to disrupt the 
desired action, holding power through causing unexpected 
outcomes, while intermediaries hold power through ensuring 
action and at times suppressing mediators to perform as 
desired. However, Latour’s central point is that in all contexts, 
humans work together with non-humans in order to function, 
and that therefore both the human and non-human can cause 
action: hence the emphasis on seeing the world as networks, 
not individual components. A cyclist is an assemblage of 
human and non-human actants that act together to travel faster 
than either can alone. Agency is shared equally between the 
human and non-human actants (Bencherki, 2012; 
Latour 2005, 2009). 
Such a view reverses the standard sociological 
conception of agency. For Actor-Network Theorists, agency is 
produced through a heterogeneous network rather than 
individually. In the cyclist example above, agency is produced 
through the human cyclist, bicycle and other associated non-
humans such as helmets, shaving and skin-tight suit, which, 
depending on the properties of each and how they assemble, 
will determine the speed at which the cyclist moves. 
This chapter explores the notion that technologies act as 
mediators or intermediaries through the case study of the GPS 
units introduced into AFL. Following this, the example of 
hypoxic chambers (TCHEs) is used to understand the breadth 
of what makes up a network and its ability to act. TCHEs are 
shown to have a variety of ideas ‘folded’ (Latour and 
Venn, 2002) within them that make their use both 
understandable and also controversial. 
Case study: the use of global positioning systems (GPS) in 
Australian rules football 
The introduction of GPS units into the Australian Football 
League (AFL) provides fruitful study for understanding how 
different actor-networks can produce particular effects, how 
technologies can act within the network and how surveillance 
can be enacted through new technologies. The cases thus far 
have focused on the issue of enrolment. In this case enrolment 
is only a small part of the discussion, since GPS units have been 
enrolled in Australian Football League for several years. 
Instead, this section focuses on GPS units as actants. 
AFL is one of the most popular sports in Australia, and 
boasts the largest number of attendees of any sports: 6.5 million 
in 2011 (Foreman, Deegan and Wigley, 2012). The AFL was an 
early adopter of GPS, having used it within the league since 
2005 (Foreman, Deegan and Wigley, 2012; Wisbey, Rattray and 
Pyne, 2010). AFL has possibly the highest uptake of GPS of any 
sport (Aughey, 2011). 
The GPS units used in the league consist of small units 
worn on the backs of players that transmit data to satellite and 
then to a computer or other device able to receive the satellite 
signals. Foreman, Deegan and Wigley (2012, pp. 1–2) describe 
the exact details: 
Athletes wear a small (approximately 80x50mm) transmitter on their upper back in a 
purpose-built supportive harness … which measures and analyses data from sensors, 
including multi-axis accelerometers and heart rate monitors … The data is collected and 
broadcast simultaneously to the remote computer for ‘real time’ analysis. Sports scientists 
can therefore view real time performance and tactical data during matches or training 
sessions. From the analysis of the data, the coaching team can make tactical changes, 
analyse player effort or manage player rehabilitation. 
The use of GPS units allows a significant amount of data to be 
collected that can be used to assist sport scientists and coaches 
with maximising athlete output throughout the game 
(Foreman, Deegan and Wigley, 2012). During the play, the data 
generated through the GPS systems includes player speeds, 
player intensity, player workload, player rotation and player 
movement patterns (Wisbey, Rattray and Pyne, 2010). In the 
training environment GPS can be used to evaluate athlete 
strength and conditioning and to set programmes for tactical 
and strategic analysis, for play rehabilitation and for injury 
management (Foreman, 2009). Many of these applications are 
essentially ways of making the internal workings of the body, 
or of a complex game, easily visible to scientists who are 
employed to improve sporting performance. So, unlike 
technologies that act directly to improve athletic performance, 
these act indirectly, needing the translation of a scientist in 
order to be useful. The scientist is necessary for interpreting the 
data provided by the GPS through comparing and contrasting 
it with expected norms and other previous information in 
order to inform coaches about which players are operating at 
their best and therefore assist the coach with making decisions 
within the field of play. It is the networked arrangements 
between the GPS units, the scientists and the coaches that make 
the GPS units particularly useful within the game and not 
simply the technology itself. 
GPS units were introduced somewhat slowly into AFL 
competitions. In 2005 and 2006 AFL clubs were permitted 
access to GPS units but were allowed to use them for only five 
players per team over ten games per year (Le Grand, 2007). At 
this point only half the teams in the league used the units 
(Wisbey, Rattray and Pyne, 2010). In 2007 all sixteen AFL clubs 
lobbied to lift the restrictions. Initially, the league argued 
against this for a number of reasons. First, they were concerned 
about the issue of equality. The units cost around $4000, so 
were expensive for clubs to buy (Foreman, 2009), and the 
league were anxious that richer clubs would therefore be at an 
advantage in being able to purchase more of the units than the 
poorer clubs. Given the need for data analysts to interpret the 
data, as discussed above, the need to employ them was an extra 
cost for clubs to bear. Another issue of concern was that of 
athlete safety. 
As the units are worn on the upper back of the players, 
there is a possibility that they could cause injuries during 
tackles (Le Grand, 2007). While the problem here could be 
understood as being introduced by the technology itself, in 
reality it is an issue caused by the particular network of sports 
rules, humans and technologies. Other sports have not enrolled 
the GPS units because their particular network includes 
elements that would make it unsafe for players to wear the 
units. For example, rugby union has not enrolled GPS units 
because the sport includes tackles as a significant part of its 
network. 
Finally, the league was also concerned that the increased 
GPS data would allow teams to circumvent newly introduced 
rules brought in to slow the game down (Le Grand, 2007). 
However, these concerns were not considered sufficient to 
prevent their use. Therefore, the restrictions were lifted, and 
now every team in the league uses GPS (Wisbey, Rattray and 
Pyne, 2010). 
Does GPS provide the promised benefits? 
It appears to be agreed that the GPS units do provide a large 
quantity of data that many teams find useful (Aughey, 2011). 
In that sense, these units are intermediaries, acting as expected 
every time they are used. Aughey (2011, p. 302) describes how 
the use of the units has changed and extended over the years 
since their adoption in 2005, moving ‘from general descriptive 
work on player movement in matches to the analysis of fatigue, 
comparison of real-time to post-game analysis of data, and 
comparisons among playing levels’. This quote suggests that 
GPS units act through fulfilling their desired role of providing 
extensive information to players, coaches and scientists. 
Foreman’s (2009) analysis found GPS to be particularly 
useful in three different areas. First, GPS can maximise player 
fitness through monitoring player fatigue levels and thereby 
providing information to coaches that allows players to be 
rotated off the field during competition, and through 
confirming overall fitness levels so coaches can prepare 
individual training programmes to maximise individual 
fitness. Second, GPS can provide information to assist coaches 
with tactical decisions, such as showing them precisely where 
all the players are during a live match. Finally, GPS can assist 
with rehabilitation by providing feedback on whether a player 
is over- or under-loading their training when they are 
returning from injury. 
Aughey (2011) goes on to describe the usefulness of the 
GPS data in comparative terms. He argues that GPS data has 
been useful in comparing expenditure of energy ‘across a 
match, between matches, between levels of competition, and 
between types of matches’ (Aughey, 2011, p. 303). 
Comparative data of this nature is described as providing 
greater understanding of the demands made on players, 
thereby allowing coaches to configure training sessions to 
work on areas of weakness revealed by the data (Wisbey, 
Rattray and Pyne, 2010). 
Foreman, Deegan and Wigley (2012) investigated 
thoroughly the question of whether GPS units are useful 
devices. One finding from their study was that the accuracy of 
the GPS units is questionable. They point out that, although the 
manufacturer’s website claims that the units have a high 
degree of accuracy, with a margin of error of only two to four 
per cent, other independent studies reveal inaccuracies of up 
to 140 per cent (see, for example, Aughey and Falloon, 2010). 
They further argue that these margins are for straight-line 
sprinting, which is rarely the case in AFL as the game requires 
players to change direction constantly, in line with what is 
happening in the game. Therefore, they conclude that although 
GPS units are an effective tool to use during training sessions, 
their accuracy prevents them from being useful for the purpose 
of tracking player movement during the game. In this example 
the GPS units are essentially acting as mediators, rather than 
providing the exact positions of the players as desired, which 
would mean the units were acting as intermediaries. 
In addition to the accuracy issue, in keeping with the 
ANT perspective, the GPS units cannot be considered without 
examining the socio-technical network in which they operate. 
This chapter will now discuss the network that surrounds the 
GPS units with a view to determining whether the units can be 
viewed as intermediaries when examined as part of an actor-
network. In all the examples below, it is found that the GPS 
units can only do their job as intermediaries if the appropriate 
network is in place. In some cases, it is found that an aspect of 
the existing network acts as a mediator in preventing the GPS 
units from acting. 
One of the major considerations when using GPS is the 
analysis of the data provided. Unfortunately, at the current 
time, there is no technology that can automate the data 
analysis: significant advances in the field of computer vision 
would be required for it to be achieved (pers. comm., Richard 
Green, 2013). Therefore, clubs have created different kinds of 
networks to solve this problem. The richer clubs have opted to 
employ several skilled specialists to analyse the data and edit 
it into a form useful for coaches and athletes. By contrast, those 
clubs that lack sufficient economic capital as part of their 
network must instead resort to measures such as the one 
adopted by Richmond, who employed a student performing 
work experience to ‘crunch’ the data (Le Grand, 2007). In this 
respect, the GPS devices require the addition of a human in 
order to allow them to act as intermediaries. 
Further, different ways of using the data need more 
specific expertise. For example, one useful tactic is to 
synchronise the GPS data with game or training time to allow 
coaches to correlate what is happening on the field with the 
GPS data. Foreman, Deegan and Wigley (2012) found that it 
was unexpectedly difficult to align the two as they have 
different timestamps, and therefore that very few clubs were 
able to afford to access the specific expertise needed to utilise 
this aspect of the programme. It thus remained a feature that 
was not enrolled, and again the GPS was unable to act unless 
the network included this highly specific expertise. 
Similarly, Foreman, Deegan and Wigley (2012) described 
one of the most heavily advertised features of the GPS as not 
being used: the ability to track the structure, movement and 
space of the team. They argued that this is impossible to 
achieve unless clubs own an individual GPS unit for every 
player and, because of the cost very few clubs can afford this. 
Therefore, this is another feature that remains not enrolled, 
with the units unable to act. 
The network can also contain features that actually 
prevent technologies from acting, as is the case with the 
various stadiums that clubs use. If a stadium includes a closed 
roof, the GPS signals are unable to get through, rendering the 
technology completely useless. As sports journalist Le Grand 
(2007, p. 43) describes, a number of teams are affected by this: 
GPS ‘doesn’t work under the closed roof of the Telstra Dome. 
This puts clubs such as St Kilda, the Western Bulldogs, 
Essendon, Carlton and the Kangaroos, who all use Telstra 
Dome as a home venue, at a disadvantage.’ However, Le Grand 
(2007) also notes that one of these clubs, the Bulldogs, found a 
way around it by partnering with the Victorian University of 
Technology, who provided an alternative way for them to 
receive some of the data that would normally be received 
through the GPS units. In this last example, the job of the GPS 
was delegated to an alternative technology in order to create 
the necessary action, but it is ironic that this is necessary, given 
that the data provided is one of the main reasons for using the 
GPS units. 
GPS units have also been found to include features that 
are simply not useful in the AFL scenario. One such feature is 
the ability to compare a player’s intensity during a game with 
their intensity during training. While on the surface this 
sounds useful, the goal of an AFL training session is not 
necessarily to mirror the intensity experienced in a game, so 
this feature is not useful (Foreman, Deegan and Wigley, 2012). 
This scenario is similar to the situation in French kayaking 
described by Trabal (2008). In both cases the designers of the 
technology, whether boats or GPS devices, approach sport with 
a different understanding from that of the athletes and coaches 
who are directly involved. Therefore the requirements of the 
two groups do not necessarily align and the result is, again, 
non-enrolment. 
All the above examples demonstrate the importance of 
understanding technology as part of a heterogeneous network 
if maximum usage of a technology is the desired outcome. 
When making the decision to allow GPS units to be used, the 
league considered the units as singular technological items 
made up of boxes to be worn on players’ backs. The league 
raised concerns about the individual costs of the units and 
factored this into their decision to allow GPS units, but omitted 
consideration of the many other components that produce the 
network of a working GPS unit. As a consequence, the units are 
not able to act in the way that they were set up for, and the 
league is losing some of the potential value of the units. Other 
parts of the network act as mediators in preventing the GPS 
units from working to their full potential. The GPS units could 
have been of greater benefit in AFL if the additional parts of 
the GPS network, such as experts and roofs, had been 
considered in the planning around the use of the devices. 
Acting through surveillance 
In contrast to the above examples where the GPS units were 
not able to act, there was one way that the GPS units were able 
to act very effectively: to provide player surveillance. One of 
the ways that an ANT perspective differs from others is 
through the assertion that power is enacted through non-
human devices. This point is well illustrated through an 
examination of the way GPS units act as surveillance units. 
One of the most prominent theorists who explored 
surveillance is one whose work shares many similarities with 
ANT, Michel Foucault. In previous works (see Kerr, 2014) I 
have noted that ANT and Foucauldian theory hold a number 
of similarities, most importantly their understanding of power; 
indeed, one of the most prominent ANT theorists, John Law, 
claims that ANT owes a debt to Foucault in this regard 
(Law, 1992). However, in line with the ANT perspective 
discussed throughout this book, ANT goes further than 
Foucault in arguing for the significance of non-humans as 
actors in the workings of society. 
Foucault argued that power reaches bodies through 
what he terms ‘dispositives’, also at times translated as 
‘apparatus’, which refers to anything that affects the 
behaviours, beliefs or views of any living being (Legg, 2011). 
Prison architecture was one type of apparatus that Foucault 
described (Hekman, 2009), with Foucault arguing that the 
famous Panopticon prison design would have a distinct effect 
in creating self-regulation on the part of the inmates. It is 
Foucault’s concept of power being enacted through a material 
form that connects strongly with Latour’s work 
(Dorrestijin, 2012). For example, in his book Discipline and 
Punish, when discussing the Panopticon, Foucault states, 
‘Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain 
concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes’ 
(Foucault, 1977, p. 220), thereby acknowledging the way power 
relations are enacted through material forms. 
Within the sporting context, Manley, Palmer and 
Roderick (2012) utilised the ideas of both Foucault and Latour 
to demonstrate the way surveillance took place through 
material forms in their study of a competitive football 
academy. They described (2012, p. 306) how the academy 
collected a wide range of data that was used to regulate the 
athletes’ bodies in a very detailed manner: 
Control functions took the form of documentation, data or information that was retrieved 
from a process of video surveillance, human observation and physiological testing. These 
data were then used to collate knowledge that was presented to those further up the 
academy hierarchies. Fitness tests, physiological tests and review sessions within the 
football academy aided the shaping and regulation of the athletes’ behaviour so they may 
improve their performance … The categorisation of the athletes’ qualities allowed for the 
regulation of the minutest detail in relation to performance. 
The process described here essentially reduces the athletes’ 
performances to numerical values, or to ‘data’, for the specific 
purpose of influencing the athletes. The data was used to 
situate athlete performance within the parameters of successful 
performance, which had the effect of ensuring that athletes 
self-regulated their behaviour in order to meet required 
standards. 
The use of GPS units in AFL echoes this process. In AFL 
the GPS units were also used for the collection of ‘data’. This 
information could take the form of details around player speed 
and movements and data about heart rate that is believed to 
demonstrate how hard a player is working. The information is 
then utilised primarily by coaches and other officials in order 
to make decisions. As such, the GPS units act as a way for 
coaches to increase their level of surveillance of the players. 
Manley, Palmer and Roderick (2012, p. 308) suggest that such 
data 
can be processed to create a ‘digital persona’ (Clarke 1994) constituting a 
‘Superpanopticon’, i.e., ‘a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers or 
guards’ … It is the creation of a ‘digital persona’ and the collation of data that enabled the 
coaches and managers to survey their athletes in a range of aspects. 
Deleuze (1992) refers to a digital persona as a ‘coded body’. Both concepts describe the 
notion of an electronic body that acts as a different version of a player who also possesses a 
physical body. 
Given the physical presence of the GPS units on the 
players’ backs and the inclusion of data analysts as part of the 
coaching team, players could not help but be aware of the 
collection of this data. Foreman, Deegan and Wigley (2012, p. 
5) argued that the athletes were aware of the increased 
surveillance and at times resisted it, stating ‘players do not feel 
comfortable wearing GPS devices as they believe they are not 
being trusted by coaching staff to perform their on-field role’. 
This remark suggests that players feel as though the coach is 
using the GPS units to test whether they are working hard 
enough and resent the fact that coaches feel the need to do this. 
Additionally, the increased surveillance was felt outside 
of traditional training time. Pierik (2013) describes how GPS 
units were used by coaches to monitor their players’ fitness 
during their pre-season break, even when the players were not 
officially training. However, this practice has recently been 
banned, owing to the perceived need for players to address 
their work-life balance through having a complete break from 
play (Pierik, 2013). 
In this final section I argue that the wearing of the GPS 
units allows coaches to increase their level of control over 
players through providing additional information about the 
players’ whereabouts and level of exertion. From the coaches’ 
point of view, the GPS unit works as an intermediary in 
working to provide information that the coaches desire. 
However, as the ANT perspective points out, the GPS unit 
cannot be considered in isolation, and so from the players’ 
perspective, the GPS device can disrupt effective performance 
through providing unwanted information to the coach. In this 
sense, the GPS is closer to the role of a mediator than an 
intermediary, as it prevents players from working as 
effectively as their coaches might hope. This is particularly the 
case during the pre-season break, when the player may believe 
he needs time for rest and recuperation, whereas the coach may 
believe the player should be staying in shape. 
The case of the GPS units within the AFL league 
highlights two of the most important aspects of the ANT view 
of technology that were introduced in Chapter 1. First, it 
demonstrates how understanding technology as singular, 
rather than an actor-network, can be problematic for 
organisations who want to maximise sporting performance 
through the use of technology. Through considering the 
enrolment of only one part of the network (the unit worn on 
the player’s back), the other parts that were necessary for the 
GPS units to work to full potential were not enrolled and 
consequently reduced the ability for the GPS units to act as 
intermediaries. Second, the case highlighted the way that non-
humans can act to produce or prevent action. The material 
properties of the GPS units meant that they were able to 
provide coaches with genuinely useful information, and within 
this context the units acted as intermediaries. Indeed, the 
information the units provided proved so useful for coaches 
that they then began using the units to survey their athletes and 
monitor their performance in a way that the athletes did not 
anticipate. This led to resentment of coaches and the creation 
of an official ruling to prevent such a high level of surveillance. 
I now turn my attention to a very different technological 
device, where use is decided on an individual rather than 
league basis, and the benefits of the device are potentially more 
questionable than the GPS units. 
Case study: the use of technologically constructed hypoxic 
environments 
In the case described above, the introduction of the GPS units 
into the AFL was relatively uncontroversial. By contrast, the 
use of devices that imitate the effects of altitude training, such 
as technologically constructed hypoxic environments (TCHEs), 
remains controversial in sport because of the argument that the 
effects mirror those of doping: in particular, EPO and blood 
doping. Nonetheless, they remain a legal technology in sport. 
This section will investigate the legality of TCHEs through the 
notion of what is ‘folded’ (Latour and Venn, 2002) in a 
technology. Like the case of the GPS units, this section again 
emphasises the significance of viewing technologies as actor-
networks. However, where the GPS unit’s effectiveness was 
hampered by lack of support from the necessary network that 
existed beyond the physical unit, in the case of the TCHEs I will 
argue that it is the actor-network within the units themselves 
that produces the controversy. Where for the GPS case I needed 
to follow the units outwards to the network, in this case I will 
instead follow the TCHE network inwards. Specifically, I argue 
that TCHEs have a particular history folded within them, 
including the decisions made at the 1968 Olympic Games and 
the apparent natural superiority of long-distance runners from 
places such as Kenya and Ethiopia, which are at a high altitude. 
In a way, this approach has some similarities to that of authors 
such as Magdalinski (2009), who notes that the cultural 
meanings of technological devices are important for 
understanding their use. In this chapter I adopt a related 
though somewhat different approach of following the history 
of the debate, which I argue has become a significant part of 
the network that we call a TCHE. I argue that the network also 
incorporates a simplicity of use and lack of medicalisation that 
results in athletes feeling more comfortable using the devices. 
TCHEs are an interesting case to explore, as they sit at 
the very edge of technologies permitted for use by the World 
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). In 2006 WADA commissioned 
an inquiry into the use of TCHEs and decided not to place them 
on the banned list, despite their conclusion that TCHEs met 
two of the three criteria that would entail banning. WADA 
describes how a technology that meets two of the three criteria 
‘may, but is not required to, be added to the Prohibited List’ 
(WADA, 2006, para. 6). 
From altitude training to TCHEs 
Major international research and discussion around the effects 
of training or competing at altitude began in a significant way 
with the 1968 Olympic Games, which were held in Mexico City, 
a city at higher than normal altitude. Kasperowski (2009) 
reports how the organisers of the games addressed the issue of 
altitude in their bid in 1963, stating that concerns with 
competing at altitude had been 
artificially created, undoubtedly in good faith, but due to a lack of familiarity with the 
facts. It is definitely refuted by the various documents that follow … athletes only require 
a 3 or 4 day period in order to adapt themselves completely to Mexico City’s altitude. 
(Mexican Olympic Committee, 1963, cited in Kasperowski, 2009, p. 1264) 
Currently, it is understood that athletes require four to six weeks in order to adjust to altitude; 
however, the Mexican Olympic Committee’s statement is unsurprising given the lack of 
research that had been conducted at that time. While there had been some experimentation 
with overcoming issues associated with altitude in order to climb high mountains, there had 
been no research undertaken on the effects of medium-level altitude (in the range 1800–3000 
metres, with Mexico City at 2300 metres). Consequently, between 1964 and 1968 a large 
amount of research was undertaken into the effects of altitude in the lead-up to the Games 
(Kasperowski, 2009). 
There were several reasons for the interest in the effects 
of altitude. First, there were concerns over the health of the 
athletes in competing at altitude, with some citing risks of 
black-outs and even death. Second, there was a concern with 
inequality (Kasperowski, 2009). Standardised rules exist in 
sport in order to ensure fairness. While ‘natural’ inequalities 
such as differences in physiological and psychological make-
up are tested through sport, artificial inequalities are seen as 
undesirable and often limited, as described in the previous 
chapter with regard to the availability of full-body swimsuits. 
However, while an issue such as a swimsuit was easily solved 
owing to its agreed-upon artificiality, the question of altitude 
was far more complex. 
On the one hand, there were athletes whose actor-
network included already living at high altitude and were 
therefore already adapted, giving them an advantage at the 
Mexico games. But their physiological make-up as a result of 
living there could be seen as ‘natural’ and therefore impossible 
and unnecessary to regulate. The IOC also suspected that 
wealthier teams might spend time living at altitude prior to the 
games in order to gain an advantage. But it was deemed too 
difficult and not appropriate to segregate competitions into 
high- and low-living athletes. Therefore, in order to attain 
fairness, the IOC issued the following statement: 
No athlete other than those who usually live and train at such heights shall specially do 
so more than 4 weeks in the last 3 months before the opening of the Games. The IOC 
points out that to break this rule would be a gross breach of good sportsmanship and it is 
sure that no-one connected with the Olympic Movement would wish in any way to be 
guilty of taking advantage over the other competitors. (IOC, n.d., cited in Kasperowski, 
2009, p. 1269) 
While this statement was perceived to solve the problem in 
terms of fairness, national teams were still concerned about the 
effects of altitude on their athletes, with several nations 
sending scientists to study the effects of altitude. Through a 
study of Belgian athletes it was noted that athletes who trained 
at altitude often performed better once they returned to sea-
level. This notion soon became commonplace, through the 
concept of ‘living high, training low’, developed as a way for 
athletes to gain the benefits from altitude training while still 
training at normal intensity (Kasperowski, 2009; Levine, 2006). 
Bowers (2009) describes the principle behind altitude 
training. At altitude the body increases its oxygen-carrying 
capacity (through producing erythropoietin (EPO)) in response 
to the low-oxygen environment that occurs at high altitude. 
However, this effect only lasts for a short duration, with EPO 
production peaking at about forty-eight hours of altitude 
acclimatisation, and base-lining again after five to ten days. 
Furthermore, training intensity is negatively affected by 
altitude. Therefore, through ‘living high, training low’ an 
athlete is able to maximise their oxygen intake while still 
ensuring maximum training intensity. However, the problem 
of training this way is gaining access to mountains and valleys 
that allow athletes to move from high to low altitude while still 
allowing-high intensity training. 
TCHEs were developed as an attempt to mirror the 
effects of living high and training low. Levine (2006, p. 297) 
describes how 
Heikki Rusko … decided to use an old industrial technique designed to filter oxygen 
molecules and dilute a room with nitrogen to create a hypoxic environment similar to the 
mountains. Athletes could then live and sleep in the ‘nitrogen house’ and train at sea level. 
There are now various versions of these environments available, consisting of either tent-like 
structures, smaller sleeping-bag-like tubes or devices that control the air in a single room 
(Bowers, 2009). 
However, the outcomes from using these devices remain 
unclear (Bowers, 2009; Levine, 2006). Study design differences 
have complicated the issue, and while studies measuring 
simply EPO production have consistently recorded a modest 
increase, whether this translates into increased performance is 
debatable (Bowers, 2009). For example, in one study it is 
argued that ‘the physiological response to altitude is quite 
variable and unpredictable among individual athletes – for 
example, the increase in EPO levels at an equivalent altitude of 
3000m may range from a 400 per cent increase to a 40 per 
cent decrease after 24 h’ (Ri-Li et al., 2002, cited in Levine, 2006, 
p. 298; italics in Levine). TCHEs are quite unusual in having 
such uncertainty, and therefore the general rule of thumb 
appears to be that each athlete must determine individually 
whether it is effective for them. For example, a marathon 
runner’s blog records how her husband found them effective 
for his training, but that she personally had not found them 
useful, and instead experienced breathing difficulties 
(Herron, 2011). 
Should altitude chambers be permitted? 
Several philosophers and sports scientists have used a number 
of different criteria to examine the acceptability of TCHEs (see, 
for example, Fricker, 2005; Levine, 2006; Loland and 
Caplan, 2008; Miah, 2006). Fricker (2005) simply states that, as 
TCHEs do not alter the athlete in a superhuman way or cause 
harm, there is no ethical problem associated with them. In a 
more detailed analysis, Levine (2006) analyses WADA’s 
decision not to ban TCHEs using the WADA criteria of whether 
they are performance-enhancing, whether they are safe and 
whether they are in the spirit of sport. WADA found that they 
could be performance-enhancing, therefore violating the spirit 
of sport, but they are also safe (Levine, 2006). In his article, 
Levine (2006) argued against two of their conclusions. First, he 
asserted that the potential for TCHEs to enhance performance 
is by no means certain since, as described above, the reactions 
of an individual are unpredictable. Second, he argues against 
the reasoning that TCHEs are against the spirit of sport on the 
grounds of ‘passivity’ in that they do not require active training 
to use, as WADA claims. He explains that the science of 
athlete recovery is an important part of training, despite it 
being passive, that many other passive actions in sport are 
acceptable and, finally, that TCHEs should be allowed, based 
on the fact that they simulate living at altitude, which is also 
acceptable. Miah (2006) agrees with Levine (2006) that the 
passivity argument is illogical, also pointing to other examples 
of passivity, including the role of the athlete in accepting 
advice from a coach. Miah (2006) further argues that TCHEs do 
not affect the doing of sport but may potentially contribute to 
the development of sport, with technologies increasingly being 
integral to improvements and developments in sporting 
performance, and for these reasons sees it as illogical to ban 
TCHEs. 
Loland and Caplan (2008) evaluate TCHEs against the 
criteria of benefit, safeness and the possibility of providing 
fairness to determine whether they align with the spirit of 
sport. They conclude that the answer is ambiguous, stating that 
the benefits are clear – they are safe – but the last criterion 
depends on context. They argue that if TCHEs are used by 
athletes to help them adjust to altitude, then this is acceptable, 
but if TCHEs are used purely in an attempt to increase the 
oxygen-carrying capacity of the blood, this goes against the 
spirit of sport. 
The ANT perspective on why TCHEs can be viewed as 
acceptable 
In contrast to the arguments discussed above, the TCHE will 
now be considered as an actor-network, with distinctive ideas 
folded within it that make the decision to allow TCHEs 
potentially understandable. It is argued that because the actor-
network that makes up the TCHE is very different from the 
actor-networks of doping and the use of other banned 
substances, TCHEs can be understood as natural and 
unproblematic. 
First, the TCHE is designed, first and foremost, to 
simulate altitude training. Altitude training is indisputably 
allowed, given that the actor-network of some athletes includes 
living at higher altitudes. As Levine (2006, p. 300) points out: 
‘there is appropriately no movement to regulate where an 
athlete can live. That is, an athlete can choose to live wherever 
on the planet he or she can, regardless of the barometric 
pressure of the environment.’ Therefore, TCHEs have the idea 
folded within them that they have the same effect for an athlete 
as happening to be living at high altitude. 
Altitude training is further understood as acceptable 
owing to the popular discourse that one of the reasons that 
long-distance runners from nations such as Kenya and 
Ethiopia have been so successful is that they live at higher than 
normal altitudes (Bale and Sang, 1996). In their intensive study 
of Kenyan runners, Bale and Sang discuss how the association 
between Kenya’s high altitude and their success in running has 
led to the assumption that there is a causal relationship 
between the two. They describe a long history of 
environmental determinism tied to racist beliefs which has led 
to this discourse, but argue there is no conclusive evidence of 
it being accurate. They also point out that athletes who live at 
altitude in other areas do not necessarily succeed at long-
distance running, and instead describe the intensive training 
performed by Kenyan runners, which, they argue, has had the 
greatest impact on their success. Nonetheless, despite the lack 
of evidence, the belief that athletes who live at higher altitudes 
are more successful remains a part of the understanding of why 
TCHEs are an acceptable training method. 
The understanding of TCHEs as producing ‘natural’ 
bodily effects is confirmed through their link with the high-
profile banned drug artificial EPO, which is now, particularly 
after the 2012 Lance Armstrong scandal, a well-known ‘evil’ in 
the study of sport. On one hand, TCHEs mirror the effects of 
taking artificial EPO since the goal of TCHEs is to increase the 
body’s production of EPO. However the contrast between 
artificial EPO and using a TCHE is marked. Artificial EPO 
causes the body to change instantly, which can be viewed as a 
very unnatural response, while TCHEs allow the body to adapt 
more gradually, as it would do ‘naturally’. 
The problem is the additional actant of the TCHE, which 
acts as an intermediary in ensuring that the actor-network that 
makes up the inner workings of the body changes to include a 
higher production of EPO. But if we only consider the effects 
on the body, we can see how using a TCHE mirrors the bodily 
response of someone living at altitude and not the response of 
someone using artificial EPO. 
A rather different component folded within the TCHE’s 
actor-network is the price. TCHEs can be very expensive, and 
therefore only available to athletes with significant resources at 
their disposal. For example, while some simple versions of 
‘altitude tents’ are easily available over the internet for only 
hundreds of dollars, these have the drawbacks of being hot and 
humid and increasing the production of CO2, which 
undermines the effect of the tent. Acquiring a device that 
overcomes these barriers can run to US$100,000 (pers. comm. 
Michael Hamlin, 2013). These costs mean that it is only athletes 
or nations who are prepared to invest heavily in elite sport, and 
therefore those who commonly sit at the top of the medal table, 
who can afford these devices. Beamish and Ritchie (2006) 
describe how inequalities produced by performance-
enhancing substances are very often the same inequalities as 
produced within sport more generally. It is the same with 
TCHEs. However, in this case the inequality can be rationalised 
through the idea that using these devices enables a less talented 
runner to reach the same level as runners from Kenya or 
Ethiopia, who are assumed to have these abilities naturally 
because they live at higher altitudes. Further, the discourse that 
African runners have a natural advantage owing to altitude 
simulates the historical ideas embedded in the concept of race 
that assume a natural advantage to all dark-skinned athletes. 
In this way, TCHEs and altitude training confirm normalised 
ideas surrounding inequalities in sport, confirming that ‘white’ 
athletes can gain success through hard training and access to 
resources such as TCHEs, while ‘black’ athletes are naturally 
superior. 
There is, further, little concern about inequality in terms 
of availability because, unlike the swimsuits discussed in 
the previous chapter, the use of these devices is relatively 
invisible. A swimsuit is easily visible to all watching the race, 
but training, and particularly sleeping, are private activities not 
usually seen by outsiders or other athletes. This also connects 
to a point made by Levine (2006), who argued that, if TCHEs 
were banned, policing their use would be extremely difficult 
owing to the invisibility of their use, so would have to rely 
upon the creation of a culture of spying. 
Finally, the behaviours involved in using the devices are 
not questionable in the way that, for example, doping is. Using 
TCHEs involves breathing in a different environment. It 
involves either a plastic tent or a sleeping-bag-like tube, which 
the athlete uses to perform activities such as sleeping or resting. 
The actor-network only includes very standard behaviour. 
This is quite different from an activity such as doping, which 
has connotations of deviance and anti-social behaviour 
(Miah, 2006) owing to the similarities to recreational drug-
taking, and includes questionable devices such as syringes as 
part of its actor-network. Doping also can involve the 
introduction of artificial substances into the body, whereas 
TCHEs do not (Miah, 2006). 
In sum, TCHEs imitate natural processes so effectively 
that their very artificiality almost becomes irrelevant. They 
produce the same effects as natural altitude training, including 
the same gradual change process within the body. The process 
of using TCHEs also encompasses only ‘natural’ behaviours. 
Athletes are able to live their normal lives, apart from 
breathing in a different environment for some part of the day. 
This example highlights the importance of 
understanding athletes as cyborgs, or as network assemblages 
made up of human and non-human elements. The effects of the 
TCHEs are so well designed to imitate the natural that they 
have less artificial effect than a runner wearing shoes. The 
assemblage of the human athlete with a TCHE produces the 
same effects as a human athlete living in a particular natural 
environment. With this in mind, the only reason to suggest that 
TCHEs should be on the banned list is that they are artificial. 
But if we dispense with the understanding that an athlete is an 
entirely natural entity and understand that, as a network 
assemblage, an athlete exists as a network of human and non-
human, then TCHEs can be seen as entirely acceptable. This is 
a similar scenario to the case of Oscar Pistorius’s legs, which 
are artificial but designed to imitate human legs so effectively 
that several years of examination could not determine any 
discernible difference. In both cases, the technologies act as 
innocuous parts of the athlete’s network in the same way as 
running shoes, and it is only that they have the concept of 
artificiality folded within them that makes them problematic. 
 
Non-enrolment of TCHEs by athletes 
Despite the above, which can be seen as an explanation for why 
WADA has chosen not to ban TCHEs, this does not mean that 
they are always easily enrolled by athletes. The above 
description followed the actor-network of a TCHE in itself. But 
when TCHEs are utilised by athletes, the actor-network grows 
to include the athletes’ own actor-network, which does not 
necessarily allow the two actants to assemble easily together. 
An obvious reason for not enrolling TCHEs is, as 
described above, cost. Not all athletes or nations can afford 
them. Moreover, those nations that can afford them must find 
a way to provide access to all athletes. For example, nations 
that adopt a more centralised training model, where all athletes 
are concentrated together in one area surrounded by sports 
science support, would be more likely to find it easier to 
provide athletes with TCHEs than those who adopt a more 
independent model, in which, athletes are more likely to be 
scattered throughout the country, making it difficult to site a 
TCHE in a place which would benefit all athletes equally. 
Also described earlier was the doubt surrounding the 
effectiveness of TCHEs. While most studies reveal that they 
generally increase EPO, it is not clear that this always leads to 
an increase in performance. Therefore, athletes are unlikely to 
adopt a practice where the benefits are unclear. 
There is also the question of whether enrolling the device 
will actually be of use to that particular athlete. One goal of the 
production of new technologies can be to overcome obstacles. 
From an ANT perspective, this is described as the creation of a 
programme to overcome an anti-programme (Latour, 1991). 
For example, in the sport of mountaineering, the obstacle of 
‘lack of oxygen’ is overcome through the use of oxygen 
canisters which can be carried up the mountain (van 
Hilvoorde, Vos and de Wert, 2007, p. 175). In this example, 
‘lack of oxygen’ acts as an anti-programme as it is a factor that 
makes the climbing of the mountain very difficult. Adding the 
technological device of the oxygen canister to the actor-
network of the mountaineer overcomes the anti-programme 
and improves the chances of mountaineer reaching the top of 
the mountain. 
For some athletes the TCHE does not overcome any 
obstacles because it is not present in their particular case. This 
could take the form of athletes already residing at altitude, or 
having greater genetic capacity to carry oxygen as part of their 
actor-network. 
Finally, the ANT approach points out that all aspects of 
the network are connected. So if one aspect of the network is 
altered, some other part of training may also not work so well. 
For example, in distance runner Herron’s (2011) online blog, 
she described how using a TCHE made the rest of her training 
regime less effective making her less inclined to adopt the 
practice. This is similar to the argument made in the previous 
chapter where the kayakers identified other parts of the 
network that were as important as the kayak itself. 
As with the kayak designs discussed in the previous 
chapter, the non-enrolment of TCHEs calls into question the 
assumption that athletes are always seeking to improve their 
performance through taking on new technological 
developments. Instead, athletes’ own individual genetic 
capacities and beliefs in what works for them are important in 
determining whether an athlete will enrol a new technology. 
Thus, the concern that natural sporting competitions may be 
ruined by the increasing inclusion of technologies appears to 
be unfounded. 
Conclusion 
This chapter considered the integration of ‘foreign’ 
technologies into sport through the cases of GPS in AFL and 
TCHEs. Both GPS and the TCHEs make interesting cases for 
study since their effectiveness has been questioned by 
researchers in both cases. With GPS, researchers suggest that 
the units are not used to full capacity. However, the devices are 
used to survey players, which players perceive to be 
problematic. With TCHEs, there is inconclusive evidence 
regarding their ability to improve performance. This chapter 
describes how other aspects of the socio-technical network 
have a strong influence on decisions surrounding the use of 
both technologies. 
In both cases, I examined the technology as an actor-
network and examined its enrolment and use through 
following the network. In the case of the GPS units, I followed 
the network outwards from the individual box and determined 
that there were other important parts of the network that were 
necessary for the GPS units to be used effectively which had 
not been considered by the league in their initial introduction. 
The league’s lack of consideration of the GPS units as networks 
led to the units not being used to their full potential. 
Nonetheless the process revealed two dominant reasons 
why the units have become common practice in the AFL. First, 
GPS units provide sufficient data to be useful to coaches and 
scientists. Second, GPS offers a level of surveillance that is very 
useful to coaches and managers, who want their teams to 
perform at their best, and so the ability to monitor players to 
ensure all are contributing to this goal is highly attractive. Both 
these reasons indicate that coaches and managers are more 
likely to make the decision to enrol GPS than players. 
However, the process also found that, becuase the league did 
not consider the need for a) other intermediaries to make the 
GPS work and b) ways of overcoming mediators such as roofs, 
the GPS units were not providing the level of value that could 
do. 
Following the case of the TCHEs revealed a similar issue 
with the devices not providing value for all athletes. In this 
case, the lack of value was simply due to the fact that the way 
the TCHE assembles with each athlete is different in every case 
(which is not the case with the GPS units, which work with all 
athletes in the same way). The case of the TCHEs particularly 
emphasises the importance of understanding athletes as 
networks of human and non-human, or as cyborgs, rather than 
viewing new technologies as intrusions on a natural body. 
TCHEs have been designed to imitate natural processes so 
effectively that their artificiality becomes irrelevant, and so 
they should not be subject to the same scrutiny as practices 
such as doping, which will be considered in the next chapter. 
Both cases illustrate the importance of understanding 
technologies as heterogeneous networks. Purely examining 
their material value and seeing them as isolated physical 
artefacts prevents an understanding of how they can be 
used within sport. A similar argument is made by Magdalinski 
(2009), who argues for the importance of understanding the 
cultural meaning of technologies within the sporting arena. 
However, ANT takes this notion further by arguing that 
meaning, history, physical materiality and combining with the 
athlete are also significant in understanding how and why 
technologies are utilised and regulated within sport. 
  
4 
The actor-network of doping 
No writing on sport and technology would be complete 
without a discussion of doping. Doping has been the centre of 
a vast number of controversies centred on health, fairness and, 
more importantly for this book, purity of the human body. 
Doping is a particularly interesting case for ANT, as all 
discussions of doping concern how the human body assembles 
with artificial substances or techniques. The problem for those 
trying to eradicate doping is how to establish that the 
assemblage is occurring at all, and this chapter details a variety 
of ways in which various groups have attempted to examine 
the assemblage. 
This chapter is all about power relations. Specifically, it 
examines how various organisations have utilised inscriptions 
and a range of other surveillance methods in order to control 
doping. The type of control varies between organisations, with 
some aiming to control doping discourses, some to control 
doping in order to prevent it, and some aiming to control 
athletes. Essentially, this chapter follows the actor-network of 
doping with a view to determining the power relations that 
occur within this very contentious area. 
The history of doping and the creation of doping policy 
For as long as sport has existed, athletes have used a variety of 
stimulants with the goal of improving performance (Beamish 
and Ritchie, 2006; Hoberman, 2009 Houlihan, 1999). Until 
World War Two, drug use was very crude and generally 
ignored by sports authorities. However, during the war, 
pharmaceutical experimentation and the use of various 
stimulants by the military revealed the possibilities offered by 
doping in the realm of sport. Following the war, amphetamine 
use by cyclists was thought to be prevalent during the 1950s, 
although it continued to be of little concern to authorities until 
the death of a cyclist during the 1967 Tour de France, which 
forced them to raise the issue. Experimentation with steroids is 
also believed to have begun in the 1950s, with a rapid growth 
in use continuing through the 1960s and 1970s 
(Houlihan, 1999). 
Houlihan (1999) argues that, although doping policy 
began to be introduced in the 1960s, it was uneven across 
nations and sports. He describes how national governments 
varied in their wish to control doping. Some were highly 
motivated, such as France and Belgium, who passed legislation 
in 1965, while others, such as Australia and Canada, were 
inactive and apathetic about the issue. Some nations, such as 
Great Britain, only offered inducements to athletes to refrain 
from doping rather than carrying out testing programmes 
themselves. Similarly, some sports federations such as cycling 
organisations were faster to take action, creating drug-testing 
programmes in the 1960s, while more inactive organisations, 
such as the IAAF, only began to form policy in the 1970s. 
At an international level, Houlihan (1999) states that the 
IOC officially banned doping from 1962 onwards, and the first 
Olympic Games to test for doping were in 1972. Hanstad, 
Smith and Waddington (2008) describe how the IOC began to 
take ownership of the prevention of doping from this time 
forward. It took on an increasingly central role in fighting 
doping, primarily through the accreditation of laboratories for 
performing drug tests, and through the creation of the first 
official list of banned substances in 1971. These initiatives 
highlight the way in which organisations such as the IOC use 
particular networked mechanisms, which include non-
humans, in order to retain power. For example, the laboratory 
is valuable only because of the network of chemicals, test tubes 
and other scientific apparatus that combine together to test 
urine and blood samples effectively for evidence of doping. 
Another non-human that proved particularly important 
for the IOC and their control of doping was the creation of the 
list of banned substances. Catlin, Fitch and Ljungqvist (2008) 
describe how initially, in the 1970s and early 1980s, the list 
contained only substances for which a test existed. At the time 
the IOC felt banning was pointless until a test existed to test 
culpability. However, an incident of blood doping at the 1984 
Olympic Games, widely reported in the media, proved that this 
approach was not effective, and from then onwards substances 
were added to the list even if detection was not possible (Catlin 
et al., 2008). 
The creation of the list demonstrates the importance of 
what Latour (1999b) refers to as an ‘inscription’. Latour 
describes how, through inscribing on a two-dimensional sheet 
of paper, scientists are able to describe a world and make 
things visible that were not previously apparent: 
An inscription device is ‘a system for producing traces out of materials that take other 
forms … an apparatus of a particular configuration of items that can transform a material 
substance into a figure or diagram which is directly usable by others’. (Latour, 1986, cited 
in Law, 2004, p. 20) 
Using this definition, it is the existence of the list that 
transforms a particular substance such as a steroid, or a 
technique such as blood-doping, from being a physical activity 
into a banned substance. This cannot happen without the 
inscription in place. The ban only exists through the 
inscription, with the inscription black-boxing each particular 
substance as disallowed. However, the inscription proved only 
partly effective for deterring athletes from doping, with it 
proving necessary to extend the actor-network in several 
directions in order for a thorough testing programme to exist 
(Catlin, Fitch and Ljungqvist, 2008). 
Shackleton (2009, p. 288) claims that, although use of 
steroids was ‘known’ to have ‘occurred as early as the 1950s, 
and was rife by the 1960s’, enforcing sanctions was not possible 
until the 1970s, when a reliable test was found. Similarly, 
Franke and Berendonk (1997) report how testosterone 
injections were used extensively in the late 1970s in the GDR 
because testosterone testing was not introduced until 1982. 
The effects of the introduction of testing are illustrated in 
a description by Shackleton (2009, p. 292), where he recounts 
an incident of an East German athlete’s sample testing positive 
in 1977. At that time there were no regulations regarding how 
samples were stored in order to be tamper-proof, and so some 
unusual situations occurred: 
Occasionally athletes insisted on their innocence and demanded testing of the reserve, or 
‘B’ sample in the presence of their representatives. The first time this happened to us was 
following the 1977 European cup in Helsinki when two or three guys showed up at short 
notice at our lab in the London suburbs with Arnold Beckett (of the Chelsea College of 
Pharmacy) and a secretary of the IAAF. We were to analyze some B samples from 
Bulgarian weight-lifters I believe, and an East German athlete. The high profile attendance 
of the East Germans seemed odd at the time, and not officially sanctioned since IAAF 
rules only specified one witness. One of the DDR representatives was a team doctor, the 
second a coach and the third a minder from the embassy, probably there to ensure the 
others didn’t stray. The first conflict arose when Beckett produced the samples and the 
doctor complained that their ‘client’s’ sample was not genuine because he maintained he 
had put a scratch on the seal at time of collection and it was no longer there. The IAAF 
secretary promised to look into possible tampering but in the end the decision was made 
to continue; the seal was broken and the analysis begun. By the first evening we had the 
samples ready for conjugate hydrolysis, but clearly we had to stop for the day. However, 
the observers didn’t trust that we wouldn’t tamper with the samples during the night so 
one of us had to go to a hardware store in town to purchase a padlock for our cold-room 
where the samples were to be kept. We ceremoniously secured the test-tubes with sealing 
wax, the Germans locked the samples away and kept the key. Protocol was made up as 
we went along in those days because a couple of the observers came home with me as I 
lived close by and I cooked dinner. They loosened up with wine, enjoyed their unexpected 
Western freedom and I had difficulty getting them to leave. The following day the rest of 
the procedures were carried out and by day’s end, to the consternation of the observers 
we produced perfect mass spectra of 6ˇ-hydroxy Dianabol or the metabolites of 19-nor-
testosterone. Although we analysts didn’t know it at the time one was a very high profile 
case. We had proven the East German star shot-putter Ilona Slupianek guilty of 
nandrolone abuse and DDR athletes had the reputation for never getting caught. She was 
banned for 12 months but competed successfully in the following year’s world-cup in 
Prague. As a result of our work the DDR took direct control over their doping lab at 
Kreische (in Saxony) and from then on tested all athletes before they left the country. No 
East German female athlete was ever again convicted of doping. 
This remarkable story demonstrates how the creation of 
inscriptions in the form of regulations essentially replaced the 
numerous actants that were enrolled in this case in order to 
ensure the sample was not tampered with. Scratching the seal, 
a padlock and sealing wax were all enrolled as ways to prevent 
tampering. This story also reveals the way different parts of the 
doping actor network came together to produce quite different 
outcomes. Franke and Berendonk (1997) report how, following 
Slupianek’s positive test, the GDR initiated internal testing to 
ensure athletes were free from banned substances prior to 
departing for an international competition. If an athlete tested 
positive, they would not attend that particular competition. 
Perhaps because of programmes such as the GDR’s 
internal testing, there were fewer positive results found on the 
international stage than might be expected. For example, IOC 
testing at the Olympic Games recorded only fifty-two positive 
results between 1968 and 1992 out of an athlete population of 
54,000 (Hanstad, Smith and Waddington 2008). These statistics 
led to suggestions that the IOC programme was ineffective. 
During the period between the 1970s and 1990s, national and 
sporting bodies heavily criticised the IOC’s programme for its 
lack of success. These bodies argued that the IOC did not take 
drug-testing seriously as they were nervous that it would have 
a negative commercial impact on the Olympics through 
negative publicity (Hanstad, Smith and Waddington 2008). 
Certainly, Franke and Berendonk (1997) suggest that it is 
curious that no out-of-competition testing was ever initiated 
despite the suspicions aroused by female athletes with 
unusually deep voices. 
Houlihan (1999) points out that prior to the 
establishment of WADA in 1999, the various national and 
sporting organisations were not working together towards a 
combined goal. WADA was necessary as an organisation that 
joined a number of very disparate groups under a single 
umbrella. Houlihan (2002) argues that prior to WADA’s 
existence there was no dedicated group prepared to take 
responsibility for anti-doping, with distrust among the 
international federations and IOC making it difficult for such 
groups to work together towards a common goal. Houlihan’s 
(2002) emphasis on the distrust echoes Latour’s (1991) and 
Callon’s (1986) arguments that in order for an actor-network to 
stabilise, there must first be an alignment of points of view. In 
this case there was no alignment between various sporting and 
national bodies and the IOC, which meant no effective action 
to detect doping occurred. 
Given the lack of alignment, it was perhaps inevitable 
that those groups who were determined to see serious doping 
eradication efforts put into place would combine together to 
take control of anti-doping and create a more stable actor-
network. The resultant actor-network was WADA, created at 
the World Conference on Doping in Sport, held in Lausanne on 
2–4 February 1999, and convened by the IOC (Hanstad, Smith 
and Waddington 2008). These authors state that the conference 
was called following events at the 1998 Tour de France, when 
French police and customs officials uncovered evidence of 
widespread doping. They describe how various sporting 
bodies put pressure on the IOC to respond to this scandal 
because it was the police and customs officials who revealed 
the scandal rather than the sports authorities. Sport has always 
been in an interesting position in that it has rules with sanctions 
and other deterrents and yet sits outside of any formal legal 
framework. Indeed, many countries have restrictions on the 
ability for the law to interfere with ‘field-of-play’ decisions. So 
in this case it is not surprising that sporting bodies reacted 
unfavourably to the police’s involvement in doping, given the 
strong history of sporting bodies being able to operate in a 
reasonably autonomous manner. This provided strong 
motivation for them to remain in control of doping, rather than 
risk losing authority to the police or other legal entities. 
WADA was set up as a body with representatives from 
government and other public authorities, as well as sports 
organisations such as international federations and the IOC 
(Houlihan, 2002). Funding remains shared between these 
groups (Hanstad, Smith and Waddington 2008; 
Houlihan, 2002). Houlihan (p. 188) describes the initial role of 
WADA as: 
the funding of research, the development of educational materials, the drafting of the 
World Anti-Doping Code, the conduct of an independent drug testing programme and 
the provision of independent observers at major sports competitions, such as the Olympic 
Games. 
In performing these actions, WADA took on the role of a 
‘command centre’ in directing worldwide anti-doping 
operations in a variety of nations. WADA’s structure and 
surveillance mechanisms have allowed the organisation to 
remain in firm control of the fight against doping. 
Doping as black-boxed? 
In June 2002 WADA published the first Anti-Doping Code 
(Houlihan, 2002). With the establishment of the code and its 
consequent adoption by both sports authorities and 
governments, it acted as an inscription that black-boxed 
doping as censured. Latour describes black-boxing as 
the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When a 
machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on its inputs 
and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the more science and 
technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become. (Latour, 1999b, p. 304) 
In the case of doping, WADA and various other sports governing bodies have worked hard to 
try to black-box doping as a bad behaviour that is detrimental to sport and must be eradicated. 
For example, the WADA website (WADA, 2014) includes very little discussion of why 
members of the athletic community should take an anti-doping stance as it is assumed that the 
‘doping is bad’ message is unarguable. This is a good example of how the internal 
complexity surrounding doping has been obscured. The black-boxing means that the ‘input’ 
of an athlete who dopes results immediately in an ‘output’ of that athlete being viewed in a 
negative way (Latour, 1999b). This section will now explore why and how doping came to be 
black-boxed in this way. 
Lopez (2012) utilises a model of technological change 
developed by Brian Winston that adopts the view that any 
technological innovation must be considered within the 
broader social context of its development. As demonstrated by 
previous chapters, such a perspective strongly resembles ANT, 
which argues that the entire actor-network must be considered 
in order to understand how action takes place. In the case of 
doping, Lopez argues that the contradictions inherent in the 
doping debate can be understood through identifying two 
groups of actors. The first is the sports community itself, which 
derives status from the continued push for improvement in 
performance that is seen as a hallmark of sport. In opposition 
to this are journalists, medical professionals and various 
governing agencies, who hold a different understanding of 
sport, as discussed below. 
Lopez (2012) and Moller (2004) both argue that from 
within the sport community the eagerness to ban doping, and 
to black-box it as negative, stems from what they interpret as 
an anti-modernist argument. They point out that the desire to 
keep the sport ‘pure’ harks back to the ideals of amateurism 
ideals, which viewed the professionalisation and 
commercialisation of sport as ruining its character. However, 
Lopez (2012) argues that such a view runs counter to the very 
essence of competitive sport: the goal of becoming ‘higher, 
faster, stronger’. The use of doping to produce superior 
performances is entirely in keeping with the logic that an 
athlete should be aiming to improve on their performances at 
all times, both in terms of improving their own individual 
efforts and through eclipsing what others have achieved 
historically. 
In support of the notion of doping confirming the goal of 
sport, a number of sports sociologists or philosophers have 
pointed out the contradictions inherent in doping policy. These 
are summed up by Kayser and Smith (2008), who published a 
summary of the problematic nature of doping policy in 
the British Medical Journal, signed by twenty-four researchers 
working in medicine, philosophy or sociology. These 
contradictions are the ‘internal complexities’ (Latour, 1999b, p. 
304) of doping, which generally remain obscure to the majority 
of the population. 
Kayser and Smith (2008, p. 86) describe four 
conventional reasons for the banning of doping: ‘the need to 
ensure a “level playing field”; the need to protect the health of 
athletes; the need to preserve the integrity of sport; and the 
need to set a good example’. They point out that all four of 
these arguments have flaws. 
First, the level playing field argument is illogical in the 
face of sport being already a competition between profoundly 
unequal bodies (Houlihan, 2008). Athletes are unequal owing 
to genetic and biological differences, along with other 
inequalities stemming from access to equipment, technologies 
or expertise, as discussed in the previous chapter. It is the 
differences between these bodies and their relative success and 
identification of who is superior that interests fans who watch 
the sport. Therefore, arguing that doping violates the level 
playing field is nonsensical, since the playing field is far from 
level to begin with (Kayser and Smith, 2008). 
The argument that doping is dangerous to the health of 
athletes is similarly illogical. Sport entails athletes taking a 
large number of risks that often impact negatively on athlete 
health. Such risks may result in direct injuries or injuries from 
overuse or overtraining, or athletes may develop particular 
psychological or other health disorders. Confirming the notion 
that banning doping for this reason is illogical, it has been 
pointed out that doping could in fact make some sports safer. 
For example, Olympic medallist in downhill skiing Bode Miller 
argued: ‘I’m surprised it’s illegal because in our sport it would 
be pretty minimal health risks and it would actually make it 
safer for the athletes, because you have less chance of making 
a mistake at the bottom and killing yourself’ (Smith, 2005, cited 
in Cameron and Kerr, 2007, p. 408). Miller’s argument confirms 
the serious risk of injury and even death already in place in 
downhill skiing, and points to the illogical nature of arguing 
that doping would be more dangerous than the sport in its 
current form. 
The health argument further falls down as a result of the 
lack of scientific evidence that doping really does cause harm. 
For ethical reasons, clinical trials have not been able to take 
place to confirm the effects of doping. Additionally, because 
doping is currently banned, it leads to doping occurring in a 
clandestine fashion. Athletes have no choice but to acquire 
banned substances in whatever way they can, which means the 
quality of the substances cannot be guaranteed and opens up 
the possibility that athletes may self-administer rather than 
seek medical advice. It is possible to argue that through 
banning doping, these practices, occurring in an underground 
fashion, are potentially harmful (Houlihan, 2008). 
The integrity argument is based on the supposition that 
doping runs counter to the ethical foundations upon which 
sport exists. However, as Houlihan (2008) points out, it is very 
difficult to identify common ethical foundations upon which 
sport rests. He observes that many of the rules that exist in 
sport are arbitrary and without any strong ethical foundation, 
so banning doping for this reason makes little sense. A related 
argument is offered by Lopez (2012), who claims that one of the 
strongest foundations of sport is the belief in ‘faster, higher, 
stronger’, which entails encouraging athletes to use whatever 
means they can in order to improve performance. Doping 
fulfils this notion very well, rather than countering it. 
Finally, the argument that all athletes must be role 
models means that athletes must be held to higher account over 
their behaviour than other individuals, despite the fact that 
their expertise is in athletic excellence and not moral 
behaviour. Other individuals are not held to account for their 
behaviour in the way that athletes are (Kayser and 
Smith, 2008). 
Given this lack of logic, it is perhaps curious that doping 
has so effectively been black-boxed as censured. Lopez (2012) 
attempts to answer the question of how the black-boxing came 
about through identifying a number of groups and techniques 
that have created this categorisation. First, he identifies a range 
of conservative European ex-athletes who, upon retiring from 
competitive sport, began to hold influential administrative or 
medical positions within a range of national and international 
sporting organisations. These ex-athletes ‘wanted to fashion 
sport in their image: the established amateur traditional 
culture’ (Dimeo, 2007, cited in Lopez, 2012, p. 63). They 
pursued the romantic idealised notion that sport should be 
kept pure, and in their view doping sat outside of this pure 
image. 
Lopez (2012) further notes that sports journalism has 
been dominated by ex-athletes who either hold the view 
outlined above, or who come from nations that have 
deliberately taken a strong anti-doping stance as a perceived 
way to further their own nation’s results. For example, France 
has always taken a strong anti-doping stance in contrast to the 
superpowers of East Germany or the Soviet Union 
(Houlihan, 1999). 
Ahead of both these groups, however, Lopez argues that 
the group that has been the most influential in black-boxing 
doping is the medical profession. Lopez (2012, p. 64) claims 
that the drive to spurn doping was led by: 
a group of physicians – often former elite athletes – involved in elite sport as medical 
advisors who spearheaded the cultural revolution which in the 1960s turned doping from 
a more or less accepted (and, for some, even desirable) practice into an intolerable 
violation of the spirit of sport. 
Lopez names four particularly influential physicians who 
moved from dealing with doping from purely a medical 
perspective to introducing the notion that doping was counter 
to the spirit of sport. He argues that these four, along with 
others, eventually succeeded through a large propaganda 
campaign which was effective because of its links with the 
societal fears of technological intervention around bio-
medicine that were present in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
campaign culminated with the establishment of WADA in 
1999, but anti-doping ideals then came to be adopted by a 
number of high-profile athletes who joined the anti-doping 
campaign. Their cases were printed in the media, leading to a 
number of journalists adopting a strong anti-doping stance and 
moving beyond the role of unbiased journalists to become anti-
doping spokespeople (Lopez, 2012). 
Yet the media cannot hold any power unless there is an 
audience to listen, and several authors have already pointed 
out the links between the moral panic over doping in sport and 
the wider moral panic occurring around the use of recreational 
drugs (Kayser and Smith, 2008; Waddington, 2000). Kayser 
and Smith (2008) point to the way that the ‘war on drugs’ has 
become synonymous with the ‘war on doping’, as evidenced 
by the addition of recreational drugs that provide no 
performance enhancement, such as marijuana, to the banned 
list. 
WADA plays on the moral panic to promote the anti-
doping message. As mentioned earlier, WADA’s anti-doping 
campaign includes very little discussion of why members of 
the athletic community should be against doping, as it is 
assumed that the ‘doping is bad’ message is unarguable. 
Instead, the community is invited to contribute their own anti-
doping messages and to promote the message of anti-doping 
in whatever way that they choose (WADA, 2014). WADA also 
ensures that athletes are constantly given the message that, if 
they dope, they will be caught. This is a very simple ‘input–
output’ message that WADA has attempted to convey. 
However, this discourse on its own is insufficient to deter 
athletes from doping, with WADA’s control of anti-doping 
stemming from a vast array of surveillance mechanisms, which 
I will now discuss. 
Doping and surveillance 
A range of authors have examined how WADA operates as an 
extensive surveillance regime in its attempts to eradicate 
doping (see, for example, Hanstad and Loland, 2009; 
Park, 2005; Sluggett, 2011; Waddington, 2010). In 2003 WADA 
introduced a new requirement that all athletes registered as 
competing at the elite level must report their whereabouts to 
WADA in order that they could be located for random doping 
tests at all times (Hanstad and Loland, 2009; 
Waddington, 2010). As part of their agreement with WADA, 
national and international sports federations must keep a 
record of all athletes competing at the top level and undertake 
regular doping tests. Athletes can then face sanctions if they do 
not fill out the details of their movements or if they miss doping 
tests (Hanstad and Loland, 2009; Waddington, 2010). In 2008 
WADA reviewed their policy to demand more details from 
athletes. Since 2009 athletes have been required to report their 
exact whereabouts on a daily basis every three months. These 
requirements have led athletes to criticise WADA for using an 
extreme level of surveillance, reminiscent of ‘Big Brother’ 
(Waddington, 2010). 
Foucault (1977) specifically argues that organisations 
such as governments utilise a range of surveillance 
mechanisms in order to produce effective citizens. He says that 
these are in the language of ensuring the health of the 
population, and indeed sport is a commonly used by 
governments to ensure the health of the population. 
Utilising Foucault’s ideas, Park (2005) argues that the 
primary programmes used by WADA do not only test for 
doping but also shape athletic conduct through creating a 
culture of surveillance. He provides three examples. The first 
is the requirement that all athletes must be available for 
unannounced out-of-competition testing at any time. This 
requirement legalises the intrusion of athletic authorities into 
athletes’ private and everyday lives. The second example is the 
extensive research into potential new drug tests and the saving 
of blood and urine samples for twenty years or more. The 
saving of samples acts as a potential threat to athletes who can 
potentially be punished by being stripped of their medals 
many years after they have finished competing. The final 
example is the athlete passport, an online site designed to make 
it easy for athletes to update their details, thereby facilitating 
WADA’s surveying of the athletes’ movements. While WADA 
emphasises that participation in the passport programme is 
voluntary, they also claim that participation demonstrates an 
athlete’s commitment to the fight against doping, again 
shaping the behaviour of athletes. 
The case of Lance Armstrong demonstrates a further and 
more recent form of surveillance: the gaze of other competitors. 
Lance Armstrong was accused of doping not because he had 
failed any doping tests but on the basis of testimony from other 
cyclists, in particular Tyler Hamilton and Floyd Landis. In 
Armstrong’s case this testimony, together with that of ten other 
anonymous cyclists, acted as evidence of Armstrong’s doping, 
despite the lack of evidence through testing. Houlihan (2002, p. 
191) points to the section of the first anti-doping code, which 
said that athletes 
are quite understandably required ‘to take responsibility, in the context of anti-doping, 
for what they ingest and use’, but are also required, much more controversially, ‘to report 
anti-doping rule violations of which they have knowledge, to an appropriate anti-doping 
agency’. (WADA 2002, Article 5, Paras. 5.1.3 and 5.1.5) 
Houlihan (2002) suggests that, while it is entirely appropriate 
for athletes to be held responsible for their own actions, it 
seems harsh to sanction athletes for not reporting the violations 
of others. In a related argument, Sottas et al. (2008, pp. 191–192) 
describe how witness statements can be used as evidence of 
doping despite their unreliability: 
Reliable means can be widely interpreted and include documentary evidence, witness 
statements or any other analytical information that could be presented to a disciplinary 
panel. We have seen recently cases where athletes have been convicted of doping and 
sanctioned based on these non-analytical reliable evidences (see CAS decisions – USADA 
v. Tim Montgomery, CAS 2004/0/645, or USADA v. Chrystie Gaines, CAS 2004/0/649). 
Given that competitive sport requires athletes to compete 
against one another, it seems somewhat dubious to allow the 
testimonies of athletes in direct competition with others to 
stand alone as a proof of guilt. However, it is an effective 
doping deterrent since it creates a situation where potentially 
all athletes are surveying other athletes at all times. It therefore 
illustrates effectively Foucault’s concept of technologies of the 
self (Foucault, 1988), which argues that individuals modify 
their own behaviour owing to the belief that others may be 
watching. In the case of doping, athletes may be surveyed by 
other athletes or through analysis of their urine and blood, and 
the surveillance can occur at any time. 
Sluggett (2011) argues that, while Foucault’s ideas are 
valuable for examining some of the surveillance mechanisms 
utilised by WADA, they may not be sufficient for examining 
the full range of processes that it has in place. Sluggett claims 
that Foucault developed his ideas with reference to enclosed 
spaces such as prisons and mental institutions, but with the 
proliferation of forms of surveillance that utilise more 
technological techniques including web-based surveillance, 
other theoretical approaches may be of more value. He 
suggests that an approach that moves beyond Foucault to 
acknowledge the way surveillance has extended is to use 
Deleuze’s ideas on the ‘control society’. 
Deleuze (1992) argued that surveillance mechanisms 
changed in form throughout the twentieth century. At the 
beginning and middle of the century, the consequent 
disciplining that took place through surveillance, occurred 
through the existence of physical facilities. These institutions, 
such as schools, factories and hospitals, enacted surveillance 
within the enclosed confines of their various facilities. In this 
context the panoptic model (Foucault, 1977) was highly 
effective as it was possible for individuals to be surveyed fairly 
constantly throughout these various institutions. However, in 
the late twentieth century, globalisation has led to a different 
societal model where individuals are constantly on the move 
and constantly networked (particularly through the internet) 
rather than passing through institutions. Deleuze (1992, p. 6) 
used a sporting analogy to illustrate his point by arguing that 
traditional sports that require formal training, practice and 
competition in an enclosed facility have been replaced by forms 
such as surfing, where athletes do not necessarily receive 
formal training, are not always part of competitive or 
institutionalised structures and may be constantly on the 
move. In this context, surveillance is more likely to occur 
through many small dispersed points rather than through a 
single physical location. Instead of athletes being physically 
surveyed, they are now provided with access to particular 
information or ‘places’ with the help of particular entry codes. 
Sluggett’s (2011) study of WADA’s surveillance system 
identifies the proliferation of surveillance processes that go 
beyond those discussed above. Sluggett details how WADA 
connects with and shares information with a range of 
organisations that allow them to build up individual profiles 
on athletes and coaches. For example, WADA has signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Interpol on the sharing 
of information, and has agreements with a range of other 
pharmaceutical and police bodies. A very specific case is their 
agreement with Australian customs, who routinely share 
information with WADA about any intercepted 
pharmaceuticals addressed to coaches. Information is also 
collected through the Athlete Passport programme, in which 
WADA monitors an athlete’s biological profile through regular 
testing, not with the goal of identifying doping directly but to 
identify any changes that resemble the side-effects of doping. 
Athletes whose profiles raise suspicion are then targeted for 
more thorough investigation. 
The information from all these sources is collected into a 
database and combined together to build up a very distinct 
profile about each athlete. For example, Sluggett described one 
case where the collection of information clearly led to the 
detection of doping: 
If I can give you an example without naming the rider, there was a rider we targeted out-
of-competition because all the pieces of information came together. We observed his test 
results in-competition and out-of-competition and although he had not tested positive we 
felt there was a case to be followed up. Then he pulled out of a race he was expected to 
do well in, with a case of tendonitis. This was a few days after it became public that 
CERA1was detectable. So, we thought, this sounds strange. He’s got a very dodgy profile, 
let’s go and see him at home. Bingo, that [CERA] was what he was doing. (Gripper, 2008, 
cited in Sluggett, 2011, p. 396) 
Sluggett argues that this example shows how it was the 
invisibility of WADA’s data collection that allowed doping to 
be detected, which is in contrast to the very visible surveillance 
provided by cameras and other mechanisms described by 
Foucault (1977) as utilised by institutions. At the same time, he 
notes how the two connect through the ‘coded body’. The 
coded body is the collection of data about a particular body that 
identifies it as suspect. The coded body exists as an assemblage 
and in multiple forms. For example, the same ‘body’ (or named 
athlete) exists in both an electronic form and as a biological 
entity. Sluggett argues that this view of the body moves it 
beyond the clean/doped binary that was previously identified 
through drug testing, with the body instead being seen as more 
or less at risk of doping. Indeed, he confirms how bodies are 
allocated a number on a scale of one to ten, where the higher 
the number, the more likely the coded body is to be doping. 
Once a coded body is identified as having a high number, 
visible surveillance is used in the form of drug testing in order 
to try to identify doping. 
Sluggett concludes that Deleuze’s assemblage model is 
valuable for drawing attention to the multiple forms of 
surveillance that now exist, and as a way to identify 
connections between multiple points. However, he also argues 
that the model is too flat, and does not provide sufficient 
understanding of how state or sovereign power 
(Foucault, 1977) operates through the assemblage. 
A remedy for this defect may be offered through Latour’s 
(2005) notion of the oligopticon. Similar to Deleuze, Latour also 
describes an assemblage surveillance model, incorporating 
multiple forms of surveillance occurring through multiple 
connections. Where Deleuze and Latour differ is in Latour’s 
insistence that the assemblage has a central command point, 
which he refers to as the oligopticon. Through arguing that the 
assemblage works outwards from a particular point, Latour’s 
model is closer in nature to Foucault’s (1977) model of 
sovereign or state power. But, unlike Foucault, Latour sees 
multiple relationships occurring between the command point 
and between other parts of the network. It consists of a ‘more 
dispersed form of surveillance supported by multiple sites’ 
(Manley, Palmer and Roderick, 2012, p. 310). Latour compares 
the panopticon and the oligopticon by describing the 
panopticon’s gaze as absolute while the oligopticon is made of 
multiple strands that do not have absolute sight, but which see 
narrowly and well. Latour uses the example of the army 
control tent to illustrate how the oligopticon works. The tent is 
only one small physical area, yet owing to a surveillance 
system that covers many miles, a battle can be directed from 
the command tent, provided that it remains connected to the 
front lines. 
WADA can similarly be likened to an oligopticon, since 
the networks that contribute to the detection of doping stem 
from a central control point. WADA is run by an executive 
committee, which is described as ‘WADA’s ultimate policy-
making body’ (WADA, 2015a), and a foundation board, which 
is described as ‘WADA’s supreme decision-making body’ 
(WADA, 2015b). While there are a range of other committees 
that hold different advisory remits or representations from 
different groups (such as athletes), these two committees act as 
the central control point in the same way as Latour’s (2005) 
example of the army control tent acts as the leader of an army. 
In both examples, the ‘fighting’ takes place at a different 
location from the control centre and involves many more 
people and more action than the control centre. Nonetheless, 
the control centre firmly directs the operations, but only insofar 
as it remains connected to those at the front lines, and also 
insofar as the different groups at the front lines also remain 
connected. As Sluggett (2011) confirms, it is the connections 
between the different groups that allow information to be 
collected and doping to be detected, but, confirming Latour’s 
(2005) point, it is WADA’s central committees that sign the 
memorandums between organisations, creating connections 
and directing the overall operations. Through these actions, 
WADA directs the anti-doping actor-network. The actor-
network is made up of national anti-doping bodies who co-
ordinate testing in their own countries, and the network 
includes all the medical staff and laboratory equipment 
required to carry out the testing. The network also includes 
police and customs agents, who similarly have their own data 
collection methods and a vast number of inscriptions on the 
WADA database, which detail information about the athletes 
and their histories as well as their movements collected 
through a range of methods. Finally, the actor-network 
includes athletes, who, as the Lance Armstrong case 
demonstrated, can also act as surveyors of athletic conduct. As 
an oligopticon, WADA is able to direct anti-doping operations 
through the information generated through these various 
networks. 
But the oligopticon of WADA is also constantly shifting. 
It may stabilise at particular times, when doping cases are 
identified, but it cannot remain stable as it must be responsive 
to the new developments constantly occurring in doping in 
order to continue to detect it. Scientists are constantly working 
to find ways to beat the testing, and in this way the actor-
network that makes up doping continually expands. For 
example, as already described in this chapter, originally 
substances were only placed on the banned list once a test had 
been determined. However, this was soon altered and the 
actor-network grew through the inclusion of more banned 
substances. With the establishment of WADA, the network 
expanded through an increase in funding, which allowed more 
extensive research in an attempt to stay ahead of the game. This 
research identified substances such as designer steroids: 
steroids that were deliberately manufactured in a way to avoid 
detection through the testing system (Kazlauskas, 2010). 
Therefore the network expanded to include extensive scientific 
research on both sides, as it was needed to identify these 
substances and the methods to create more. Further, as the 
influence of WADA increased, and doping became a greater 
public issue, it became more and more difficult to obtain any 
banned substances. Therefore the actor-network grew further 
through the addition of organised crime, identified as part of 
the doping network in the Australian inquiry in 2013 
(Gerrard, 2013). 
These examples demonstrate the way that doping exists 
as an ever-expanding actor-network, continually increasing as 
more human and non-human actants are enrolled in order to 
act against each other. One of the results of this ever-larger 
actor-network is the difficulty of working out who should be 
blamed. As my ANT analysis has shown, doping consists of an 
extensive actor-network where any part can affect the results 
in another, so it is it difficult to identify who is at fault. A recent 
case that demonstrates this issue was the case of the Belarusian 
shotputter Natalya Ostapchuk. Ostapchuk failed a doping test 
at the 2012 Olympic Games, costing her the gold medal. In her 
defence Ostapchuk claimed that she had been framed and was 
not at fault. Her coach later confessed to dusting her food with 
steroids without her knowledge, but this claim has been 
greeted with scepticism (Kirk, 2012; Plumb, 2012). This 
incident demonstrates how when a part of the black box fails, 
the internal problems within it come to light. It became 
apparent that, despite the extensive surveillance performed by 
WADA, there was little clarity with regard to whether the 
athlete or coach was at fault. The most famous case where this 
issue came to light, one that has appeared in numerous court 
cases over the last decade, is that of East Germany, discussed 
in detail in the final section of this chapter. 
State Plan 14.25: the East German state-sponsored doping 
programme, 1974–1989 
The East German sporting regime is now known to have been 
responsible for one of the most famous cases of systematic 
doping of a large number of athletes. We now know that the 
experimentation with steroids began in the 1960s and 
essentially continued until the collapse of the political regime 
in 1989. 
Steroids began to be used by East German male athletes 
from 1960 and by females from 1968 (Franke and 
Berendonk, 1997). Their use became more common in the 
1970s, and doping was formalised into State Plan 14.25 in 1974 
(Dimeo and Hunt, 2011). The creation of State Plan 14.25 is 
evidence that from early on there was direct government 
facilitation of the doping programme. However, the secrecy of 
the system was such that although there were suspicions of 
doping amongst the East Germans, there was no awareness of 
the state-sponsored system until the collapse of the GDR in 
1989. The GDR avoided international positive doping tests by 
using their own laboratories to test athletes, ensuring that the 
steroids were flushed out of their system during competitions 
(Dimeo and Hunt, 2011; Franke and Berendonk, 1997). The 
secrecy was further ensured by placing control of the doping 
programme under the Ministry of State Security, otherwise 
known as the Stasi (Dimeo and Hunt, 2011). 
The secrecy surrounding doping was so successful that 
they only became aware of the GDR doping programme 
through some of the inscriptions that came to light in the 1990s. 
The inscriptions contain over 150 documents, including PhDs, 
medical reports and Stasi security documents, that detail the 
types and doses of drugs administered to thousands of athletes 
(Franke and Berendonk, 1997). 
Since these revelations there have been numerous court 
cases where athletes have testified to the debilitating side-
effects produced by the high doses of steroids they were given 
(Dimeo and Hunt, 2011). Former athletes revealed they had 
developed excessive hair growth, infertility problems, and 
kidney and liver problems, amongst other effects 
(Kettman, 2000). 
Dimeo and Hunt (2011, p. 587) described the workings of 
the GDR’s doping programme thus: 
Athletes were not given a choice: once an individual reached a certain standard of 
performance their coach would provide them with the pills. The coach would be 
following the instructions of the doping working group, and each sports federation would 
have a doping programme. The doctors would support the coaches in their delivery of 
the pills. However, the athletes were often told that these were simply vitamins, while 
pressured not to discuss them (or any other aspect of their training) with family, friends 
or other athletes. 
This description depicts the individual athletes, the coaches 
and the doctors as all simply following orders from above, 
which was the conclusion of many of the trials. For example, 
the doctor in charge of the swimming team, Dr Lothar Kipke, 
denied being culpable, on the basis that he was just following 
orders and was unaware of the side-effects of the steroids 
(Dimeo and Hunt, 2011). Furthermore, the network of those 
involved in doping was enormous. Franke and Berendonk 
(1997) report that the documentation they researched 
revealed that seven different ministries were involved in the 
doping research programme, which included a network of 
over a thousand different individuals. 
Dimeo and Hunt (2011) also point out that, even if the 
athletes had been told of the doping programme, many were 
too young to make a choice, and none had access to any 
rational information to assist with decision-making. For 
example, many athletes reported that they were aged between 
twelve and fourteen when they were first doped. They were 
given pills that they were told were vitamins, or special drinks, 
or injections where they were not allowed to look at the labels 
on the vials. The athletes were also told not to discuss these 
with their parents or anyone else (Dimeo and Hunt, 2011; 
Franke and Berendonk, 1997). Therefore it is very difficult to 
argue that the athletes were in any way at fault for doping. 
However, Dimeo and Hunt also present a counter-
argument by suggesting that some of the athletes were very 
aware of the nature of the pills and discussed it with each other. 
Similarly, they report how there were coaches who believed 
the state-sponsored doping plan was too tame compared with 
what they believed was occurring in other nations. Some of 
these coaches are described as having personally overdosed 
athletes, against the advice of the doping working group, and 
were disciplined by their superiors for doing so. Franke and 
Berendonk (1997) also report how the doctors complained of 
the constant demands for steroids from the coaches, so it is 
likely that in some cases the coaches were at fault. 
Franke and Berendonk describe a report that details the 
exact doping procedures in weight-lifting and who was 
involved in the decision-making processes. They claim that the 
coaches and team doctor made the decision about which 
athletes should receive doping assistance, with the central 
government working group responsible for determining the 
exact form the doping should take. Such a process suggests that 
all of the coaches, doctors and politicians were equally 
responsible, as all appeared to be involved. 
Franke and Berendonk also report a situation where the 
director of the doping working group, Mannfred Hoeppner, 
reported to the Stasi that he refused to take responsibility for 
the administration of a new steroid: mestanolone. This was 
administered to athletes before official approval of its 
administration to humans, including any clinical trials. This 
case indicates that, while it would be difficult to claim 
Hoeppner was innocent of any involvement in the extensive 
doping, at times the network extended beyond the normal 
reach of the state, with clandestine trials occurring outside of 
the state’s jurisdiction. 
The other area that presented a difficulty was 
determining who had awareness of the side-effects and the 
long-term effects of doping. Dimeo and Hunt (2011) report that 
coaches and doctors both claimed not to be aware of the effects. 
By contrast, Franke and Berendonk (1997) cite evidence that 
doctors were aware of the effects and that many found the 
treatments unethical, only continuing the work because of 
pressure from the Stasi. 
In legal trials that occurred in 2000, where hundreds of 
East German athletes sought compensation, the head of the 
GDR sports system, Manfred Ewald, was given a twenty-two-
month suspended sentence, and Mannfred Hoeppner, director 
of the doping regime, an eighteen-month suspended sentence 
(Magnay, 2005). Only 197 athletes received compensation, as in 
many cases there was no documentary evidence, no 
inscriptions, to provide evidence of other athletes who were 
doped (Magnay, 2005). 
While it is understandable that there was a wish to 
provide some sort of accountability and compensation for 
those who were affected by the doping regime, an ANT 
analysis would argue that doping is the result of a 
heterogeneous actor-network. More than a thousand 
individuals were involved. Additionally, doping occured 
through the creation and administration of non-humanactants 
such as pills, injections and drinks, which were created, tested 
and manufactured by laboratories with specialist equipment. 
Records of the administration were kept as inscriptions, which 
allowed the tracking of the effects of the drugs and the 
revelations of their use in the future. Doping occurred through 
the use of these non-human actants. It is impossible to argue 
that any of these factors were by themselves fully to blame, but 
together, they proved to have a very definite effect of 
improving sports performance as well as impacting on 
athletes’ health. 
Further, it has been very difficult to determine exactly 
what happened because of incomplete inscriptions. The 
incomplete inscriptions essentially act as mediators, disrupting 
the easy identification of what exact doping regime was 
administered to which individual. This is the opposite to the 
intermediary function for which the records were originally 
created, as the detail included in the records was able to show 
conclusively the effects of the particular drugs. For example, 
Franke and Berendonk (1997) include photographs taken from 
original Stasi files that consist of detailed graphs showing the 
administration of particular steroids and their effects on 
performance. These graphs were immensely valuable in 
determining the effects of the steroid most commonly 
administered during the GDR’s regime – Oral Turinabol – 
clearly indicating the increase in performance that resulted 
from the steroid. 
Latour (1990, cited in Smith et al., 2000) argues that 
graphs are a particularly important type of inscription, because 
they possess five distinct features. First, they are able to 
transcend time and place, through utilising representations 
to show clearly what would otherwise be invisible. The graphs 
featured in Franke and Berendonk demonstrate the link 
between the steroids and performance in a way that is invisible 
to anyone simply looking at the athletes’ performance or 
watching them take the pills. Second, graphs can be compared, 
thus allowing understandings of differences and 
developments across different times and places. This was a 
crucial feature of the GDR’s regime, as the meticulous keeping 
of records in the form of graphs allowed an understanding to 
be gained as to the long-term effects of steroids. For example, 
one of the problems identified in the regime was that athletes 
quickly adjusted to the doses of the steroids and, as the years 
passed, needed larger doses in order to produce the same 
effects, which meant the risks of side-effects became greater 
(Franke and Berendonk, 1997). It was the existence of graphs 
that allowed the effects of steroids to become visible. Third, 
graphs are easily transportable. They can be carried to different 
laboratories or sent over the internet. In the case of the GDR, it 
was this transportability that allowed the identification of the 
doping regime to come to light, as graphs can be viewed with 
understanding years later. Fourth, they are immutable, both in 
the sense that they can be physically moved around while still 
holding their shape and in the sense that their meaning is 
retained regardless of the groups that look on them (Law and 
Singleton, 2004). Again, graphs such as those discussed above 
maintain their of regardless of where they are moved, and the 
meaning from the graphs is retained regardless of the context, 
meaning we can examine a graph in 2015 and derive the same 
understanding as derived in the GDR in the 1960s, when the 
graph was first produced. Finally, because of the qualities 
already described, graphs can be enlisted to convince other 
scientists of the data (Smith et al., 2000). The GDR’s graphs 
could easily be used to convince those with doubts about the 
effects of steroids on sporting performance. In all likelihood, 
graphs such as these would indeed have been used by the 
scientists who conducted the tests to convince wider groups, 
such as the Stasi, of the potential offered by steroids. The 
inscriptions reveal that this is exactly what happened, and that 
once the effects of the steroids become apparent, the state-
controlled doping programme began in earnest. Essentially, 
the doping programme worked through inscriptions, which 
also allowed the details of the programme to be revealed in the 
1990s. 
The numerous inscriptions available about the East 
German programme make it possible to understand at some 
level what occurred. However, this is very unusual in the case 
of doping, where extensive inscriptions of this nature rarely 
exist. For example, despite the 1998 Tour de France scandal 
acting as a catalyst for the creation of WADA and overall 
awareness of doping, there is still no clarity over exactly who 
was involved. 
Conclusion 
Throughout its history, a range of organisations have 
controlled doping through multiple mechanisms. The IOC’s 
creation of the banned list was the first inscription that 
transformed various substances from innocuous to 
problematic. But the IOC’s network included a range of 
commercial connections, such as media and sponsors, which 
meant that the IOC did not want to draw attention to doping 
in sport because of concerns about risking its reputation. 
Consequently, the IOC’s efforts to ban doping were relatively 
weak. This changed in 1998, when the discovery of a significant 
doping ring by police and customs agents led sporting bodies 
to question the IOC’s efforts and produce a more stable and 
effective actor-network in the form of WADA. 
Since its formation, WADA has utilised a range of 
different methods in order to attempt to eradicate doping. 
WADA has consistently black-boxed doping as ‘bad’ despite 
the lack of evidence to confirm this claim. Indeed, the mass 
media and sports fans appear to have now accepted anti-
doping as an important aspect of the workings of sport. 
In order to identify doping athletes, WADA has operated 
various forms of surveillance since its formation. Some of this 
surveillance has taken the form of physical tests that constitute 
a form of direct surveillance reminiscent of the panoptical 
institutions described by Foucault (1977). I argue that WADA 
has more recently operated as an oligopticon. WADA has a 
central command point made up of two committees, and these 
direct operations with significant global reach. Through 
connections with police, customs and pharmaceutical 
companies, along with information about athletic performance 
and changes in the internal make-up of athletes, WADA is able 
to piece together a coded body (Deleuze, 1992) to identify 
whether each athlete is likely to be doping. It is the connections 
between these various groups that are important in allowing 
the information to be pieced together to determine guilt, as 
opposed to direct surveillance. 
WADA’s operations are in contrast to those adopted by 
East Germany as part of State Plan 14.25. In the context of East 
Germany I argue that the most important elements that made 
the coded body visible were the inscriptions. These allowed the 
effects of steroids on the body to become visible to coaches and 
scientists at the time, and they allowed these to remain visible 
many years later. 
The ANT concepts of inscriptions and oligoptica are 
significant for understanding power relations. This chapter 
shows how inscriptions are a crucial tool used by organisations 
to retain power. They were used by the IOC to seize control of 
the anti-doping campaign through the banned list, by East 
Germany to determine the significant performance effects of 
steroids and therefore justify the programme, by the legal 
profession to hold East Germany accountable and by WADA 
to confirm its position as the director of the anti-doping 
campaign. Similarly, WADA’s case demonstrates how the 
concept of the oligopticon is significant for understanding how 
institutions use networked operations in order to confirm 
overall power. 
This last point is particularly relevant for future 
examinations of institutions. Deleuze (1992) suggests that 
physically enclosed spaces and the surveillance that occurred 
throughout them in the twentieth century are no longer 
applicable in today’s networked society, where there is 
significantly more mobility. However, as Sluggett (2011) notes, 
Deleuze’s concept of the network emphasises the connections 
and the importance of all aspects of the network so strongly 
that it becomes difficult to identify power relations. By 
contrast, Latour’s (2005) concept of the oligopticon assumes 
that institutions and organisations still make efforts to retain 
power but that they do so through a dispersed network rather 
than through direct surveillance. 
Note 
1Continuous erythropoiesis receptor activator, an artificial substance that mirrors the effects 
of EPO and which is consequently on the WADA banned list. 
5 
The integration of science and medicine into sports 
training 
Every athlete’s body consists of a unique assemblage of 
physical attributes. In order to maximise performance, these 
attributes must be trained and honed, but this can be a difficult 
task as the inner workings of an athlete’s body are not visible 
to the naked eye. Sometimes, an athlete’s particular skill-set 
reveals information about the inner workings of their body. For 
example, an athlete who can sprint quickly is likely to have 
fast-twitch fibres as part of their bodily assemblage. But in 
many cases, it is very difficult for an athlete or coach to 
determine the exact state of the actor-network inside the body. 
This problem is generally solved by enrolling sports 
scientists and medical professionals into the sporting arena. 
Indeed, experts in sports science and medicine are now 
assumed to make up a significant part of a competitive athlete’s 
actor-network. These experts have a range of technological 
tools at their disposal that are able to reveal the inner workings 
of the body and suggest solutions. For example, doctors may 
take blood tests in order to test whether an athlete’s body is 
lacking in any particular type of nutrition. If this is the case a 
specialist dietician or nutritionist may be enrolled in order to 
solve the problem. 
This chapter investigates the processes used by athletes 
and coaches to integrate sport scientists into the sporting 
context. While it would be easy to assume that enrolment 
would easily take place because athletes, coaches and scientists 
all have the common goal of improving performance, the two 
cases in this study demonstrate that the integration process is 
more complex and encompasses a range of perspectives and 
understandings, as well as specific actants, that contribute to 
enrolment or non-enrolment. 
 
 
 
The development of sports science and medicine 
Sports medicine has not always existed as a discipline. Instead, 
it has grown in line with the development of modern sport. 
Waddington (1996, p. 177) defines sports medicine as 
the more or less systematic application of the principles of medicine and science to the 
study of sporting performance, and the institutionalization of this practice in the form of 
professional associations, research establishments, scientific conferences and journals. 
Waddington (1996) describes how sports medicine came into 
being as a discipline in the 1920s and 1930s: the first college of 
sports medicine was created in Germany in 1924, and the first 
use of the term ‘sports medicine’ is recorded as occurring in 
1928. However, it was after the 1950s that the growth of the 
discipline really accelerated. Waddington (1996) argues that 
this came about as a result of the medicalisation of society, 
which encompassed sport, and the increasingly competitive 
nature of sport. These two influences resulted in sports science 
and medicine becoming normal and recognisable parts of 
modern sporting practice. Several authors (Safai, 2007; 
Theberge, 2008; Waddington, 1996) have established that the 
integration of sports scientists into sports training programmes 
has come to be seen as an important path to improving 
performance. Moreover, Safai (2003) acknowledges that the 
constant stream of injured athletes provides regular work for 
sports scientists, leading to them being easily integrated into 
the field. Therefore, it is not surprising that sports medicine has 
flourished and, more recently, come to incorporate some 
complementary or alternative practitioners alongside the 
traditional physicians and physiotherapists (Theberge, 2008). 
Consequently, the modern athlete is understood as 
surrounded by a range of support staff with scientific or 
medical expertise who assist with ensuring the he or she 
performs at maximum capacity. For example, Theberge (2008, 
p. 21) describes the range of sports medics that made up the 
medical delegation for the Canadian Olympic teams in 2004 
and 2006: 
At the 2004 Athens Olympics, the Canadian medical delegation included medical doctors, 
physiotherapists, athletic therapists, chiropractors, massage therapists and psychologists. 
At the 2006 Olympics in Turin, the delegation included these professions, and the addition 
of a nutritionist. 
Similarly, large medical teams are frequently used to support 
professional sport. For example, Lance Armstrong had a three-
member medical team assisting him, which was not questioned 
as unusual until Armstrong’s doping scandal, when all three 
members were banned together with Armstrong 
(Vinton, 2012). 
Within the sociology of sport, attention has been paid to 
the role of scientists in its risk culture (Nixon II, 1992; 
Safai, 2003), the history and development of sports medicine as 
a discipline (Safai, 2007; Waddington 1996, 2000); and the 
specific roles of and power relations between different sports 
medicine professions (Malcolm D., 2006; Theberge, 2008). 
However, there has been only little attention paid to the 
enrolment processes through which sports scientists become 
part of the sporting network. Exceptions include Nixon’s (1992) 
study, where the concept of the ‘sportsnet’ is utilised to 
describe how athletes and coaches identify external resources, 
Pike’s (2005) exploration of how rowers step outside the 
traditional medical framework in order to identify alternative 
practitioners and my own (2012) examination of how gymnasts 
in New Zealand enrol sports scientists. The case studies in this 
chapter are drawn from the work of Pike (2005) and myself 
(2012), with a view to understanding how it is that athletes 
make choices about utilising various practitioners. The cases 
are similar in the sense that neither the rowers nor the 
gymnasts have formal access to sports medicine support as 
part of their training regime, meaning that both the gymnasts 
and rowers (and/or at times their coaches) must make their 
own arrangements in order to access medical support. 
The study of medicine through ANT: the work of Annemarie 
Mol 
A theorist who has received significant acclaim for her ANT-
orientated work is Annemarie Mol. In The Body Multiple: 
Ontology in Medical Practice, Mol sets out to investigate ‘the way 
the tensions between sources of knowledge and styles of 
knowing are handled inside present-day allopathic medicine’ 
(Mol, 2002, p. 1). Mol’s work is of relevance, since this chapter 
examines the integration of sports medicine and sports medical 
professionals into sport, where similarly there are tensions 
regarding knowledge sources and ways of knowing. 
Mol (2002) emphasises that she is interested in multiple 
understandings and not perspectives. She argues that the term 
‘perspective’ refers primarily to a point of view, or a particular 
meaning, whereas, in line with ANT, her view is broader than 
that, in aiming to incorporate physical reality. She is not only 
interested in the meanings ascribed to particular instances of 
the body; she is also interested in the body itself, and in the 
non-humans artefacts attached to medicine that allow different 
understandings to co-exist. She argues that the term 
‘perspective’ refers only to a way of thinking, whereas 
‘understanding’ incorporates a physical reality. 
Mol is also interested in how diseases come into being. 
She observes that diseases do not exist until they have been 
identified by the medical team, and then they come into being 
with a range of associated treatments. She argues that diseases 
are thus ‘performed’ (Mol, 2002, p. 32) by doctors and patients, 
together with a range of heterogeneous actants such as a 
microscope, which allows the doctor to identify particular 
signs and ‘produce’ the disease. Her argument aligns with the 
argument made in the previous chapter that substances only 
come into being as banned once WADA identifies them as 
banned and includes them on the banned list. Both arguments 
emphasise the way that identification by a medical team of 
diseases or substances transforms them from a range of 
apparently innocent symptoms or chemicals into potential 
‘evils’. 
Thus far in this book there has been little attention to the 
methods used by ANT theorists, primarily for the reason that 
there are very few studies of sport that utilise an ANT 
methodology to draw on. Mol’s ethnography, however, 
provides an excellent example of the ANT methodology at 
work. 
In one sense Mol undertook a traditional ethnography. 
She located a setting, in her case a Dutch hospital, where she 
situated herself and undertook extensive observation. Mol 
(2002, p. 3) describes her experiences: 
I observed technicians handing diagnostic tools in the vascular laboratory. I followed the 
tracks of radiologists and pathologists in their leadings with leg arteries. I went for months 
to the weekly meetings where the treatment options for patients with complicated cases 
of vascular disease were discussed. I witnessed several operations. Spent some days in 
the research laboratory of the haematologists. Held interviews or had conversations with 
epidemiologists, physiologists, internists, surgeons, and general practitioners. A couple 
of them read my articles and we talked about their reactions. I also went to the library and 
studied the textbooks and journal articles written, or mobilised as a resource, by ‘my 
doctors’ and, when the references and my curiosity took me there, compared them with 
other publications. For two years I followed the monthly research colloquium on 
atherosclerosis. I co-authored with a junior doctor an article about the introduction of a 
diagnostic protocol. I supervised a medical student who interviewed vascular surgeons 
in several smaller hospitals and another one who analysed discussions about the intake 
of cholesterol. And finally, I had the temporary luxury of a research assistant … who held 
long patient interviews, transcribed them, talked them over with me, and co-authored 
publications about this material. 
The actions Mol describes here are very similar to a traditional 
ethnographic account in the sense that she describes 
immersing herself in the hospital environment and observing 
and talking to a wide range of participants. However, the first 
line indicates that there is a substantial difference between 
Mol’s work and that of the ‘normal’ ethnographer. Mol begins 
by stating that she ‘observed technicians handing diagnostic 
tools’. By describing the observation of tools as her opening, 
Mol indicates her intention not merely to observe people, but 
also to observe objects, in line with ANT methods. She argues 
that through considering objects, or non-humans, and the way 
they act, it is possible for multiple, rather than singular, 
realities to be revealed. The method that Mol employs in her 
work enacts the argument that humans and non-humans 
should be considered as of equal importance in the production 
of reality. She pays equal attention to humans and non-
humans. 
The structure of Mol’s book draws attention to a further 
aspect of the ANT method. Each page of the book has two 
sections. It has a ‘main’ narrative, which is in a standard-sized 
font and takes up half to three-quarters of the page. But below 
that, in a subtext, is a different narrative. The upper narrative 
consists entirely of the description of Mol’s time in the hospital. 
Encounters are described, field notes are recorded and 
interviews are quoted. Below that, in a separate section, is the 
reference to literature that is expected as part of standard 
academic method. Mol separates these sections because ANT 
argues that the descriptive narrative provides sufficient 
information without the need for a formal explanation. Latour 
(2005, p. 147) expands on the need for a detailed description to 
stand on its own as the method for understanding a situation: 
What is meant by a ‘social explanation’ most of the time? Adding another actor to provide 
those already described with the energy to act. But if you have to add one, then the 
network was not complete … I have never seen a good description in need of an 
explanation. 
By a ‘good description’ Latour refers to a description of 
sufficient detail that takes into account both human and non-
human actants. He argues that providing a description of this 
nature allows the explanation to be revealed without the need 
for further work. Mol’s account of the hospital is what Latour 
would term a ‘good description’, as in the upper (main) section 
of the book Mol does indeed provide a highly detailed account 
of the hospital while paying attention to both humans and non-
humans. 
What follows are two case studies. While the first uses 
work from a traditional ethnography, the second is one of the 
few sports studies that adopts an ANT approach. As such, the 
second case consists predominantly of description. 
Case study: the enrolment of sports medical practitioners by 
female rowers in the UK 
Elizabeth Pike’s study of rowers in the UK provides a useful 
account of the different understandings held by medical 
professionals and athletes, and the consequences in terms of 
enrolment of sports scientists. Pike performed a two-year 
ethnography of two women’s rowing clubs in the south of 
England with a goal of examining their medical support in a 
bid to begin to remedy the lack of research into the practices of 
sports medicine. Because the findings reveal the use of 
alternative rather than traditional medical practitioners, Pike 
notes the different understandings that those with different 
roles bring to the athletic body and the resultant tensions 
between these understandings. Her argument resonates 
strongly with Mol’s observations of the way different medical 
professionals hold different sets of understandings which 
affect how they operate. The following considers two of the 
understandings identified by Pike: the bio-medical paradigm 
and the sport ethic. 
The bio-medical paradigm 
Pike (2005) observes the dominance of the bio-medical 
paradigm within both researchers of sports medicine and 
medical practitioners. She describes how researchers agree that 
the bio-medical model has dominated Western medicine 
throughout the twentieth century (see, for example, Nettleton 
and Gustafsson, 2002; Wade and Halligan, 2004). The bio-
medical model can be summarised as resting on the following 
five key assumptions (Nettleton and Gustaffson, 2002): 
1. The mind and the body are treated as separate 
entities, with mental phenomena considered in isolation 
from physical symptoms. 
2. The body is treated as though it is a machine and 
therefore doctors are understood as akin to engineers. 
3. It is assumed that the most effective way of healing 
what is viewed as an unwell body is through 
technological intervention. 
4. Diseases and illnesses are explained in terms of 
biology without consideration of social and psychological 
factors. 
5. Every symptom, disease or sign is understood as 
being caused by a specific, identifiable agent. 
In Mol’s (2002) terms, these five assumptions combine to 
form a particular understanding of the body. This is the 
understanding that many in the medical profession bring when 
encountering an athletic body. Related to the bio-medical 
model is the sport ethic, which similarly works as a particular 
understanding of how elite athletes should behave. 
The sport ethic 
Hughes and Coakley (1991) argue that sport is dominated by a 
particular understanding of the body that they refer to as the 
‘sport ethic’. They describe how ‘the sport ethic refers to what 
many participants in sport have come to use as the criteria for 
defining what it means to be a real athlete’ (Hughes and 
Coakley, 1991, p. 308). The four dimensions that are agreed to 
make up the sport ethic are: extreme dedication to sport, a 
drive to distinguish oneself through sport, accepting risk and 
playing through pain, and rejecting any obstacles that stand in 
the way of success (Hughes and Coakley, 1991; Malcolm 
N., 2006; Sefiha, 2012). 
Several researchers have identified how athletes learn to 
take on these understandings through the messages they 
receive from sports coaches, sports officials, other athletes and 
the media (Hughes and Coakley, 1991; Malcolm N., 2006). 
Specifically, Malcolm N. (2006) identified how athletes are 
socialised into adhering to the sport ethic through coaches 
making light of athletes’ injuries, ignoring complaints about 
pain and demonstrating adherence to the sport ethic. The 
behaviour resulting from adhering to the sport ethic may be 
deemed deviant, as it may consist of disordered eating, 
overtraining or playing through injury, but the underlying 
motivations are viewed as positive owing to their role in 
achieving highly in sport (Sefiha, 2012). Therefore the 
components of the sport ethic act as behaviour expectations for 
athletes involved in competitive sport. 
Pike (2005) found that the rowers in her study both 
adopted and rejected the above two understandings, which led 
to them dealing with injury differently and enrolling different 
forms of treatment. First, she found that many of the rowers 
and coaches accepted injury as a natural part of rowing. This 
belief was rationalised through an understanding that rowing 
technique involves ‘twisting the back to one side, knee 
compression, and repetitive wrist movements’, which 
inevitably lead to injury (Pike, 2005, pp. 203–204). Yet it also 
conforms to the sport ethic through demonstrating the way 
that athletes accepted the risk of injury and the assumption that 
it would be necessary to play through pain as entirely normal. 
Further evidence of conforming to the sport ethic was found 
through the way the majority of rowers said that they would 
continue to train with their injury, despite being aware that 
further damage might be caused. 
The desire of athletes to conform to the sport ethic at 
times ran counter to the advice they received from doctors. 
Doctors were described as not understanding sport, which led 
the rowers to lack faith in their diagnosis or advice. This was 
particularly the case if the doctor’s advice ran counter to their 
own beliefs regarding how they should behave as an athlete. 
For example, many of the rowers expressed dissatisfaction that 
their doctors told them to rest. Rest was not seen as an option 
for the rowers, since they felt the need to continue training to 
ensure their ‘place in the boat’ (Pike, 2005, p. 204). This reflects 
the strength of the sport ethic in the way that athletes expressed 
a wish to do everything they could to remain part of the rowing 
team, and therefore did not see rest as an option. Furthermore, 
the reaction of the rowers in feeling that this advice was 
insufficient also suggests that the rowers had taken on the 
belief in the bio-medical model in expecting doctors to be able 
to fix their problem. The assumption is that a doctor will be 
able to identify the problem and fix it, in line with the notion 
that there are particular symptoms that can be fixed through 
identifying a specific agent and intervening technologically to 
fix it. Instead, the doctor simply prescribed rest and/or 
painkillers without fixing the problem. 
In perceiving painkillers to be insufficient, the rowers 
demonstrated their expectation that any technologies or 
techniques utilised by doctors should be able to do more than 
simply mask the pain. This suggests that the rowers were 
uninterested in enrolling technologies or techniques that did 
not fix the problem, owing to their belief in the bio-medical 
model. Consequently, their understanding made them 
reluctant to enrol the pain killers and, by extension, the doctors 
who prescribed them. 
The dissatisfaction with the doctors led some of the 
rowers to choose ‘alternative’ practitioners instead. Pike (2005) 
suggests that the rowers preferred these practitioners because 
of their holistic, whole-body understanding, which differed 
from the bio-medical paradigm. The rowers described how 
doctors would not treat them as ‘people’, instead adopting the 
view of them as a machine to be fixed. By contrast, the rowers 
enjoyed the collaborative aspect of the alternative treatments, 
where they were able to be an active participant in their 
treatment rather than being treated as a passive machine. Pike 
notes how the active nature of their participation was 
indicative through the language used, with doctors seeing 
‘patients’ and alternative practitioners seeing ‘clients’. 
Pike (2005) notes that cost was another factor in 
determining the choice to visit an alternative practitioner. She 
observes that traditional medicine is covered by government 
funding, while visiting an alternative practitioner is not, as 
determined by government policy. As with doping, this 
demonstrates the power of inscriptions in determining 
outcomes. The policy inscription in this case did not allow the 
government to cover visits to alternative practitioners, thereby 
making it difficult for those without disposable income to do 
so. The actor-network for alternative medicine includes the 
policy inscription as an anti-programme that could only be 
overcome through the presence of sufficient funds to cover the 
cost of visiting. 
Pike (2005) also found cases where athletes chose to 
accept one practitioner’s advice over another. For example, she 
describes how a rower she called Sally saw a consultant 
surgeon about her shoulder injury who advised her that she 
required surgery, but by contrast, she saw an osteopath who 
told her it was fine. Sally followed the advice of the osteopath 
since it allowed her to keep training. In Mol’s (2002, p. 32) 
terms, this example demonstrates the concept of diseases, or 
injuries, being ‘performed’. Sally’s consultation with the 
surgeon produced an injury in need of fixing, in line with the 
bio-medical model’s understanding that medical problems 
require technological intervention in order to be fixed. In 
contrast, the injury disappeared through her consultation with 
the osteopath. Mol (2002) also discusses how different 
practitioners’ views on a problem clashed at times, and when 
they did, the findings from one were given more weight than 
the other. 
Pike’s (2005) study suggests that the different 
understandings held by rowers and practitioners resulted in 
different levels of enrolment, though enrolment was not the 
focus of Pike’s study. Rather, her study focused on the different 
understandings, which were similarly important in Mol’s 
work. Acknowledging that enrolment may not occur as a result 
of the existence of different understandings is a significant part 
of the theory of enrolment. As discussed earlier, enrolment is 
unable to occur without the alignment of different points of 
view or, as Callon (1986) described it, intéressement. As Callon 
and later Latour (1991) note, intéressement does not mean that 
all parties must agree and have the same motivations, only that 
all parties must have an agreement that enrolment is beneficial. 
In Pike’s (2005) case, the athletes frequently chose not to enrol 
mainstream medical practitioners because they believed it 
would not be beneficial because of the very different 
understandings held by themselves and the medical parties, 
encapsulated in the contrast between the bio-medical model 
and the sport ethic. 
Identifying the link between the viewpoints of the 
different parties and the enrolment process is one of ANT’s 
most significant contributions. Many theoretical approaches 
focus on the identification of the viewpoints held by particular 
groups, such as the work of theorists who identified the sport 
ethic and the bio-medical model. ANT is not interested in what 
makes up these points of view per se, but provides a process 
for identifying the impact these different understandings have 
on action taking place. In this example, the important point is 
that the contrasting points of view led to non-enrolment, or a 
lack of action, between the athletes and traditional medical 
practitioners, rather than the exact points of view themselves 
being the focus. 
The next example continues the exploration of the 
enrolment (or non-enrolment) of sports scientists through 
examining the sport of gymnastics in New Zealand. However, 
unlike Pike’s (2005) study, this study stems from my own 
research, in which I deliberately used the ANT method of 
‘following the action’ (Latour, 1987). 
Case study: the enrolment of sports scientists into the sport of 
gymnastics in New Zealand 
In previous chapters of this book I introduced the ANT concept 
of enrolment in order to examine the integration of 
technologies into the sports environment. In the following case 
the concept of enrolment is again employed in order to 
understand how different understandings of sport and 
medicine, such as those discussed in the case of the rowers, 
influence whether sports scientists are enrolled by athletes or 
coaches. The case study used here is one of the few ANT 
studies that have been conducted in sport, and examines how 
gymnasts and coaches in New Zealand enrol or choose not to 
enrol sports scientists to work with them as part of their 
training regime. 
Methods 
In line with the ANT perspective, this study used ethnographic 
methods where ‘actants’ (Latour, 1991; 1999a; 2005) such as 
gymnasts, coaches, sports scientists and sport policy 
documents were followed through the process of creating 
gymnastics. ‘Following’ refers not to the round-the-clock 
observation of individuals, but to a ‘mapping of the moments’ 
(Michael, 2000, p. 131) when gymnastics makes its appearance. 
This research mapped the moments in which elite gymnastics 
and its integration with sports science occurred. 
The mapping began with the aim of observing all the 
elite training gymnasiums in New Zealand. I visited and 
observed all ten elite gymnastics training venues in the country 
and spent a minimum of two full days observing at each. 
Depending on my access, the period of observation was 
usually much longer and in some cases weeks or months of 
weekly observations took place, along with interviews with 
any consenting participants at the gymnasium. The process of 
interviewing involved seeking out participants who appeared 
to be informed and competent. Finding informed participants 
is a key aspect of all sociological research that Latour argues is 
equally significant and necessary in ANT (Farnsworth and 
Austin, 2005; Latour, 2005; Simpson, 2007). Formal interviews 
took place with forty-seven participants, ranging from 
gymnasts, coaches and judges to parents, administrators and 
scientists, all of whom are referred to by pseudonym and role 
within this chapter. All were heavily involved in the sport at 
the elite level and therefore highly informed about the 
workings of the sport. Some other participants declined to be 
interviewed formally but agreed to answer informal questions 
by email or in person. 
In the interviews I asked the gymnasts and coaches to 
describe which sports science services they had utilised and to 
explain how this had occurred. Similarly, I asked the sports 
scientists to describe how they had worked with gymnasts and 
how such arrangements had come about. A definition of 
‘sports scientist’ was not given to the participants; instead they 
were invited to interpret the term in whichever way they 
wished. The most commonly discussed sports scientists were 
physiotherapists, nutritionists, psychologists and 
biomechanists, and participants revealed a range of methods 
for enrolling them into the gymnastics network, as described 
below. 
One-off enrolment 
While some highly successful athletes enrolled scientists 
through a government-funded system known to athletes as 
‘carding’, very few athletes were able to access funding to enrol 
scientists in this way. Instead, the most common enrolment of 
scientists occurred as one-off enrolments. These would occur 
with the coach, gymnast or gymnast’s parents enrolling a 
scientist to assist with a specific issue. Usually these 
enrolments were for a single session only, with the scientist 
being paid for their work by the gymnast or their parents. 
The majority of gymnasts had at some point attended a 
joint session with either a nutritionist or a psychologist in order 
to provide them and their parents with general information 
and skills. Some gymnasts, such as the trampolinist Esmerelda, 
described how they had attended a large number of these 
sessions at sports camps for talented athletes of all ages. In 
other cases, such as one the women’s gymnastics coach Jessica 
described, it was something that the coaches organised in the 
gymnasium, asking each gymnast to pay a small amount to 
cover the scientist’s fees. Mary, a rhythmic gymnastics coach, 
described how she found group sessions like these extremely 
useful both as a way of imparting new knowledge and as a 
reminder, using the example of how she enrolled a dietician for 
a one-off session: 
Dietician is the other one I use occasionally, and invite the parents. They prepare the meals 
and do the shopping. And that’s where you get some interested and some not, but most 
of the parents are pretty good. Even the ones who are trained in nutrition say it’s still good 
to hear it. 
Mary emphasised the importance of the parents as part of the 
gymnastics actor-network, as those who prepare the meals for 
the gymnasts. She acknowledged that parents are empowered 
to control the diet of the gymnasts and was happy that most 
chose to utilise the knowledge gained from these sessions to 
benefit the gymnasts. Enrolment was easy to achieve because 
the parents, coach and dietician all perceived the dietician to be 
directly helpful in ensuring the gymnasts remain healthy while 
training through receiving the correct nutrition. Their exact 
reasons for believing this varied, with some there to improve 
athlete health and others for performance enhancement, but 
regardless of individual motivation, enrolment occurred and 
action took place in the form of an education session by a 
dietician. 
In contrast to Mary’s example, other coaches and athletes 
said they found nutrition sessions disappointing as the 
information was not necessarily specific to their sport or their 
situation. Gilbert (2009) confirms how many sports are under-
represented in the sports nutrition literature, making it 
challenging for the sports nutritionist to work with athletes 
from these sports. Mike described the difficulty in finding a 
nutrition expert who understood the long and demanding 
training hours of gymnastics: 
I don’t believe that a lot of the nutritionists actually know gymnastics well enough to give 
expert advice. Which is not to say they couldn’t learn, they’ve obviously got the 
knowledge but they don’t know the sport well enough to help. 
Esmerelda, a trampolinist, agreed with Mike, describing how 
many sports science sessions she had attended focused on 
other sports, including artistic gymnastics, but omitted 
trampolining: 
How do I apply it to tramp(oline)? They’ve based it on netball and rugby and they’ll go 
‘how many rugby players? How many cricket players?’ (Artistic) gymnastics is totally 
represented, but I went with another rhythmic gymnast once and they didn’t mention our 
sports (trampolining or rhythmic gymnastics) once the whole time … That’s the hard 
thing, finding someone – and I mean, where would you find someone that’s trampoline 
specific? 
In these cases, although scientists are enrolled in the sense that 
they provide an educative talk and receive payment, full 
enrolment is not achieved because the gymnasts and coaches 
are not enrolling the knowledge imparted by the scientist. 
Often, one reason for knowledge not being enrolled is a lack of 
understanding on both sides about the athletes’ requirements. 
For example, in his discussion of eating practices of rhythmic 
gymnasts, Johns (1998) describes a case of a nutritionist 
struggling to assist a gymnast because the gymnast was unable 
to explain the exact weight she was required to be. Johns 
highlights how, although the judges and coaches have an idea 
about how a gymnast should ideally look, this is not always 
translated into a form that a nutritionist is able to help with. In 
the New Zealand study, Kelly, a rhythmic gymnastics coach, 
described how she solved this problem by translating the needs 
of a rhythmic gymnast into the need to be at the lowest end of 
the healthy weight range. When one of Kelly’s gymnasts and 
her mother visited a nutritionist, Kelly instructed the mother to 
ask the nutritionist for advice about how to stay at this weight, 
an instruction the nutritionist was able and willing to work 
with. Therefore in this case, the translation provided by Kelly 
allowed enrolment to occur. 
The role that Kelly played in providing this translation 
contrasts strongly with other studies of gymnasts’ eating 
behaviour that identify gymnastics coaches as requiring 
athletes to eat very little and retain a very thin body shape 
regardless of the health consequences (see, for example, Johns 
and Johns, 2000; Kerr and Stirling, 2012; Ryan, 1995). Few 
solutions to this culture have been identified. Further research 
examining the role that translators of any form may play in 
ensuring gymnasts and other at-risk athletes remain healthy 
within environments with stringent expectations may be of 
benefit. 
Participants identified nutritionists as one of the most 
commonly enrolled scientists by both parents and coaches. 
Whitson et al.’s (2006) study of the knowledge level of sports 
coaches in the USA about assisting athletes with eating 
disorders found that the coaches acknowledged the necessity 
of having knowledge of nutrition and eating disorders, and 
that they would have liked more education about these 
matters. However, Whitson et al. do not question how 
enrolment may occur in situations where the nutritionist and 
coach are not able to agree on a goal or articulate their needs, 
which is where employing an ANT perspective could be of 
value. Similar to Whitson et al.’s study, many gymnasts in this 
study acknowledged the usefulness of enrolling a nutritionist. 
However, some coaches described how they found attempting 
to enrol nutritionists to be a waste of time because the athletes 
lied to the nutritionists about what they normally ate. Natalie, 
an aerobics coach, reported: 
the hardest thing is dieticians. And it’s not that the dieticians aren’t good, they are good, 
the ones we use. The problem is getting the athlete to listen to them … They don’t 
necessarily give all the information. For example, the dietician tells them to fill out a food 
diary for three days. So they change their diet for those three days. 
Amy, a trampolining coach, described the same experience of 
athletes doctoring their food diaries. A ‘food diary’ is supposed 
to act as an inscription, in documenting each day’s actual 
consumption. However, as in the scallops domestication case 
described by Callon in his landmark study, the gymnasts have 
mixed responses to aligning themselves to the plan set out by 
the scientists. While some agreed with the scientists’ reasoning 
that a proper diet is necessary to training and competing well, 
and aligned themselves to this task accordingly, others rejected 
this and therefore intéressement (Callon, 1986) did not occur. 
Natalie’s and Amy’s experiences highlighted the 
difficulty of making the internal workings of the body visible, 
a difficulty that technology is potentially able to solve. For 
example, the technology of testing blood can reveal severe 
problems such as low iron. In such a circumstance, the 
technology acts as an intermediary in revealing the make-up of 
the blood and its deficiencies. By contrast, without such an 
intermediary there is no way for the nutritionist to know the 
precise food consumed by gymnasts short of following the 
gymnast around and observing exactly what they eat. The 
literary device of the food diary is created in order to make 
food intake visible; however, it fails to work because the 
gymnasts fail to enrol it. In a very extreme example of 
overcoming this difficulty, Johns (1998) described how in his 
study he discovered an incident where some gymnastics 
coaches physically locked gymnasts in their hotel rooms while 
away on tour so that they could police the gymnasts’ food 
intake. 
Non-enrolment 
The majority of discussions about sports scientists and coaches 
assume from the outset that it is the coach and gymnast who 
can learn from the sports scientist. It is assumed that the 
scientists have specialist knowledge which it will benefit the 
coach to learn. However, coaches with great confidence in their 
knowledge often did not enrol sports scientists because they 
had previous experiences of scientists interfering with their 
programmes in a negative way. For example, Anna, a women’s 
coach, described how one of her athletes visited a sports 
psychologist in order to reduce her fear of performing a new 
skill. The psychologist made suggestions to Anna to assist the 
gymnast, which Anna, using the knowledge derived from her 
coaching experience, believed to be absurd. Consequently, 
Anna made a deliberate decision not to enrol any other 
psychologists into her programme. Liam, another women’s 
coach, agreed with Anna’s view that his own psychology 
training was sufficient and that enrolling a psychologist could 
in fact confuse the issue: ‘I’m not a great believer in it. I think 
that sometimes psychology can make you think too deep rather 
than thinking about what you actually need to do.’ Like the 
medical professionals in Mol’s (2002) study described earlier, 
Anna and the psychologist came to the gymnast’s problem 
with two different sorts of training, which resulted in differing 
understandings about the problem. Anna’s coaching 
knowledge leaned her in a different direction from the 
psychologist with specialist psychology knowledge. In 
confirmation of Anna and Liam’s opinion that they had 
sufficient psychological knowledge on their own, Cote et al.’s 
(1995) study of the coaching skills of seventeen elite gymnastics 
coaches found that the ability to prepare gymnasts 
psychologically for competition was considered a standard 
skill. 
My New Zealand study also found that lack of enrolment 
of sports scientists by coaches came about because, as in both 
Anna and Liam’s cases, coaches have often studied sports 
science in order to gain their coaching qualifications. They 
possess the academic knowledge that legitimises the sports 
science profession (Abbott, 1988). In New Zealand all coaches 
need to have attended some short sports science sessions in 
order to be permitted to coach, a practice that is policed at 
competitions. Many have either a Bachelor of Physical 
Education or a coaching qualification which will have required 
them to pass sports science courses. Coaches who had studied 
in other countries were often even more highly qualified. For 
example, there are now a large number of coaches in New 
Zealand who received qualifications under the former Soviet-
run system (Kerr and Moore, 2015). These coaches were 
required to attend four to six years of university, where they 
passed numerous courses in sports science disciplines as well 
as specialist gymnastics courses. These coaches often resist 
enrolling specialist sports scientists as they believe their own 
knowledge to be equal to or greater than many New Zealand 
sports scientists. For example, Amy, a trampoline coach, 
described how, although she enrols nutritionists to give talks 
to her trampolinists, she monitors their eating and their food 
diaries as she describes herself as having qualifications in this 
area. Similarly, Jessica, a women’s coach, described how she 
saw no need to enrol a sports psychologist as she majored in 
psychology at university. 
The strongest example of how coaches may have 
identical knowledge to sports scientists, causing coaches to 
resist enrolling scientists, occurred in the area of biomechanics. 
Judy, a biomechanist and women’s coach, described the 
crossover between the work of the artistic gymnastics coach 
and the biomechanist to be a ‘grey, murky area’, with the two 
roles having many similarities. This became very apparent 
through the lack of enrolment of a biomechanist, Jim, who 
happened to have offices connected to a women’s and men’s 
artistic gymnasium and was keen to be enrolled in the 
programme on a voluntary basis. Jim described how he had 
found the elite coaches in the club to be uninterested in his help 
and would not enrol him, whereas the lower-level coaches 
were the opposite. Jim demonstrated how, through using his 
computer, he had assisted a non-elite coach with teaching a 
gymnast a very difficult skill. Jim and the coach used a method 
of trial and error. The gymnast would attempt the skill, then 
Jim would video the attempt, take the footage back to his 
computer, analyse it, compare it with other top athletes, then 
come back to the gymnasium and suggest corrections. The 
gymnast would try it again, and Jim would repeat the process 
until they succeeded. Although ultimately Jim’s method 
resulted in the gymnast eventually learning the skill, this 
approach contrasted very strongly with how a very 
experienced and successful elite coach, who had coached 
world and Olympic medallists, taught the skill. The 
experienced coach directed the gymnast to perform a number 
of carefully crafted ‘lead-up’ drills before attempting the skill. 
He changed the gymnast’s conditioning programme to ensure 
they had the necessary strength and flexibility to perform the 
move. Then the gymnast worked through a number of 
‘progression’ skills, until finally attempting the skill with the 
coach assisting, and then by themselves. Cote et al. (1995) 
described this as the dominant method used by coaches to 
teach gymnasts new skills. A priority of this system is the fact 
that the gymnast is safe when attempting the skill for the first 
time. By contrast, when Jim’s gymnast attempted the skill, he 
landed very painfully a number of times. Despite this, because 
Jim was successful in teaching the skill, he made the 
assumption that this ability would be a useful tool for the elite 
coaches and was surprised they did not want to work with him 
and learn from him. He was not aware that the elite coaches 
felt they already had the knowledge that he wanted to provide. 
This led to Jim losing respect for the coaches in assuming they 
did not want to learn from him, and the coaches losing respect 
for Jim in assuming he did not want to learn from them. 
In this final example, the coaches and the biomechanist 
approached the situation with very different sets of 
understanding and produced gymnastics through very 
different actor-networks. Each utilised different technologies 
that produced different outcomes. The biomechanist used 
video plus specialist computer software, while the coach used 
a range of equipment from the gymnasium. The different 
understandings, and the resultant actor-networks that each 
professional produced, meant that neither network was able to 
extend to enrol the other. 
Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the work of one of the most prominent 
ANT theorists who works in the area of health and medicine: 
Annemarie Mol. This chapter found Mol’s (2002) work to be 
very useful in a sporting context for examining how medical 
practitioners bring different understandings to their work, 
which leads to differing outcomes for athletes, including the 
‘performance’ of particular diseases or injuries. This chapter 
used Mol’s work to examine the use of alternative practitioners 
in Pike’s (2005) study of rowers in the UK. The rowers were 
found to adopt the sport ethic strongly and both adopted and 
resisted the bio-medical model when seeking medical 
treatment, which led to them at times accepting the advice of 
certain doctors while rejecting that of others. In particular, the 
rowers were found to favour the use of alternative practitioners 
owing to their lack of use of the bio-medical model, which 
resulted in the athletes being able to be active in their treatment 
rather than being treated as machines or commodities to be 
fixed. The athletes further appreciated the way the alternative 
practitioners adopted a holistic understanding of the body 
rather than focusing on specific agents as problems. In doing 
so, these practitioners deliberately went against the bio-
medical paradigm. 
Mol’s (2002) work was also of interest because of its 
demonstration of ANT methodology. As previously discussed, 
methodology is central to the use of ANT, given the emphasis 
on including the non-human and human and the inclusion of a 
detailed description that acts as the entire explanation for a 
phenomenon. In this chapter the second case, examining 
gymnastics in New Zealand, demonstrated the ANT 
methodology at work, since ANT methods were adopted from 
the outset. This case describes the actions of the gymnasts and 
coaches along with any non-humans that were identified as 
significant, in order to understand why particular sports 
scientists were enrolled into the gymnastics actor-network 
while others were not. 
Both the studies examined in this chapter identified one 
of the central issues in sports medicine: the boundaries 
between the different professions. While Theberge (2008) uses 
Abbott’s work on professions to examine this issue in relation 
to the integration of chiropractors into the line-up of sports 
medical professionals, in this chapter I suggest that focusing on 
the different understandings and the concept of enrolment can 
be equally fruitful in understanding how different professions 
become part of a particular field. The ANT emphasis on the 
enrolment process rather than individual beliefs shifts the 
focus to why action occurs or does not occur, and therefore 
why a particular field stabilises or changes. 
In the case of sports science, it would be easy to assume 
that enrolling scientists into the sports training environment 
would be unproblematic. As Safai (2003) points out, sports 
scientists are specifically trained to rehabilitate sporting bodies 
and to assist them to work at their fullest potential. However, 
this chapter reveals how performance enhancement is an 
insufficient motivation for ensuring the enrolment of scientists 
by athletes and coaches. In both studies, participants were 
found to hold strong views that did not correspond with those 
of the sports scientists and prevented enrolment. The first 
study found that rowers opted to enrol alternative practitioners 
who were not as strongly attached to the bio-medical model in 
order to adhere to the sport ethic. The second study found that 
gymnasts and trampolinists, and their coaches, did not have 
enough confidence that the scientists were sufficiently versed 
in their sports to believe that enrolment would have any effect. 
These findings suggest that the assumption that athletes are 
now commonly surrounded by a competent medical team that 
proves crucial to their performance success is questionable. 
Instead, this chapter suggests that athletes and coaches make 
varied decisions based on their own actor-networks, which 
include individualised sports science training and 
perspectives. Consequently, the enrolment of sports scientists 
is highly unstable and can involve unexpected scientists. 
  
6 
Technologies for judging, umpiring and refereeing 
In many sports, referees, umpires or judges are placed under 
immense pressure to make accurate split-second decisions that 
determine or contribute to the outcome of the sporting 
competition. In some sports, such as figure skating or 
gymnastics, the judges are responsible for the entire score. In 
other sports the referee or umpire has the ability to make field-
of-play decisions that significantly contribute to, or in some 
cases may determine, the outcome. In order to function 
effectively such decision-makers must have full knowledge of 
the rules of the sport and be able to apply their knowledge in 
split-second decisions made under often very stressful 
conditions. If they make the wrong decision, they are often 
blamed for the outcome of the game. 
Given the pressure that these individuals face and the 
importance of ensuring accurate results, several sports 
governing bodies have attempted to increase the accuracy of 
officiating decisions through implementing new technologies 
in their sports (Woodward, 2013). These officiating 
technologies, often based on video systems, allow movements 
to be replayed and judgements to be confirmed or reviewed. In 
some cases these systems have been developed specifically for 
an individual sport, but in other sports the push for 
technological intervention has come from commentators and 
coaches who have access to more advanced technology than 
the referees themselves (Leveaux, 2010). For example, the 
slow-motion replay that commentators make use of on 
television was available to commentators before it was 
available to referees. 
This chapter considers the actor-networks of various 
sports that have enrolled technological devices for assisting 
with umpiring or judging. The cases of cricket, tennis and 
artistic gymnastics are drawn upon to examine how the actor-
network of each sport is affected by the new technology. Each 
sport is followed beyond the point at which the governing 
body introduces the new technology, to look at how the new 
assemblage affects other, often unexpected, parts of the actor-
network. 
The translation from movement to score 
The motivation for introducing technology stems from the aim 
of sporting competition. In order for a sporting competition to 
occur, the rules of every sport must have a method for 
determining a winner. In some sports, such as swimming or 
running, this is a relatively simple matter, with the winner 
being the person who completes a particular distance in the 
fastest time. In these sports the numbers describing the time 
taken to finish the race translate directly into a ranking system. 
These sports employ devices such as stopwatches and photo-
finishes in order to determine an accurate and direct 
translation. Such devices obtain empirical data, then convert 
the data into a score without human intervention. For example, 
in swimming competitions, the moment swimmers touch the 
end of the pool, which is equipped with sensors, they can look 
up at the scoreboard to see their times. In races that are very 
close it is common to see all swimmers rush to look up at the 
scoreboard to see who won. This can be seen as an ‘ideal’ form 
of evaluation for sport, as the performance translates smoothly 
into a number in order to rank performers and establish a 
winner. This allows little scope for controversy, with the times 
recorded generally accepted as the correct outcomes. 
However, in many other sports the rules include much 
greater complexity so a smooth translation is difficult to 
achieve. Determining the winner may involve factors such as 
whether they adhered to the rules, or even subjective 
judgements from human umpires or judges. Subjective 
judgements are not seen as ideal in sport, as they are perceived 
to be unreliable, so technology is often introduced in order to 
assist with the provision of reliable, empirical data. 
In order to arrive at the correct results, a range of sports 
have introduced different pieces of technology. In all cases, the 
assumption is that the technology will act in a more reliable or 
accurate manner than a human performing the same role, or 
that the technology will provide more information to a human 
making the decision. Latour (1992) asserts that technologies 
can often be relied upon more than humans since they 
generally perform a repetitive, boring function without any 
interruption. Latour illustrates his argument using the example 
of a door hinge. He describes how humans can be notoriously 
unreliable at remembering to close doors after they have 
passed through them, which can, of course, lead to wind or rain 
coming inside. He argues that one solution to this could be to 
employ a porter to close the door; however, the porter, being 
human, is likely to find the job very boring and tedious and 
will also require lunch breaks etc. in order to function. Another 
solution could be to place a sign by the door, reminding people 
to close it; however, people who may be absorbed in their 
thoughts or a conversation when they enter are not likely to 
pay attention to such a sign. By contrast, if the porter or sign 
were to be replaced by a door hinge that automatically closed 
the door, this would be a far more reliable solution. The door 
will be closed every time without the door hinge becoming 
bored, forgetful, requiring a break or requiring pay. While this 
example is very simple, it illustrates one of the fundamental 
arguments of this chapter: that delegation to non-humans can 
produce a more reliable result, or is assumed to be able to do 
so. In sport, the accuracy of the results of a game or competition 
is important in order for the sport to be deemed valid, but in 
many cases in sport humans cannot always provide reliable 
results, as in the swimming example described in the previous 
paragraph. Here the technology capable of determining the 
precise point when a swimmer touches the wall to finish the 
race is far more effective than a human. The human eye can 
easily distinguish between swimmers who are several seconds 
apart but is not able to determine the winner when the intervals 
are in fractions of a second. 
Latour (1991) further argues that, when an actor-network 
arrives at a state of relative stability, it is usually due to the 
presence of a non-human ensuring that the network is 
functioning well. This is illustrated in the above example 
where, without the technology that provides timing differences 
to fractions of a second, it would be necessary to rely on the 
human eye to determine winners. In such a scenario it is likely 
that those watching the swimmers would disagree on which 
swimmer won the race if the swimmers finished the race at 
what appears to be the same time. Such a situation would result 
in many arguments and could result in rule changes regarding 
who is allowed to make the final decision about the winner, 
and where they should stand etc. In contrast, with the current 
technology in place, swimmers can be confident that the 
technology will reliably tell them who won the race, and there 
is no need to argue for any changes to how the sport is run in 
this area. Therefore, swimming has obtained a desirable form 
of stability in possessing a piece of technology that is able to 
reliably determine the winner. This is quite different from a 
sport such as gymnastics, which instead employs large 
numbers of judges who must be constantly re-educated about 
rule changes in the sport. Gymnastics lacks the technology that 
swimming possesses, and so instead exists in a state of 
constant instability. The rules and regulations are formally 
updated every four years, with other changes also occurring on 
sometimes a monthly basis. But even in gymnastics, stability is 
possible at particular competitions owing to the presence of an 
inscription, a rule book known as the Code of Points that 
everyone at the competition agrees to follow. 
Technologies utilised in team sports competitions 
Thus far in this chapter, very little in the way of technologies 
for team sports have been referred to. Stopwatch-style 
technologies such as that used in swimming, and rule books as 
used in every sport are relatively simple types of technology 
that are easy to understand. But with the variety of types of 
sports, both individual and team, comes a variety of types of 
technologies that are used to ensure that the results of a 
competition are valid and correct. I will now discuss some of 
the more common types of technology utilised by different 
team sports. 
Post-match 
After a match is over, many sports employ an expert, often 
referred to as a ‘citing commissioner’ (Leveaux, 2010, p. 5), to 
review video footage of the game. Any incidents that are seen 
during this process can be viewed from multiple angles, and 
any offending player/s can be brought before the sport’s 
judiciary or tribunal (Leveaux, 2010). This technology is more 
likely to be utilised in team sports, where there are multiple 
players on the field. For example, in the sport of rugby union, 
where there are thirty players on the field at once, it is 
impossible for the referee to see the behaviour of all these 
players at all times. Here the use of the citing commissioner 
following the game has at times resulted in players receiving 
yellow or red cards, owing to the commissioner observing 
behaviours such as eye gouging or biting that were not 
observed by the referee during the game. These examples 
indicate that the use of the citing commissioner who reviews 
replayed footage is effective for identifying rule-breaking 
behaviour. 
At the same time, from a legal standpoint, Nafziger 
(2004) notes the necessity of sports having clear regulations 
around the use of video footage. He describes a case where a 
rugby player had his suspension overturned by an English 
court because video footage had been used to determine that 
he should be suspended, but the player had had no 
opportunity to view and comment on the footage before the 
decision to suspend him was made. Nafziger’s emphasis on the 
need for regulation acknowledges the usefulness of 
considering officiating technologies within the network of the 
sport in which they operate rather than as standalone items. 
The policies and regulations around how video footage is used 
to make decisions can be as important as the technology itself. 
During the match 
Some sports use video replay systems during the match. In 
several sports a system is employed where the referee may opt 
to use a third party to make a decision if they not feel they were 
in a position to make an accurate call. Some examples are a line 
call in tennis, the fall of a wicket in cricket and a try in rugby 
(Leveaux, 2010). A problem with viewing video during the 
match is that it requires the brief suspension of the match while 
the decision is made, which can be frustrating for players and 
spectators alike (Nafziger, 2004). The following case study 
discusses this issue in more detail. Typically, the third party is 
a referee stationed outside the field of play who has access to 
video footage that allows the viewing of the situation from a 
variety of angles. A rugby referee in Leveaux’s study (2010, p. 
5) describes how he is only able to use the third umpire in 
certain situations, and then must be very specific in what he 
requests of them: 
I can only call to the video ref in certain situations, for example, about a try being scored 
with regards to matters relating to the grounding of the ball or if I might be undecided if 
a breach of the rules occurred in that play, such as a forward pass – and when I do use the 
video ref(eree) I have to be explicit in what I ask, e.g., was so and so in an off-side position 
when receiving the ball or with correct grounding of the ball in a try. 
This referee’s comments indicate how the rules are carefully 
spelt out as to the use of the video referee, and do not allow the 
referee to use them in a way that may hold up the game or 
require clarification. Sports vary in the processes for consulting 
the third referee or umpire and as to whether players can also 
request their assistance. For example, in tennis, players can 
consult the third umpire but are only permitted two incorrect 
challenges per set (Leveaux, 2010). 
Other sports such as taekwondo do not use any form of 
third umpire or video referee during the match, as the time 
taken to pause and consult is too disruptive to the sport 
(Leveaux, 2010). This highlights how the different actor-
networks of sports influence whether a piece of technology is 
utilised or not. In taekwondo, where two athletes physically 
fight each other, the necessity for the match to continue 
unimpeded is far greater than the need for a video referee. 
Similarly, the concept of allowing a player to challenge a call, 
as in tennis, was seen by the referees in Leveaux’s study as 
open to far too much exploitation by players to be considered 
appropriate. 
However, the taekwondo referees do view the use of a 
video replay system to be useful during a ‘sudden death’ 
match. An example the referees described to illustrate this was 
when both fighters score a kick at what appears to be the same 
time (Leveaux, 2010). This scenario resembles the swimming 
example discussed earlier, where technology is useful for 
determining what the human eye has difficulty seeing. In the 
taekwondo example a video replay would allow pausing of a 
video reply at the exact point of the kick, making it possible to 
determine which athlete scored first. 
Behind-the-scenes technologies 
One of the central claims of ANT is the importance of following 
all the strands in a network. Latour (1996, p. 371) describes how 
society has ‘a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy, capillary 
character’ where understanding the workings of the network 
involves following all the capillaries. In researching in this 
manner, action is revealed that is often not noted in traditional 
sociological analyses that focus on single issues or large-scale 
phenomena and miss the smaller capillaries. In sport there is a 
range of actions that could be argued to make up these smaller 
capillaries. For example, when watching a sport, the spectator 
sees only the actual performance by the athletes. Hidden from 
view are a complex array of organisational factors that make 
the sport run, which often include a variety of technologies. 
One type of technology that makes sport run is the systems put 
in place to schedule tournaments, including the selection of 
and scheduling of umpires and referees. In examining tennis, 
Farmer, Smith and Miller (2007, p. 187) describe how ‘Behind 
the scenes, an intricate system of hierarchies, experience, and 
qualifications dictates the proper assignment of umpires to 
tennis matches.’ They describe how the scheduling of tennis 
umpires in a large tournament can be very complex, with up to 
eighteen matches being played simultaneously with up to ten 
umpires per match, and with the need to take into account 
nationality, player histories and experience. In order to 
facilitate such complicated scheduling, the United States 
Tennis Association (USTA) developed a software package. 
Unfortunately, this software did not prove to be a success for a 
range of reasons. One factor that limited the software was it 
was created specifically for the US Open, not taking into 
account that different tournaments have different scheduling 
practices. Additionally, the software did not consider the 
global commitments of the umpires. Finally, in the event of a 
rain delay, the software could not adapt itself to the new 
conditions, but rather required the schedule to be rewritten 
completely from scratch. With this as an example, one of the 
goals of this chapter is to open the black box and examine 
technologies that more commonly exist behind the scenes. 
Anti-programmes and ‘networks’ within the study of technology 
and sport 
In one of his landmark articles, ‘Technology is society made 
durable’, Latour (1991) introduces the concept of anti-
programmes. These are any programmes that work counter to 
the desired programme. In the case of tennis, the ‘programme’ 
is for a tennis tournament to occur. For this many things need 
to be in place including umpires, who need to be specifically 
scheduled. In order to make this happen, software is added to 
the actor-network of tennis. However, as discussed above, 
Farmer, Smith and Miller (2007) describe how the original 
software that was enrolled was a failure because it was 
interrupted by several anti-programmes: the differing practices 
of other tournaments, the global commitments of tennis 
umpiries and the rain. The remainder of the article details the 
creation of a new software that was written in order to 
overcome these difficulties. The article illustrates Latour’s 
(1991) argument that actor-networks can become ever more 
complicated and extensive as anti-programmes are identified 
and overcome. 
With this in mind, the ANT theorist’s role is to follow and 
describe the actor-network. It must be remembered, however, 
that the ANT understanding of ‘network’ is somewhat 
different from the mainstream. Latour (1999a) describes how 
‘network’ came into use in ANT studies prior to the invention 
of the worldwide web, yet with the ubiquity of the web the 
word has come to be understood as the creation of 
instantaneous ties and connections. Yet Latour argues that this 
is the exact opposite of the original intention. He argues that 
the use of ‘network’ was intended to refer to a concept similar 
to Deleuze’s ‘rhizome’, which refers to ‘a series of 
transformations’ (Latour, 1999a, p. 15). The word 
‘transformations’ emphasises Latour’s argument that bringing 
things together produces new assemblages and forms that 
have different qualities from the disparate parts that combined 
together. Therefore, the ANT theorist’s role is to examine these 
transformations through following the network, with an 
understanding that every point in the network can connect to 
another point and form new associations. The following 
examination of Hawk-Eye technology aims to demonstrate 
how the actor-networks that exist in cricket and tennis have 
facilitated a variety of outcomes through the way that they 
have connected with Hawk-Eye. This case particularly 
emphasises the transformative nature of the network. 
Case study: the use of Hawk-Eye in cricket and tennis 
In terms of its history, the case of Hawk-Eye demonstrates one 
of the most significant connections currently in existence in 
sport: the sport–media connection. This connection is 
immediately apparently through the way that Hawk-Eye was 
developed almost simultaneously as both a technology for 
enhancing the viewing experience for spectators and for 
improving the accuracy of officiating decisions (Hawk-Eye 
Innovations, n.d.). Hawk-Eye was first used in public in 2001 
by UK’s Channel 4, where it was introduced to enhance the 
coverage of the Ashes cricket series. While still under 
development it was trialled at the Davis Cup tennis 
tournament in 2002. Collins and Evans (2012, p. 910) provide 
the following description of its workings: 
Hawk-Eye is an example of what we call a ‘Reconstructed Track Device’ or RTD. RTDs 
use visible-light television cameras to follow the path of the ball and a procedure to filter 
the pixels in each frame. Certain pixels are taken to represent the position of the ball and 
others to indicate the position of the line or other features of the playing arena. The space 
and time coordinates of these pixels are represented numerically and a statistical 
algorithm reconstructs the flight and impact point of the ball and crucial features of the 
playing area by combining information about the pixels in the different frames with 
information about the size of the ball, the physics of its distortion, the width of the line, 
and so forth. From these calculations, the system then determines what decision should 
be given – for example, should the ball be called ‘in’ or ‘out’? 
This description explains how Hawk-Eye relies upon a 
particular actor-network of cameras, which are placed around 
the field or court and provide the data Hawk-Eye needs in 
order to reconstruct the exact movements of the ball. For the 
actor-network to work, and for this particular assemblage of 
disparate parts to transform and become useful, cameras need 
to be carefully placed to see the ball from different angles, and 
particular algorithms need to be integrated into the system. 
Then these separate parts to combine together to produce a 
device with unique capacities. 
Spectators and umpires both find it desirable to be able 
to identify where the ball is in relation to other factors. For 
umpires, Hawk-Eye is useful for determining the correct call to 
make in cases where it can often be difficult for the umpires 
themselves to see to make the correct call. For spectators, 
Hawk-Eye allows more information to be given than may be 
provided by the television cameras alone. Indeed, for television 
viewers Hawk-Eye is particularly transformative. Viewers are 
provided with a ‘virtual reality graphic’ that consists of ‘either 
an image or a short video clip showing the path and impact 
point of the simulated ball’ (Collins and Evans, 2012, p. 910). 
With this clip, the viewing experience is transformed to become 
similar to the umpire experience, where viewers use the images 
provided by Hawk-Eye to make their own decisions on the 
match. 
A range of sports, including cricket, tennis, football, 
snooker and badminton, have adopted Hawk-Eye (Singh Bal 
and Dureja, 2012). Hawk-Eye has become part of a very large 
actor-network that incorporates these sports along with the 
assemblages that make up the umpiring processes of each 
sport, and the sport–media connection. It is beyond the scope 
of this chapter to examine the whole breadth of this extensive 
actor-network, so this chapter will focus on the introduction of 
Hawk-Eye as part of the umpiring processes of two sports: 
cricket and tennis. The following chapter will then examine the 
actor-network of sports media. 
Hawk-Eye in cricket 
The sport of cricket incorporated Hawk-Eye into the umpiring 
actor-network of cricket for test matches in 2009 and for one-
day matches in 2011 (Steen, 2011). Cricket took an unusually 
long time to adopt Hawk-Eye technology as part of its 
officiating process in international cricket, even though it had 
existed as a broadcasting tool since 2002. One of the most 
interesting reasons for the slow enrolment from an ANT point 
of view is the difficulty in determining how the umpire and 
Hawk-Eye should assemble together. Steen (2011) emphasises 
that, unlike technologies such as the stopwatch, which, as 
previously discussed, are designed to translate movement 
directly into a score, Hawk-Eye is not designed to work as a 
standalone device and it is not a substitute human. Instead, 
Hawk-Eye in cricket was designed to be part of a ‘system of 
review’ (Steen 2011, p. 1430). It is a piece of technology that was 
designed to ‘enhance perception’, and is quite different from 
technologies that ‘take decisions’ (Collins and Evans 2012, p. 
907). Collins and Evans state: ‘Where these technologies are 
used, the replays are usually reviewed by a newly created class 
of “off-field” officials who then advise the on-field officials.’ 
This is exactly the case with Hawk-Eye in cricket, where a third 
umpire uses what is essentially an animated reconstructed 
replay of the incident in order to review the decision of the on-
field umpire. Steen (2011) emphasises that Hawk-Eye’s 
purpose is frequently misunderstood by the media, where he 
explains: ‘The final decision remains with the on-field umpire 
– the decision is reviewed by, not referred to, the third umpire’ 
(ICC, 2011, cited in Steen, 2011, p. 1430). This statement 
confirms that Hawk-Eye is only permitted to be enrolled as a 
way to assist the decision-making process, not to determine 
any actual outcomes. McFee (2004) argues that assuming 
technologies can do the work of humans better than humans 
can be problematic, because technologies lack the capacity to 
explain. The set-up of Hawk-Eye prevents this problem 
because the work of making a decision is not delegated to 
Hawk-Eye itself; instead, a new assemblage of human-Hawk-
Eye is produced that is used to support a decision made by a 
human. The assemblage is acknowledged as effective through 
the praise it has received for improving umpires’ decisions in 
cricket (see Steen, 2011). 
However, as Latour (1991) notes, new forms of 
technology can also generate unexpected consequences. Such 
consequences reflect the notion of the network as 
transformative, where connections between parts of the 
network can transform the way action takes place or generate 
new forms of action. In the case of Hawk-Eye, Steen (2011) 
notes how the technology has become utilised as a method of 
surveillance of cricket umpires. In this example Hawk-Eye can 
be seen as not only a device for assisting umpiring but also as 
a method of transforming the practice of umpiring into a 
monitored act. By noting how many times the third umpire 
views Hawk-Eye, the ICC can evaluate various umpires’ skills. 
Through using Hawk-Eye in this manner, the ICC found that 
umpires believed to be the most skilful really do make good 
decisions, compared with those umpires who are believed to 
have less skill. In the 2011 Cricket World Cup there were a total 
of 182 referrals to Hawk-Eye across forty-nine games, where 
20.33 per cent led to reversals in decisions. In tracking which 
umpires had their decisions reversed, Steen (2011, p. 1437) 
described: 
The vaunted emerged with heads high – Dar was challenged 14 times and not once 
reversed, Billy Bowden (six challenges) also defied contradiction, Taufel was proven right 
in 10 of 12 reviews and Steve Davis (perfect after his first 10) affirmed his growing 
reputation. At the opposite end of the scale, reservations about Asoka de Silva (four 
reversals in his first four reviews, which led to him being dropped for the final group 
matches) and Daryl Harper (seven in 14) had been underscored. 
Steen’s argument here is that the monitoring performed 
through Hawk-Eye confirmed Dar, Bowden and Taufel as 
good umpires, and de Silva and Harper as not so skilful. The 
findings of the differences between umpires reveal two 
different aspects of Hawk-Eye. First, as discussed, these 
findings reveal the way that technology can affect sporting 
practice in unexpected ways. While the goal of utilising Hawk-
Eye is to improve umpiring decisions, its deployment has 
revealed that it is also useful for demonstrating the ability level 
of different umpires. The actor-network further expands with 
the addition of the actant, the ICC, which can now select 
umpires appropriately, which may result in an improved level 
of umpiring in the long term. 
Second, given that Hawk-Eye is a hybrid system and not 
a substitution for a human, the ability of a human to use it 
correctly becomes crucial. In this example, the actor-network 
extends to the umpires needing to acquire new skills. Steen 
(2011) discusses how cricket officials are understandably aware 
of the need for good umpires to work with Hawk-Eye and have 
therefore adopted a system where perceived ‘good’ umpires 
are rotated throughout a test match so that they take turns 
being on the on-field or third umpire. This rotation 
demonstrates how the introduction of a new piece of 
technology in sport can be very disruptive, requiring 
significant reworking of the actor-network. In this case the 
hybridised nature of Hawk-Eye resulted in the need for a third 
umpire, which further resulted in the anti-programme of 
insufficient umpires with the necessary skills. This then led to 
a further expansion of the network through the need for 
introduction of a rotation system to ensure that umpires are 
used equitably and effectively. 
This example has implications for sports policy-makers 
who intend to enrol new pieces of technology. Through 
viewing the case as an actor-network, we can see the way that 
introducing a new piece of technology may also result in the 
need for restructuring or further resourcing. The example 
highlights how, although new technologies can improve 
sporting practices and processes, they can require extensive 
networks around them in order for the technology to be used 
for its maximum effectiveness. In the case of cricket, significant 
work has been performed by the ICC over several years in 
order to finalise an effective structure, but this work was not 
foreseen prior to Hawk-Eye’s introduction. 
Earlier it was argued that the actor-network of cricket 
acknowledges Hawk-Eye as a hybrid system rather than 
expecting it to be a full replacement for a human umpire. 
However, there are suggestions that the hybrid format can be 
problematic. For example, Mahmood et al. (2012) suggest that 
it would be more effective if the human element were 
eliminated and an entirely automated system produced 
instead. This would be akin to Latour’s (1992) example of the 
speed bump replacing the human policeman. Mahmood et al. 
provide two arguments for the effectiveness of removing the 
human element through identifying two anti-programmes at 
work: game time lost in consultation, and the problem of 
human error. 
In terms of game time, the use of the third umpire is 
supposed to take only thirty seconds, but in reality it more 
often takes up to a minute for them to reach a decision. This is 
understandable, given the role of the third umpire in reviewing 
the footage provided by Hawk-Eye and coming to a 
conclusion. However, this amount of time is argued to be 
enough to break a player’s concentration and therefore acts as 
an anti-programme, disrupting the player’s performance and 
the flow of the match. Mahmood et al. (2012, p. 12282) describe 
cases where the referral to the Hawk-Eye system has resulted 
in altered performance: 
We witnessed that several bowlers bowled brilliantly before a referral, by preventing the 
batsmen from scoring lots of runs. However, after the referral, the same bowlers lost their 
rhythm, hence leading to an increased scoring rate. Similarly, there were several batsmen 
who were scoring lots of runs before a referral, but after a referral, their scoring rate 
decreased, or they got out, due to a disruption of their rhythm. 
The result here of a distinct change in performance, is a highly 
undesirable outcome from both the players’ perspective and 
for spectators. A drop in performance is obviously undesirable 
for players, and for spectators the potential excitement offered 
by high scores and continual play is disrupted. Again this is an 
unexpected consequence of the introduction of a new piece of 
technology, with potential follow-on effects to other parts of 
the network: in this case, player performance and resultant 
spectator interest. 
This argument points to the lack of perspectives that 
have been adopted in examining technology in sport. While 
theorists have examined technology as adopted by athletes and 
its impact on performance (see, for example, Butryn, 2003; 
Haake, 2009; Magdalinski, 2009; Tangen, 2004), the lack of any 
perspectives that utilise the idea of sport existing as an actor-
network has meant that there has been very little consideration 
of how the integration of technologies for other purposes 
affects athletes. An exception is Butryn (2003), who notes the 
impact that the large ‘jumbo-screens’ placed around the 
Olympic athletics stadium have on performance. Butryn (2003) 
and Mahmood et al. (2012) leave little doubt that the 
technologies that are introduced to improve the watching of 
sport (by both spectators and umpires) have a significant effect 
on athlete performance. Yet interestingly providing ways to 
produce programmes to overcome these anti-programmes is 
viewed as part of the role of the athlete’s coaching and scientific 
team rather than a wider concern. This is in contrast to an issue 
such as doping, which is commonly understood as a problem 
for all parts of sport. Further research about the impact of 
decisions about the use of officiating and media technologies 
on athlete performance that acknowledges the connections 
between these two areas of the actor-network would be of 
benefit. 
The second argument of Mahmood et al. (2012) against 
the use of technology that exists as a hybrid is that of human 
error. Both Steen (2011) and Mahmood et al. (2012) discuss the 
problem of human error as evidenced by cricket being a sport 
with a long history of contentious umpiring decisions. Steen 
(2011) and Collins and Evans (2012) describe numerous 
instances of questionable umpiring decisions as a way of 
justifying the need for a technologically assisted system. In 
other sports the reliability of the human umpire, referee or 
judge has also been raised. Nationalistic bias (Ansorge and 
Sheer, 1988; Dixon, 2003; Ružena, 2000), expectations of 
success (Findlay and Ste-Marie, 2004; O’Brien, 1991) and 
evidence of genuine mistakes (Ste-Marie, Valiquette and 
Taylor, 2001) have all been found at various studies of judging. 
In contrast to human fallibility, technology is assumed to be 
free of these sorts of mistakes, since it is not able to be 
persuaded. This reasoning mirrors the argument made by 
Latour (1992) that non-humans can be more reliable than 
humans. However, a counter-argument put forward by Collins 
and Evans (2012) opens the ‘black box’ of the Hawk-Eye system 
by positing that the system is seriously lacking in its reliability. 
In this sense, it is similar to the human judges being subject to 
making genuine errors. Collins and Evans describe the 
immense difficulty in determining decisions regarding leg-
before-wicket (lbw). In an lbw situation the umpire must make 
a call based on where the ball would have gone if it had 
continued uninterrupted, which is extremely difficult. Given 
the difficulty of the decision, Hawk-Eye is often used to 
confirm lbw decisions, but it is also unable to calculate this with 
complete accuracy. Collins and Evans (2012, p. 912) describe 
how, when reconstructing the path of the ball, Hawk-Eye 
includes a ‘zone of uncertainty’: if the ball is found to land in 
that area, the third umpire cannot overrule the on-field 
umpire’s decision. This lack of accuracy demonstrates that 
despite the belief that technologies can produce more accurate 
and reliable results than humans, in the case of Hawk-Eye the 
technology is not completely reliable. The question of 
reliability becomes more complicated and interesting when the 
use of Hawk-Eye in cricket is compared with its use in tennis. 
 
Hawk-Eye in tennis 
Tennis adopted the Hawk-Eye system earlier than cricket. It 
was first used for broadcasting in 2002, and 2006 was the first 
time the system was used for umpiring purposes in a 
professional tennis match (Fischetti, 2007). Clarke and Norman 
(2012, p. 1765) describe how Hawk-Eye is used in tennis, which 
is quite different from how it is used in cricket: 
In tennis, it displays a schema of the court lines along with a mark where the ball is 
believed to have bounced, along with a decision on whether it was in or out. (Interestingly, 
the path of the ball is never shown with any error bounds: the public and players appear 
to accept that it is exact and infallible.) The interesting development in tennis was that the 
players, not the umpires, under certain conditions were allowed to challenge the umpire’s 
decision by referring to Hawkeye. If Hawkeye sided with the appealing player, the 
umpire’s decision was reversed. 
This quote outlines two clear differences between the actor-
network of tennis and that of cricket. First, in tennis it has 
always been the case that the players are allowed to challenge 
the umpire’s decisions and refer them to Hawk-Eye, which was 
not originally the case in cricket. The implications of this 
difference will be discussed later. Second, in the case of cricket, 
there is an awareness of the existence of the zone of uncertainty 
by both the officials and the spectators. During a cricket 
broadcast, commentators discuss the zone of uncertainty when 
the Hawk-Eye reconstruction is shown, leading to spectators 
having a greater understanding of why decisions are made in 
the way that they are. However, in the case of tennis a different 
actor-network exists, in which the International Tennis 
Federation (ITF) has not seen fit to acknowledge any zone of 
uncertainty. It remains an unacknowledged anti-programme. 
The reconstructions produced by Hawk-Eye are presented as 
accurate, with the ball conclusively being in or out. Therefore, 
spectators have no sense that there may be apparent 
inaccuracies in tennis as there are in cricket. Collins and Evans 
(2012) argue that the lack of acknowledgement of a zone of 
uncertainty is problematic as it allows incorrect decisions to be 
made that are understood to be correct. They argue that the ITF 
should introduce similar rules to cricket that acknowledge that 
Hawk-Eye is not 100 per cent accurate and note that a zone of 
uncertainty exists. They suggest that part of the problem is 
identical to the one already discussed in cricket: the 
assumption that Hawk-Eye is a standalone device that can 
produce the ‘correct’ answer, rather than acknowledging that 
Hawk-Eye works as an assemblage with a human. They argue 
that if Hawk-Eye were understood as a device to assist umpires 
to avoid making mistakes, rather than being seen as an 
unarguable voice of authority, more accurate line calls, and 
consequently more effective operation of tennis, would occur. 
Collins and Evans (2012) argue that the actor-network 
that makes up tennis is less effective for producing accurate 
results than the cricket actor-network. However, as previously 
described, it also points to the way that the cricket actor-
network has been forced to become larger and more 
complicated as a result of acknowledging the existence of a 
zone of uncertainty. By contrast, tennis has not acknowledged 
the limitations of Hawk-Eye, which means it has been possible 
to keep the umpiring actor-network ‘black-boxed’ without 
seeing the need to extend the network. The anti-programme of 
the zone of uncertainty remains unacknowledged, and 
therefore the need to extend the network to overcome the anti-
programme is not seen as necessary. 
As briefly mentioned earlier, another difference between 
the cricket actor-network and the tennis actor-network is the 
inclusion of permission for players to challenge the umpire’s 
decisions and refer the decision to Hawk-Eye. A result of this 
ruling is that players whose actor-network includes the ability 
to understand how this ruling can work to their advantage can 
quite deliberately benefit. In tennis players have been able to 
challenge a call and ask for it to be referred to Hawk-Eye from 
the outset, whereas with cricket, allowing players to initiate a 
challenge has only recently been introduced. But despite this, 
many tennis players do not use their ability to challenge the call 
to their best advantage. Players are allowed a limited number 
of challenges: up to three unsuccessful challenges in a set and 
four if it reaches a tie-break, but when they choose to use these 
challenges can make up to a five per cent difference in the 
outcome of the game (Clarke and Norman, 2012). After using 
dynamic programming, to analyse the effect of challenging 
calls at particular times during matches, Clarke and Norman 
(2012, p. 1771) conclude: 
the optimal strategy depends on the importance of the point – the more important the 
point in winning the set, the more likely a player should challenge. Since importance 
increases in later points of close games, and in later games of close sets, this implies that 
players should save their challenges until needed deeper into close games and sets. 
However this must be balanced against the possibility that another challenge opportunity 
may not arise. A player well ahead will have more chances of challenge opportunities 
should his opponent make a comeback, and so might be sensible to save his challenge. 
But a player well behind may not get another opportunity, so should be more aggressive 
with his challenges. 
Clarke and Norman (2012) suggest that tennis players should 
deliberately adopt a strategy for when to challenge points 
during a match. However, this would also mean that 
traditional tennis coaching and training should be altered to 
include education about this issue. This reflects the same idea 
as that already identified in the discussion about cricket, that 
the effects of technologies that improve the watching of the 
game can also have an impact on other parts of the actor-
network of the sport that might not appear connected. In this 
case, understanding the workings of the Hawk-Eye was found 
to make a significant potential difference to a tennis player’s 
ability to win the match; and it would therefore be useful to 
integrate it into tennis training and coaching. Again, the Actor-
Network Theory approach demonstrates how connections can 
exist between areas that may appear disparate. This is 
important for sports policy-makers when considering 
introducing new technologies into the sport. 
Case study: IRCOS in artistic gymnastics 
Just as cricket has been identified as a sport with a long history 
of contentious decisions, so too has the sport of artistic 
gymnastics. Artistic gymnastics has had judging scandals on a 
regular basis almost since its inception. There are numerous 
cases of gymnasts and coaches feeling they were judged 
unfairly or incorrectly for a range of reasons. One of the most 
famous occurred at the Athens Olympics in 2004, when Paul 
Hamm was incorrectly crowned Olympic champion as a result 
of a judging error.1 In a reflection of the emphasis on the human 
as opposed to the non-human in the study of sport, there have 
been several studies examining the process of judging. Judging 
studies examining artistic gymnastics, rhythmic gymnastics 
and figure skating have found examples of judging errors as a 
result of nationalistic bias (Ansorge and Sheer, 1988; 
Dixon, 2003; Ružena, 2000), expectations of success (Findlay 
and Ste-Marie, 2004; O’Brien, 1991) and genuine mistakes (Ste-
Marie, Valiquette and Taylor 2001). Improvements in 
technology and the close sponsorship of the Swiss company 
Longines led to an attempted solution to the problem of 
judging inaccuracies or bias. At the 2005 World 
Championships, a video replay system developed by 
Longines, known as IRCOS (Instant Reply and Control 
System), was used for judging men’s and women’s artistic 
gymnastics. It simply allowed some of the judges to replay the 
routine, or parts of the routine, to confirm exactly which 
movements the gymnast made. Alyssa, a New Zealand 
gymnastics judge who has used the system while judging at 
several international competitions, explained: 
It’s quite a big screen, obviously. You have two screens; over here you get a list of the 
competitors, so you can click on the competitor to bring up the screen. And then you get, 
well, it’s like a DVD player, you can go forwards, backwards, slow motion, whatever you 
want to do, it will do first six second session, second six session, etc. Especially in bar, you 
don’t want to watch the whole minute routine so you hit the last six seconds or the first 
six seconds because you want to obviously see a turn. So you can choose whereabouts. 
It’s quite easy to use. Then you obviously get the replay here. Then here you get the judges 
scores. 
Unlike in cricket and tennis, where all umpires have similar 
roles, in artistic gymnastics there are two roles that a judge can 
hold. First, a judge may be responsible for judging what is 
termed ‘difficulty’, which means they determine how many 
movements a gymnast performed during their routine and 
decide whether the gymnasts should receive the marks for 
demonstrating these skills. Second, a judge may judge what is 
termed ‘execution’. Execution judges deduct marks from a 
score of ten for any errors in performance. A gymnast’s final 
score is then calculated by adding the difficulty and execution 
scores together. 
 
1A drawing of the IRCOS screen by Alyssa 
When it was implemented, the IRCOS system was 
designed to be used only by the difficulty judges and not by 
the execution judges. Difficulty is the area of gymnastics where 
objective evaluation is a possibility. When judging difficulty, 
the judge is determining whether the gymnast performed a 
skill or not. As in ice skating, it is ‘a matter of verifiable 
empirical fact whether skaters performed the required jumps 
and do so without falling or stumbling’ (Dixon, 2003, p. 105). 
In gymnastics each skill has very particular guidelines 
describing whether it has been performed correctly. For 
example, on rings any holds must be held for between one and 
three seconds to be counted. Thus, whether a gymnast 
performed this is easily confirmable through watching a video 
and timing the hold. Yet, as described in the previous section, 
human judges can make mistakes. 
In contrast, as discussed in relation to cricket, it is often 
argued that technology is more accurate than a human (see, for 
example, Mahmood et al., 2012). This assumed reliability of 
technology led to the International Gymnastics Federation 
(FIG) greeting IRCOS with enormous enthusiasm. IRCOS was 
expected to have the ability to avoid mistakes of the sort that 
occurred in the Olympic Games in 2004 where the wrong 
gymnast received the gold medal owing to a judging error. It 
allows the difficulty judges the chance to check that they have 
made correct judgements, and it allows coaches to protest and 
use the video footage as evidence of perceived incorrect 
judgements. After each routine the difficulty judges are 
immediately able to view either parts or the whole of the 
routine again on a laptop to confirm they have made the correct 
judgement. If a coach or gymnast disagrees with their difficulty 
score, they can issue a protest and the routine will be reviewed 
by other judges to ensure the mark is ‘correct’. 
As with Hawk-Eye, part of the reason that IRCOS is 
effective is because it is a hybrid system that utilises both a 
human and technology in order to make a decision. Its hybrid 
nature allows accountability because there is an inscription 
created in the form of a video that allows the routine to be 
circulated among other judges. As a result, the score can be 
checked and confirmed, yet explanations can still be provided. 
However, in order for this to occur, the judge must enrol the 
technology; the video must become an assemblage with the 
judge. Interviews with judges revealed that there were 
variations in how often judges made use of the replay system. 
Stuart, a judge of men’s gymnastics, described his experience 
of using the system at international competitions: 
Roslyn: So how often did they use it at Worlds (World Championships)? 
Stuart: Quite a bit, I suppose. 
Roslyn: Every routine, every tenth routine? 
Stuart: In rings, if you don’t hold a skill for a second it doesn’t count, if you hold it for a 
second it does count. So, if it’s not going to be counted, they’d probably look at it then. If 
it’s between one and two seconds, they won’t look at it because they can see it’s counted, 
that’s their job. And generally if you say it’s ‘1001’ (counting) they’ll give it credit without 
looking at the video. But if it’s really short, that’s where they’ll look at the video to get the 
proof … And probably looked it 20–30 per cent at the time. At a guess. 
Stuart’s description suggests the men’s judges perceived the 
system to be a useful tool and enrolled it regularly. Stuart 
believed it assisted with ensuring accurate judgements. 
Alyssa’s comments, from women’s gymnastics, were quite 
different: 
Alyssa: I didn’t use it to make any judgements at all. But we used it on vault to confirm a 
decision we’d made … both times we were right. 
Roslyn: So it wasn’t used that often? 
Alyssa: No. They used it a few times on bars just to check the completion of something … 
And I don’t know if they used it at all on beam … But on floor we used it later to confirm 
what we thought. 
Alyssa described how the system was only enrolled 
occasionally to confirm a judgement they had already made. 
However, she was clear in saying that she did not require the 
system and that she was capable of doing her job without the 
system. Unlike Stuart, Alyssa did not suggest the assemblage 
was particularly worthwhile. 
The quotes from the judges reveal that, even when 
international sporting bodies enrol technologies with the 
intention of improving judging performance, it is a mistake to 
assume that the judges or referees will enrol the device. Both 
Stuart and Alyssa emphasised that, in their view, their own 
knowledge meant that they did not need to enrol IRCOS. This 
reflects the argument that was raised earlier in the book with 
the French kayakers: that it is a mistake for sporting bodies to 
assume that a piece of technology will be utilised purely 
because their own empirical evidence suggests it will be an 
improvement. Just as the athletes trusted their own knowledge 
of kayaking, which made them suspicious of the newly 
designed kayak, the judges here similarly trusted their own 
training, which meant that IRCOS was not utilised fully. 
Conclusion 
Through examining officiating technologies in cricket, tennis 
and gymnastics this chapter has demonstrated how 
acknowledging that sport exists as an actor-network can be 
significant for sporting bodies. The officiating technologies 
examined in this chapter were introduced into their respective 
sports with the goal of improving umpiring and judging 
standards. In all three cases the particular technologies 
included an aspect of video replay that meant the 
performances of the athletes could be repeatedly seen and 
examined in detail by suitably qualified umpires or judges. All 
three sports also chose to implement hybrid systems, which 
exist as a technology and human working together in order to 
produce the most effective outcome, with literature arguing 
that both technology or humans on their own can be 
problematic. 
In all three cases, following the network revealed 
unexpected consequences that were not foreseen by the 
respective sporting bodies. In cricket the use of Hawk-Eye 
revealed the respective skill-sets of various umpires, which in 
turn necessitated the inclusion of rotating systems for umpires 
within matches. Perhaps more significantly, Hawk-Eye was 
argued to affect player performance strongly. This last point is 
particularly interesting, with performance enhancement being 
touted as one of the primary reasons for adopting technology 
in sport. This chapter, along with Butryn’s (2003) work, 
demonstrates how officiating technologies can have a negative 
effect on sporting performance. In cricket, the delay in waiting 
for the outcome from Hawk-Eye can have a detrimental effect 
on performance, while in tennis, players who do not use their 
permission to challenge calls are not maximising their 
performance. But the potential negative effects do not seem to 
be considered by sporting bodies when considering adopting 
new officiating technologies. The effect on the audience in 
taking time away from the match is considered, but not player 
performance. Instead, this is generally considered the realm of 
the sports scientist or coaching team rather than the 
responsibility of an international sporting body. This 
separation could be viewed as logical if player performance is 
seen as a ‘micro’ factor while officiating systems are considered 
as ‘macro’. Yet as the ANT perspective argues and as this 
chapter demonstrates, the micro and macro levels cannot be 
considered in isolation, and it is problematic for international 
sporting bodies to do so. The role of international sporting 
bodies is to regulate their sports and provide the best 
competitive opportunities for their athletes, so any new 
initiative should be considered in the light of the effect it could 
have on all aspects of the sport, and particularly on athlete 
performance. More extensive research examining the effects of 
new officiating and media technologies on athlete performance 
would be helpful in addressing this issue. 
Note 
1Paul Hamm received the individual all-around gold medal, which should have gone to Yang 
Tae-Young from Korea. The FIG and IOC investigated the situation and discovered that three 
judges had accepted bribe money and consequently marked Yang down. These three judges 
were banned for life from judging at any further gymnastics competitions. Paul Hamm was 
asked by the FIG to return his gold medal in the spirit of fairness but declined to do so 
(Grandi, 2004). 
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Translating performances: the production of sports 
media broadcasts 
When René Magritte painted a picture of a pipe and wrote 
beneath it ‘This is not a pipe’, he was drawing attention to the 
difference between representation and reality. The painting 
was, of course, an image of a pipe, as opposed to the pipe itself, 
and Magritte was asking viewers to keep the distinction 
between the two in mind. In any televised coverage of sport the 
same distinction is in place. A television image of a football 
game is not the actual game; it is a representation or depiction 
of the game. While we rarely refer to sports television 
producers as artists, their role is exactly the same. Like 
Magritte, they produce images that show a particular depiction 
of reality. 
Within the study of art, art historians, theorists and 
philosophers have studied and written intensively on 
representations. The meaning of representations is discussed at 
length, and this forms a significant core of the discipline. But 
alongside the art historians are others who specialise in the 
study of artistic technique. These technicians are less interested 
in the meaning behind the representations themselves, and 
instead turn their attention to how the art work was produced. 
They are experts in brushes, paint and canvases, rather than in 
Madonnas or landscapes. 
In the study of mediated sport there are plenty of 
equivalents of the first form of art historians. Many sociologists 
or advocates of cultural studies have examined intensively the 
representations produced by sports media. They have 
identified particular depictions of different genders, races, 
ethnicities, nationalities and many other factors. But unlike in 
the study of art, there are very few technicians who examine 
the exact methods by which sports media are produced. Some 
of these techniques may be learnt in broadcasting school, or on 
the job, but within academic literature the topic seems to be 
almost entirely missing. 
Latour (1992) is famous for describing non-humans as 
the ‘missing masses’ in the study of society. While more 
recently authors have argued that the increased number of 
studies examining technology, animals and other non-humans 
means that non-humans are no longer missing (see 
Sayes, 2014), they remain missing in the study of sports media. 
There is little attention to the exact technologies utilised by 
sports producers and how the assemblage of humans (such as 
commentators) and technologies (such as digital overlays) 
work together to produce the actor-network that is the sports 
media broadcast. 
The goal of this chapter is to begin to remedy this 
deficiency. The chapter draws attention not to sports media 
representations but to the processes by which these 
representations are produced. It considers how humans and 
technologies assemble together to produce what we view to be 
a seamless television broadcast. 
One of the most interesting aspects of a television 
broadcast is its global accessibility. A broadcast makes one 
game in a single location visible to countless people who are 
physically distant from where the game is happening. 
Broadcasts can also cross borders, with numerous countries 
often drawing on the exact same footage, subject of course to 
the inscriptions outlining each broadcaster’s media rights. In 
this chapter the global nature of sporting coverage is 
considered through Collier and Ong’s (2005) concept of a 
global assemblage. Following this, I examine China Central 
Televison’s production of the 2008 Beijing Olympic coverage, 
and the history of the broadcasting of the America’s Cup. 
Global assemblages 
One of the central questions within this chapter is: how are 
global assemblages created? The term ‘global assemblage’ 
stems from Latour’s (1987) term ‘immutable mobile’. This in 
turn refers to the relatively stable configuration of an actor-
network which can be displaced yet still holds its shape. The 
displacement refers to the way a certain set of ideas, or way of 
doing things, can be moved or used in any part of the world, 
while the idea of holding shape refers to the concept that it is 
stable enough to remain the same regardless of its movement 
(Law and Mol, 2001). Cooren et al. (2007, p. 157) explain the 
value of the concept: 
By immutable mobile, Latour means an entity that can travel from one point to the other 
without suffering from distortion, loss, or corruption. The beauty of this concept is that 
Latour shows how much energy needs to be spent and how much technology has to be 
mobilized to sustain the immutability of a mobile, whether this mobile be information 
about the geographical position of an island, the data related to the location of an oilfield, 
or the statistics that go into an economic projection. In all these cases, information needs 
to be transported from one point to the other (it needs to be mobile) but scientists and 
technologists have to find ways to maintain the integrity of some of its crucial aspects 
(they have to render it, to some extent, immutable). Unless they do it loses credibility. 
This account demonstrates the value of the concept in relation 
to sports media coverage. A broadcast of a sports game can 
remain the same regardless of how many places in the world it 
is transmitted to, and how many televisions display it. The 
global movement of the coverage does not distort or change it 
in any way. 
Earlier in this book, in Chapter 4, there was a discussion 
of how the graph acts as an immutable mobile, since it is a form 
that contains particular information that is not distorted when 
the graph is moved from point to point. The concept essentially 
relates to the idea that an actor-network can stabilise through a 
non-human actant in order to allow its transportation. Within 
television coverage of sport, it is a particular network of non-
humans, including satellites and television screens, that allows 
this transportation, as well as inscriptions in the form of 
agreements between countries and broadcasters. 
Collier and Ong (2005) extended the notion of an 
immutable mobile to the concept of a ‘global assemblage’ as a 
way to focus on actor-networks that have global reach, and 
which retain their form despite moving across international 
borders. The immutable mobile does not necessarily have to 
have a global form; it is often something that contains 
physically linked components and may only move short 
distances, whereas a global assemblage includes international 
components and is moved around internationally. 
In terms of sport, broadcasts of some games or matches 
act as global assemblages. Broadcasts consist of an edited video 
recording of the match that is specifically designed to hold its 
shape or form while being globally distributed. As Cooren et 
al. (2007) describe in the account above, a fundamental aspect 
of the immutable mobile (or global assemblage) is the centrality 
of the technology in ensuring that the form of the entity is 
retained. In sport, distribution takes place either through 
traditional media broadcasting technologies such as television 
or, more recently, through online forms such as YouTube or 
other internet video sites. These technologies facilitate the 
movement of the sports form. The edited recordings work as 
global assemblages in that the audience receiving them 
generally understands and accepts them as depicting the 
match (Law and Mol, 2001). Therefore, it could be argued that 
the sports media relationship results in the stability of a global 
assemblage. 
So the questions this chapter sets out to answer are: how 
did these global assemblages come into being? What is 
necessary for an actor-network to stabilise into a global 
assemblage? These questions will be answered by examining 
two different cases. In the first case, the broadcasting of the 
Olympic Games is already stabilised as a global assemblage. 
Therefore the goal in this case is about understanding how the 
games retain their distinct form when confronted with changes 
in technology. In contrast, the case of broadcasting of the 
America’s Cup was chosen because of the complexity of the 
technology that was required in order to mobilise the sport, 
with the question of whether it has achieved stability in the 
form of a global assemblage still in doubt. However, before 
examining the cases, the chapter provides a brief overview of 
the history of technology in sports broadcasting. 
Technological developments in sports broadcasting 
Stead (2008, p. 340) describes how sports media companies 
employ professionals to produce a sports media package that 
‘aims to attract, interest and excite their audience’. Therefore it 
is understandable that sports media produce a ‘distorted’ 
version of sport and not an objective and neutral presentation. 
Stead describes a number of techniques that media companies 
use to present sport in a more interesting way, such as 
commentary, expert analysis, an emphasis on the spectacular 
and presenting athletes in very particular ways. While these 
may seem simple, Whannel (1992) argued that these techniques 
developed in tandem with the technologies that facilitated 
their use. Similarly, Turner (2007) argues that the relationship 
between sports broadcasters and sports organisations has 
intensified owing to technological developments in the field of 
sports broadcasting. 
Whannel (1992) describes how television broadcasting 
was only possible through the production of satellites that 
became sufficiently efficient in the 1950s to beam live coverage 
around the world. In essence, satellite technology needed to 
stabilise as a global assemblage to allow the production of 
television coverage. With satellites in place, it became possible 
to broadcast sport worldwide. The focus then turned to the 
production of a more realistic screen image, with the 1950s and 
1960s characterised by improvements in camera and 
microphone technology, the most famous of which was the 
introduction of colour television in the 1960s. Ross (2008) 
describes how the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation used 
instant replay for the first time in 1955 when 
broadcasting Hockey Night. Replays were further developed in 
the 1960s, with both the action replay and the subsequent slow-
motion replay becoming commonplace. Replays altered the 
coverage of events significantly, with replays not only being 
played during matches but also allowing for extended panel-
style discussion both before and after a match. In the 1970s the 
focus shifted to utilising electronic devices to edit images. For 
example, a new amplifier allowed the production of a ‘tighter’ 
image, meaning that any unimportant or unattractive parts of 
the image could be removed (Whannel, 1992, p. 61). Clear 
camera shots from a variety of angles, replays and commentary 
have all come to be understood as a normal part of the sports 
broadcasting experience. 
In terms of the technologies available to viewers, Todreas 
(1999, cited in Turner 2007) argues that there have been three 
distinct eras of broadcasting development. First, the 1950s to 
1975 included limited broadcasters and heavy regulation. 
During this era viewers had very little viewing choice. A 
second era emerged in the 1980s, with the advent of cable, or 
pay-TV, which provided viewers with a greater range of 
options. The third era emerged in the 1990s with the advent of 
digital technologies, which increased yet further the range of 
options available to the viewer through websites and online 
content. Similarly, in examining the changes that have 
occurred through moving to digital technology, Bull (2005) 
notes the way the movement from the Walkman or Discman to 
the MP3 player has revolutionised listening to music through 
the far wider range of options now available to listeners. 
Listeners now have a choice of thousands of songs on a single 
device, plus a range of methods for listening to them. However, 
it is not the user experience that is the focus of this chapter but 
media production. The following case study details the 
introduction of digital technology into broadcasting. The move 
from analogue to digital technology arguably created a range 
of new possibilities, but also some risks and problems. 
Case study: the broadcasting of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games 
The summer Olympic Games could be argued to be one of the 
most famous examples of a global assemblage. As a ritualised 
event, it includes specific features such as the torch relay, the 
parade of athletes and victory ceremonies that include the 
playing of the winner’s national anthem (Roche, 2000). 
These aspects are now understood as stable aspects of the 
Olympic Games that occur at every Olympiad despite it 
moving to entirely different international venues every four 
years. 
However, Horne and Whannel (2012) point out that a 
significant aspect of the actor-network of the Olympic Games 
is the televised aspect. The Olympic Games are produced as a 
television event, with television taking precedence, rather than 
it being merely a live event that happens to be recorded and 
then shown on television. Horne and Whannel (2012, p. 149) 
use a controversial example from the 2008 Olympic Games to 
illustrate the vital place of television within the actor-network 
of the Olympic Games: the ‘digitally enhanced’ fireworks that 
were part of the opening ceremony: 
Part of the firework display was ‘real’ and live, but other parts appeared to have been pre-
recorded and used to enhance the television image … While there clearly were real 
fireworks, the full display could not be properly seen either from inside the stadium or 
from immediately outside it … Only on television could the whole production, complete 
with digital augmentation, be properly perceived. 
The example of the fireworks illustrates the importance of the 
television coverage as part of the actor-network of the Olympic 
Games. If the television coverage was not important, there 
would be no need to digitally enhance the fireworks in this 
way. Therefore, the production of the television coverage 
forms a vital part of the global assemblage that is understood 
to be the Olympic Games. For most people who watch the 
games, it is their entire experience of the Olympic Games. With 
this in mind, the following case study details the work 
involved in producing the television coverage of the 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games. 
This case uses the work of Liang (2013). This writer does 
not describe himself as working from an ANT perspective, but 
his arguments resonate strongly with the ANT point of view. 
Like Latour, Liang (2013, p. 475) argues that both the ‘material 
and social’ are important, indicating an intention to pay equal 
attention to both the human and non-human within his study. 
His work is unique in focusing on the actual work that occurs 
at the production level, which is why it is so relevant in 
understanding the question of how a global assemblage comes 
to be created. As discussed earlier, among those examining 
sports media it is more common to discuss cultural meaning 
than to examine the work performed in production, so Liang’s 
(2013) work is an important exception to this rule. 
To explain why there is so little work examining media 
production processes, Couldry (2008) argues that media have 
become black-boxed as benign and natural rather than 
institutionalised. This is understandable since in the early days 
of media coverage the media were the only way in which 
people who were not at an event could access any news about 
what was happening. However, today, the media instead aim 
to attract viewers in order to maximise commercial gain. 
Couldry (2008) notes that the black-boxing process has ensured 
that the networks that make up the media have become hidden 
from view. With this in mind, Liang’s (2013) work is useful for 
unpacking the black box that has become ‘media coverage’. 
Liang’s focus is not only the production of the coverage 
but also the introduction of digital broadcasting technology as 
a mode of broadcasting. As described above, the move from 
analogue to digital has been identified as a significant shift in 
broadcasting and in society (see, for example, Bull, 2005; 
Turner, 2007). In the case of the Olympic Games, the role of the 
broadcasters was to ensure that television coverage was 
produced that mirrored the kinds of broadcast that had 
featured at previous games, thereby ensuring the continued 
production of the global assemblage known as the Olympic 
Games. As outlined below, Liang (2013) identifies that digital 
technology opened up a range of potential new broadcasting 
methods. However, equally, it is noted that the anti-
programme of ‘limited time’ meant that the full potential of the 
technology was not utilised during the Olympic Games despite 
the large resources allocated to it. 
Time is again identified as a scarce resource in this case 
(Woodward, 2013), as in many other cases described in this 
book. In this case, Liang’s (2013) description of the 
broadcasters’ reasons for not using all the potential provided 
by digital technology is identical to the reasons why elite 
athletes do not easily enrol technologies. In both cases, the anti-
programme of ‘limited time’ forms a significant barrier, with 
both groups aware that they have time to utilise only a limited 
actor network. 
Liang argues that the move to digital broadcasting in 
China, as adopted by the national broadcaster, China Central 
Television (CCTV), brought about a complete change in the 
way that broadcasting took place. He explains how in the 
previous era of video tapes the processes of production and 
broadcasting took place independently, out of necessity. The 
physical tape needed to be completed by the first group before 
being edited by the second group. As the tape existed as a 
physical object, it needed to be physically passed from one 
group to the other. In contrast, by the 2008 Olympic Games the 
improvements in the digital platforms meant that the two 
processes could be integrated. Liang (2013, p. 473) states: 
With a crucial material link in the process (the videotape) being removed, TV content 
came to be stored, edited, produced, and broadcast purely via digital files. TV making 
henceforth transformed from a ‘material’ era to an ‘immaterial’ era. 
Here Liang interprets the digital era as no longer requiring a 
physical object as the vehicle for circulating the images, but 
because of his focus on the ‘material’ he notes how the 
participants in his study were still very aware of working with 
particular technologies despite the ‘immaterial’ nature of the 
digital age. For example, he describes how there were concerns 
about remembering to save footage to the correct part of the 
server in order to allow it to be edited. In this example, 
although the digital server does not technically physically 
exist, broadcasting personnel clearly treated the server as a 
significant actant in the production of the broadcast. They 
acknowledged the need to use the server correctly in order for 
it to act as an intermediary rather than as a mediator. 
This example suggests that the transition from analogue 
to digital increased the complexity of the actor-network that 
produced and broadcasted sport. In the analogue era the tape 
presented a finished product from the production team. It was 
highly stabilised and immutable, not subject to accidental 
deletion or alteration. In contrast, digital files are far more 
ephemeral. They needed to assemble with the correct part of 
the server in order for them to work, but also remained subject 
to accidental deletion or loss in a way that was not possible 
with a physical tape. 
One feature that Liang (2013) described as occurring as a 
result of the move to digital was the creation of a new device 
called the Express Video Service. Prior to the digital era, a 
physical copy of the video tape had to exist in order for editing 
to commence. As a result, it was not possible for editing to take 
place until the event was concluded. In contrast, the Express 
Video Service featured ‘real-time recording, playback, and 
editing functions in an online environment’ (p. 479), which 
meant that editors could access the live stream of the event at 
any time and could commence editing while the event was still 
running. Liang (2013, p. 475) recognises the symmetry of the 
human users and the technologies in producing this outcome: 
In this case, the agency of users (the organizational customers) helped reconfigure the 
material features of the network technology, while the technology people helped users 
realize their creative goals by tapping into the technological affordance and added new 
features to the prototype. 
In this description Liang points out that the various actors hold different roles and therefore 
have different understandings, and one aspect of moving into the digital areas was to bring 
these different groups together. The digital platform acted to allow users to perform different 
actions, and because of the immediacy provided by the platform, the ‘technology people’ 
were able to instantly respond to users’ needs and consequently improve the digital platform. 
The digital technology, ‘technology people’ and users all contributed equally to the 
improvement of the prototype. 
As previously discussed, one of the largest changes in 
moving from analogue to digital was the way that, with the 
digital platform, production and broadcasting could be 
undertaken simultaneously. This technological shift resulted in 
two groups working together who had not done so before, and 
Liang (2013, p. 478) found through interviews that bringing 
them together was perceived as generating new forms of 
creativity, as one interviewee (a broadcaster) described: 
The sports people have the best minds. They often come up with ideas how a new 
technology might help realize a certain vision. Conversely, I would float my ideas and see 
if they could help improve the television production process. We would then toy with the 
ideas and try to find a proper channel, such as the Football World Cup, to turn these ideas 
into technological reality. 
The scenario contrasts greatly with the cases described 
in Chapter 5, where sports coaches and scientists were not able 
to work seamlessly together because they brought different 
understandings to the scenario, even though their goal might 
be the same one, of producing a more effective athlete. 
However, despite the apparent willingness to work 
together, Liang (2013) argued that the resultant Olympic 
coverage was not as creative as it could have been owing to a 
lack of familiarity with the technology, and the processes 
involved in working with the technology. Essentially, the 
limited time available and the impossibility of practising the 
coverage of an event the size of the Olympic Games acted as 
anti-programmes towards the best possible production. Again 
the actant ‘time’ proved significant. While a large number of 
resources were utilised, such as allocating an individual 
support technician to every media maker, the lack of 
familiarity with the new technology meant that the media 
makers did not feel they performed as well as they could have. 
For example, Liang (2013, p. 482) described a revealing 
scenario that occurred after the games: 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) hosted its Golden Rings Awards to honour 
the best Olympic programs by TV rights holders. CCTV’s feature team was asked to 
submit one program to compete for the award. I was surprised to learn that the producer 
submitted an entry that was broadcast in the run-up to the Games and not during the 
Games. The producer later explained that he could not recall any outstanding feature 
during the Games that merited a submission. The extraordinary pressure during the 
Games constrained the creativity of media makers. 
A further reason for the pressure felt by the media makers was 
the belief that the introduction of digital technologies 
introduced a higher degree of risk. This was described in an 
interview with an engineer: 
If the system works well, everything is fine and more efficient. But should there be a 
breakdown, it will result in a catastrophe. Unlike the tape era, when a glitch on one single 
machine would only have a local impact, this time a problem at the systematic level would 
have a systematic impact. That’s the downside of a complex, interconnected system. 
(Liang, 2013, p. 480) 
The argument made by this engineer is the same as that made 
by Latour (1999a): that any point in an actor-network can affect 
any other point and potentially generate unexpected outcomes. 
In this case the technology of the video tape acted to limit the 
size of the actor-network, since the circulation of the data on 
the tape could be achieved only through the circulation of the 
physical tape. By contrast, the immediacy of the circulation 
offered by digital technology meant that the actor-network 
suddenly increased in size. While on the one hand, new, novel 
and creative solutions were then able to be generated, on the 
other, greater risk also resulted through mistakes also being 
able to circulate rapidly through the actor-network. 
Liang’s (2013) study of the broadcasting of the 2008 
Olympic Games highlights the way that the technologies used 
for production and broadcasting have a significant impact on 
the way that footage is generated. His findings fill a significant 
gap in the literature, in examining the processes that took place 
within broadcasting and the role of technology within this 
environment. Further work in this area would be beneficial in 
order to understand the role that changing technology plays in 
the media broadcasting of sport. When watching televised 
sport, we cannot fail to be aware of the immense number of 
technologies involved in production, such as cameras, 
headsets, cables, microphones etc., so it is surprising that so 
little attention has been directed at these elements. 
Moving to image enhancement 
While the previous case examined the introduction of digital 
technology in the production of a single mega-event, the 
following case examines how computer-based broadcasting 
enhancements have influenced a particular sports event over a 
number of years: the America’s Cup. First, however, the 
background to computer-based technologies is discussed. 
Owens (2005) documents how a range of different 
computer-based technologies have been introduced into sports 
broadcasting that have been met with various degrees of 
interest. Some of these have become ubiquitous within sport, 
while others have not been so successful. For example, one of 
the more ubiquitous is the virtual field-of-play lines that are 
now commonplace within sporting coverage. These consist of 
virtual lines ‘drawn’ on the field that demonstrate where 
particular play zones are, or similar. Such lines have also been 
extended into showing where an athlete is in relation to a 
world record and have been used in sports such as athletics and 
swimming. Virtual field-of-play lines add to the excitement of 
the viewer by presenting additional information in an easy-to-
understand manner. But not all enhancements have been so 
successful. For example, Owens (2005) describes how an 
enhancement introduced into ice hockey, which made the puck 
easier to see by making it glow, was not greeted with 
enthusiasm by fans. As a result, it was only used for three years 
in television coverage of hockey before it was removed. 
Virtual field-of-play lines and a glowing puck are small 
examples of two technologies that have been introduced into 
sports coverage with the goal of making the coverage more 
accessible and popular with viewers. In order to understand 
how technologies such as enhancements develop over time, it 
is necessary to examine the step-by-step process of their 
historical development. Latour (1991) demonstrates this 
process through the examine of the Kodak camera. He 
describes the different actor-networks that made up the camera 
at different stages of its existence. Parts of the actor-network 
included small physical technologies that could be replaced or 
upgraded, such as gelatin, replaced by soluble gelatin, but also 
included what would traditionally by considered much 
larger actants, such as the existence of a mass market for 
cameras. Latour demonstrates how the camera existed and 
exists in a continual state of flux as it changes based on the 
make-up of the actor-network. Related to this argument is the 
question of when the actor-network stabilises and becomes an 
immutable mobile or global assemblage. In the following case, 
the America’s Cup is examined through the same method in 
order to track the efforts made by broadcasters to turn the 
event into a global assemblage. 
Case study: the broadcasting of the America’s Cup, 1983–2013 
The America’s Cup is a high-profile sailing event that began in 
1851. The format involves different countries issuing 
challenges to win the cup, but the USA continued to win the 
cup until 1983, when it was won by Australia (Andrews, 1992; 
Bentley, 2013). Unlike the case of the Olympic Games, the 
America’s Cup is not a widely popular international event, 
despite the desire of those running the event to make it so. 
Therefore, where the case of the Olympic Games was about 
producing a consistent broadcast despite a change in 
technology, the case of the America’s Cup is about the efforts 
of those involved in the cup to produce an event that may one 
day reach the status of the Olympic Games or FIFA World Cup, 
in becoming a global assemblage. Therefore in this case study 
the development of the America’s Cup in terms of broadcasting 
is followed from 1983 to 2013. It is more difficult to argue that 
the actor-network that makes up the America’s Cup is a global 
assemblage, for two reasons. First, an unusual quirk of the 
America’s Cup is the way the winner of a race is entitled to 
choose the venue and rules for the next cup. Therefore, the 
format of the event is unstable, with great variation between 
cups. Second, despite the efforts of those involved in the 
America’s Cup, it fails to attract any significant global 
attention. Sports journalist Tripp Mickle (2012) speculates that 
there are several reasons for the lack of global interest. First, he 
suggests that the expense of the yachts means it is beyond the 
means of most sailors to compete, resulting in fewer than 
twenty yachts competing, often from the same wealthy 
countries with some history of sailing success. Second, he 
suggests that the race is not globally popular as sailing does not 
work easily as a spectator sport. The rules of sailing are 
complicated and difficult for the layperson to understand, and, 
in terms of viewing, it is difficult to make out the position of 
the boats relative to each other or to the race course. 
Additionally, the timing of races is determined by wind and 
weather conditions, making it difficult to ascertain precisely 
when races will be held. For example, in the 2013 America’s 
Cup, numerous races were cancelled or postponed because of 
wind conditions, leaving spectators in doubt about when the 
next race would occur. 
Despite these difficulties, since Australia’s victory in 
1983, which brought the race to the attention of many new 
viewers, broadcasters have recognised the potential for the 
America’s Cup to become a globally popular event. Since that 
time broadcasters have sought ways to increase the global 
popularity of the sport. In essence, they have attempted to 
transform sailing into a global assemblage. Therefore, with this 
goal in mind, the following now documents how the sport has 
experienced significant change over the last thirty years both 
in terms of operation and broadcasting. It begins by providing 
a brief history of broadcasting the cup, then considers the 
question of whether the cup has become a global assemblage. 
To date, there has been very little academic work examining 
the America’s Cup, so the discussion below draws upon a 
variety of media releases, journalistic articles, websites, blogs 
and policy documents as well as one academic article. 
A brief history of broadcasting the America’s Cup 
ESPN describes its 1983 coverage of the America’s Cup as a 
pinnacle moment in its being treated as a serious television 
network. ESPN made a last-minute decision to televise the final 
race when the series was tied 3–3, and despite the coverage 
coming from a single camera in a helicopter, which resulted in 
the boats appearing as simply two tiny dots in the ocean, the 
ratings recorded a weekday afternoon record (Stewart, 1992). 
Such an indication was a strong one that interest in sailing was 
out there, motivating broadcasters to improve the coverage to 
attract more viewers. 
The following event in 1987 included a far larger pool of 
nations and subsequently attracted greater media attention 
(John and Jackson, 2011). Therefore, from 1987 onwards, 
broadcasters began to turn their attention to how to present 
sailing most effectively to a wider audience. The first 
development, included in 1987, was the use of on-board 
cameras that were placed on boats near the challenging yachts. 
However, on-board cameras were only partially effective 
because the boat with the camera had to be in precisely the 
right place at the right time in order to record the action, 
something that was not always possible, leading to a very 
unstable actor-network. Further, on-board cameras did not 
show the tactics and nuances, or explain the rules, so the 
footage was not particularly useful. Gladwell (2009, para. 4) 
describes how a potential solution was trialled in 1987, 
‘consisting of the yachts being “shot” using accurate survey 
equipment located on hills around the race course, and the 
output used to produce a GPS track of the yachts’. However, 
while the system appeared to have promise, it did not work 
effectively, so again the broadcasting of the cup did not 
stabilise to include GPS technology at this time. 
In 1991 a team of graphics and GPS specialists came 
together and produced a workable system that overcame the 
anti-programmes identified above (Gladwell, 2009; 
Stewart, 1992). The graphics team produced computer-
generated graphics of the boats using techniques from the film 
industry. These were then linked to a GPS black box which was 
placed in the boat, allowing the boats to send and receive real-
time data that allowed the plotting of their exact position 
(Gladwell, 2009). Therefore, the coverage included computer-
game-like animations of the boats that demonstrated their 
relative positions to each other and the course. Additionally, 
the 1992 cup coverage included cameras that allowed steady 
aerial filming from a helicopter that produced live overhead 
viewing of the position of the boats (Bentley, 2013). These 
developments significantly improved the presentation of 
sailing for television, as viewers were now able to understand 
the exact positions of the boats in relation to the race. 
There was, however, still one anti-programme yet to be 
overcome, and that was the inability to see both the boats and 
their relative positions simultaneously. In 1992 the coverage 
was only able to switch back and forth between the aerial view 
and the animated view, without a link between the two 
(Bentley, 2013). The simultaneous-viewing problem was not 
solved until 2010, when the same team of technicians came 
back together in order to take the next step in improving 
television coverage of the race. This time the improvements to 
the coverage were directly linked to other changes that took 
place in the America’s Cup format. The 2010 America’s Cup 
was won by Oracle USA, owned by Larry Ellison, but the 
victory followed years of court battles over the rules which led 
to sponsors and competitors pulling out of the race 
(Mickle, 2012). 
Larry Ellison proved to be highly determined to turn the 
America’s Cup into a global assemblage. As mentioned briefly 
earlier, one of the unusual quirks of the America’s Cup actor-
network is the lack of an overall organising body. Rather than 
having an international overseeing body, such as FIFA for 
football, the America’s Cup allows the winner of a race to 
choose the venue and rules for the next cup. Consequently, 
Larry Ellison, of Oracle USA, planned significant changes for 
2013 with the goal of increasing global spectator interest in the 
sport (Mickle, 2012). 
Ellison introduced a number of changes to the cup. 
Perhaps the most controversial was the change in boat design. 
While unique boat technology has always been a hallmark of 
the America’s Cup, highlighted by the ‘winged keel’ that won 
Australia its historic race in 1983, the changes introduced for 
2013 were particularly significant (Bentley, 2013). Ellison 
allowed the racing of carbon-fibre catamarans that used wing 
sails rather than soft sails. This style of boat is able to travel 
very fast, up to 50 miles per hour, therefore arguably making 
races more exciting (Mahler, 2013). Further, it is able to sail in 
a wider variety of wind conditions, making weather delays less 
likely (Mickle, 2012). However, there were a number of 
problems with the new boats. First, the boats were so expensive 
to build that there were only four challengers (competing 
teams) for the cup, as opposed to ten or more as in previous 
years. Second, the boats are far more difficult and potentially 
dangerous to sail than previous styles. For example, in 2013 a 
capsized catamaran killed British Olympic gold medallist 
Andrew Simpson. As a result, the actor-network for racing 
expanded to include new safety gear such as crash helmets 
(Mahler, 2013). 
This technological development is particularly 
interesting through the contrast with other sports in which 
governing bodies must carefully weigh up the value of new 
technological developments in terms of fairness, safety and 
other relevant rules. This was illustrated very effectively in the 
case of the polyurethane swimsuits. Even though the faster 
times had the potential to make swimming more exciting, 
FINA chose to ban these swimsuits on the grounds that they 
felt they were unfair and in breach of the rules. By contrast, the 
actor-network that makes up the America’s Cup has no such 
governing body to consider whether changes in regulations are 
fair and the best thing for the sport. Consequently, changing 
the sport in order to increase viewer interest is far easier. It 
provides an interesting case study as a corporate model of 
sport. 
The other revolution came in the broadcasting of the cup. 
Ellison chose the seas around the city of San Francisco as a 
venue partly because of its suitability as an ideal backdrop for 
a television broadcast (Bentley, 2013), but, more importantly, 
there were some significant technological improvements to the 
broadcasting of the 2013 America’s Cup. The first was the 
introduction of Liveline, a system that combined overlays with 
real-time live footage. In a media interview, one of the main 
developers of the technology, Stan Honey, explained: 
People wanted to see the real boats and crew sail, handling and puffs on the water, and 
at the same time wanted to have aids to interpretation such as lay lines, mark circles and 
advantage lines showing who’s ahead and behind. (Bentley, 2013, para. 33) 
In order to achieve the simultaneous viewing of the positions 
of the boats and the actions of those on the boats, the broadcast 
coverage included lines drawn on the ocean to show the 
boundaries of the course, the start and finish lines, wind 
direction, current lines and other course markers on top of the 
live footage of the boats (Bentley, 2013; Mickle, 2012). The 
footage also included the boat speed and the distance between 
any two boats, leaving viewers in no doubt of which boat was 
ahead. Liveline’s goal was explicitly to make sailing attractive 
and easy for the uneducated spectator to understand 
(Fisher, 2012). 
Liveline was also utilised by umpires, who watched the 
race on screen and not live (ACEA, 2012), although this part of 
the actor-network is not the focus of this chapter. In attempting 
to produce coverage that the layperson understood, the 
graphic overlays acted as intermediaries by translating the 
occurrences within the race into a form that viewers could 
understand. 
To produce the graphic overlays, the actor-network was 
extended further to include a variety of new actants. Three 
helicopters equipped with cameras, precise GPS and 
navigational recorders filmed every race, with all their data 
being sent to the main control centre. Each boat was fitted with 
GPS units, microphones and three cameras, which also 
transmitted data to the control centre. At the control centre 
about sixty people, including commentators, were employed to 
use the data derived from the helicopters and the boats and to 
produce a streamlined television production (Fisher, 2012). 
Therefore, the television coverage may have briefly stabilised 
into a form that the layperson could understand, but it required 
a much more extensive actor-network in order to produce this 
effect. The control centre also acted as an oligopticon, with data 
from numerous physical locations all sent to one central point, 
but only as long as the connections between the various 
locations held. However, unlike WADA, who used data in 
order to police athletes, the data was used to produce effective 
television coverage. The more information that was able to be 
fed to the control centre about the exact details of the race, the 
more data the producers had to work with in order to produce 
more effective coverage. This perhaps reflects a 
similar perspective to that used by the producers of reality 
television, where maximum surveillance of the participants is 
undertaken in order to produce the most interesting coverage. 
 
The results of the broadcasts 
The actor-network was effective for producing the graphic 
overlays as desired, but it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
resultant coverage was effective as a television product that 
was desirable to watch. On one hand, within the US market, 
the 2013 America’s Cup produced higher ratings than all 
previous cups put together. However, the rating was still not 
high, particularly in comparison with other popular American 
sports such as American football and baseball. Further, there is 
an argument that the popularity of the cup was not due to 
Ellison’s changes or the graphics work, but rather to the 
incredible comeback by Oracle USA, who were down by seven 
races only to clinch the series over Emirates Team New 
Zealand 9–8. In New Zealand the ratings can be argued to have 
been very impressive, with a quarter of the population tuning 
in to the races, but this is unsurprising given that New Zealand 
has the largest number of sailors per capita in the world 
(Daniels, 2013; Noonan, 2013). 
The rating numbers fall far short of the Olympic Games, 
with its undoubted global interest. It appears that the 
America’s Cup is still struggling to find the global form that 
would allow it to reach international popularity. Daniels (2013) 
argues that, despite the changes introduced by Ellison, and the 
excitement of the final races between Oracle USA and Emirates 
Team New Zealand, the event has too many anti-programmes at 
work for it to attain global popularity. The first is cost. With the 
cost of building and maintaining the yachts estimated at 
between US $100 and $200 million, Daniels suggests that it is 
simply impossible to obtain sponsorship to offset such large 
costs. The television ratings are not high enough to generate 
that level of sponsorship. He also suggests that it is difficult to 
generate interest since it is not a sport that people can 
participate in on their own, unlike the popular sports of 
football or baseball. What Daniels argues is that, while other 
sports events have become global assemblages through having 
an actor-network that includes utilising sponsorship and 
television rights to cover the costs of the event, because of 
through global interest in the sport, the America’s Cup has not 
yet found a similar workable form. Therefore, it will not be 
surprising if the cup sees further changes in years to come as 
sailing enthusiasts attempt to continue to reconfigure the 
America’s Cup in order to reach this level of stabilisation and 
global interest. 
Conclusion 
For many sports or sporting events the relationship between 
sport and the media is an important one. Broadcasting rights 
and sponsorship provided by the media can provide 
significant income and allow sport to function. However, as 
Couldry (2004) points out, the workings that occur to produce 
sports television coverage are often concealed from view. 
Therefore, one of the goals of this chapter was to examine the 
processes that produce television coverage, paying particular 
attention to the technologies within these processes, with the 
aim of understanding how the actor-network stabilises to 
produce sport as a global assemblage. 
This chapter has only scratched the surface of this 
particular area of study. While a few of the technologies that 
affect the production and broadcasting of sports coverage have 
been identified and discussed, a large amount of work still 
needs to be done to examine the range of other technologies 
that affect sports broadcasting and how these assemble with 
other human and non-human actants in order to produce 
sporting coverage. Ethnographic studies that examine how 
sports coverage comes into being would be of benefit to 
complement the variety of work that exists on media 
representation. While representation is an important area of 
study, examining media products without acknowledging the 
technologies that contribute to producing them misses half the 
story. In the study of sports media, technologies are still the 
‘missing masses’ (Latour, 1992). 
As this chapter has shown, the capacities of technology 
profoundly affect how broadcasts appear. In Liang’s (2013) 
study of the broadcasting of the Olympic Games, the 
assembling of the production and broadcasting teams led to 
more creative coverage than when they operated 
independently. At the same time, these teams were aware that 
they were not working to the full potential of the technologies 
they were using, owing to the anti-programme lack of time. 
Similarly, in the broadcasting of the America’s Cup 
broadcasters knew exactly what would improve the coverage 
for viewers as far back as 1987, but it was not until 2010 that 
the technology existed that would allow the coverage to take 
that form. These examples show how the availability of 
technologies, their actor-networks and their abilities act to 
influence profoundly the form that sports broadcasting takes. 
Technologies act, and the realm of sports media requires more 
studies that acknowledge their role in the production of sports 
coverage. 
These two cases also highlighted the issue of stability, 
and the concept of the global assemblage was employed to 
discuss this. In the case of the Olympic Games, sports coverage 
has been and is a stabilising entity. The existence of, and desire 
for, global coverage of the games has worked to ensure the 
continued funding of and interest in the Olympic Games. The 
effect of this arrangement is that broadcasters are not 
motivated to change or improve Olympic coverage 
profoundly, but prefer to keep it recognisable as Olympic 
coverage while still incorporating the latest technology. 
Consequently, digital technology was not introduced into the 
games in order to counter an anti-programme, but simply to 
continue the effective coverage that already existed. 
In contrast, the coverage of the America’s Cup has not 
yet reached a stabilised form, so broadcasters are strongly 
motivated to introduce new technologies and enhancements in 
order to increase ratings. The America’s Cup is a particularly 
unusual case since the rules are not governed by a global body. 
Instead, Larry Ellison is able to direct the cup with an unusual 
amount of power. Despite his efforts, the America’s Cup has 
not yet managed to become a stable global assemblage. 
Conclusion 
In today’s world, we are offered a constantly expanding range 
of interconnected technologies to use at work, at home and in 
leisure activities. The realm of sport is no exception, where new 
technologies or enhancements are available to athletes, 
coaches, scientists, umpires, governing bodies and 
broadcasters. However, in a world where time has become a 
precious commodity and numerous options are always on 
offer, functionality is no longer enough to drive their use. 
Instead, as this book has shown, each assemblage must grapple 
with a unique set of understandings and connections in order 
to determine the best actor-network to serve their particular 
purpose. As each chapter shows, there are multiple 
explanations and factors at play in the use of technology that 
cannot be reduced to singular explanations such as 
performance enhancement or commercialisation. Instead, 
technologies were shown to exist within actor-networks where 
any point in the network can affect another point, leading to 
multiple actants affecting the enrolment or non-enrolment of 
technology in sport. 
This book shows how at times these networks stabilise 
with particular actants being enrolled, such as in the case in 
doping, where the actor-network of doping includes a 
particular understanding of doping as censured. In other cases 
the path of the network comes to an end as a particular 
assemblage or actant is no longer enrolled, such as in the case 
where in 2010 FINA no longer allowed the wearing of 
swimsuits with particular technological qualities. This book 
found different and varied forms of enrolment and translation, 
and it paid equal attention to the impact of human and non-
human actants in the creation of sport. 
Sport as a socio-technical actor-network 
Introna (2009) emphasises that in today’s world we are 
increasingly connected to technologies to the point where we 
cannot separate ourselves from them. The notion of sport and 
technologies existing as actor-networks which, once 
assembled, can stabilise to produce particular transformative 
effects has been a constant theme throughout this book. For 
example, the book explored how athletes assemble with 
polyurethane swimsuits to produce swimmers capable of 
unusually fast times, judges and umpires combine with video-
replay technologies to improve the accuracy of their decisions 
and how footballers assemble with GPS units to transform into 
trackable units, able to have their heart rate and other bodily 
statistics surveyed and measured at all times. 
The book followed these assemblages through the larger 
actor-networks that make up sports, where the connections 
between assemblages were found to generate unexpected 
consequences. In cricket I found that the new assemblage of 
umpire and video replay potentially affected player 
performance. In tennis the same assemblage combined with 
rules around player challenges to produce yet another aspect 
of the tennis that a player could choose to include in their 
training regime, or not. 
Indeed, this book included examples of many cases 
where enrolment did not occur and the actor-network did not 
expand to include a new technological device or enhancement. 
The evidence provided by scientists to show that a new 
enhanced boat was functionally capable of improving 
performance was not enough to convince kayakers to alter 
their actor-networks to incorporate the new boats. Or, in other 
words, the goal of performance enhancement did not translate 
directly into enrolment. Similarly, functionality was an 
insufficient reason for Michael Phelps and Rebecca Adlington 
to choose to assemble with any swimsuits not made by their 
sponsor Speedo, indicating the conflicting pressures athletes 
can experience between retaining sponsorship and achieving 
success. 
At the same time, the different actor-networks that make 
up athletes’ bodies mean that all technologies do not have the 
same effects on all bodies. TCHEs have had their functionality 
called into question by athletes who have found that the 
unexpected effects of them on other already working parts of 
their actor-network affected their performance negatively, 
rather than improving it. Other athletes’ actor-networks 
already include a large capacity for carrying oxygen, making 
the addition of a TCHE superfluous. 
Some of the above examples demonstrate how 
introducing new technologies into an actor-network can have 
unexpected effects on different parts of the network, such as 
Hawk-Eye impacting player performance. These examples 
have implications for sports policy-makers who intend to enrol 
new pieces of technology. Through viewing these cases as 
actor-networks, we can see how introducing a new piece of 
technology may also result in the need for restructuring or 
further resourcing. For example, in the case of the GPS units 
used in the AFL, further resourcing was found to be necessary 
in the form of data analysts and alternatives for stadiums with 
roofs that blocked GPS signals. 
Describing sport as socio-technical answers ANT critics 
such as Elder-Vass (2008), who argue that because people have 
emergent properties, they cannot be treated as equal to non-
humans. But he perhaps misses a crucial point in that he 
continues to treat people and things as separate, when the very 
essence of ANT is that things and people cannot be separated 
(Introna, 2009; Latour, 2005; Law, 1992; McLean and 
Hassard, 2004). As described above, ANT argues that, once a 
network assembles, it is transformed into a new actant with 
different properties from what existed previously. Therefore, 
the ANT theorist views the world as made up of these 
assemblages of humans and non-humans that often stabilise 
only briefly, and in particular ways. 
As part of acknowledging the role of non-humans, ANT 
also notes the impact of different viewpoints in the enrolment 
processes. Indeed, identifying the links between the 
viewpoints of the different parties and the enrolment process 
is one of ANT’s most significant contributions. Many 
theoretical approaches focus on the identification of the 
viewpoints held by particular groups. ANT is not interested in 
what makes up these points of view per se, but provides a 
process for identifying the impact these different 
understandings have on the acting taking place. In Chapter 5, 
the important point was that the contrasting points of view, 
exemplified by the bio-medical model in comparison with the 
sport ethic, led to a non-enrolment, or a lack of action, between 
the athletes and mainstream medical practitioners, rather than 
the points of view themselves being the focus. 
Technology as an actant 
One point of contention with ANT is whether humans and 
non-humans can both hold agency (Collins and Yearley, 1992; 
McLean and Hassard, 2004). Collins and Yearley (1992) argue 
that ANT tends too much towards technological determinism 
in overstating the significance of non-humans as actants. This 
book has shown how, in the case of sport, non-humans can act 
through the concepts of mediators and intermediaries. For 
example, in the case of GPS as used in AFL, this book found 
that GPS units acted as intermediaries because of the useful 
nature of the data provided to coaches, but acted as mediators 
through not necessarily providing entirely accurate data. 
Along with treating humans and non-humans as equal 
actants in the creation of sport, the question also arises of 
whether to treat all human actants equally. McLean and 
Hassard (2004) note that one criticism of ANT is that it focuses 
on ‘heroes’ or central powerful figures, because of the 
perception that they are important and powerful and therefore 
have a greater influence on the network. Yet arguably, if this 
book was to be described as focusing on any particular type of 
figure, it would be that it focuses on the activities of relatively 
‘minor humans’. While there is some discussion of various 
successful athletes, there is perhaps more discussion of the 
humans who are normally somewhat hidden from view. For 
example, Chapter 7examines the media makers and 
broadcasters who produce the media coverage or sport, who 
are a group that receive little attention in the literature. But, as 
Law (1992) points out, an ANT perspective is actually 
interested not in the ‘great person’, but rather in the workings 
that make up the success of that person. This book is therefore 
more focused on the various technologies that in some cases 
have contributed to the success of some ‘great’ athletes or 
events. 
Power 
This book reveals that the power structure in sport is 
continually shifting. Following who is responsible for enrolling 
or translating various actants into the actor-network reveals 
where the power lies. For example, in Chapter 4, the 
examination of the doping actor-network revealed how several 
very different regimes – the IOC, WADA and East Germany – 
employed a range of components in order to minimise or 
eradicate doping. Through inscriptions and surveillance, 
enacted through paper, websites and drug testing, these 
organisations were able to retain control of doping and treat it 
as either a punishable or approved act. At the same time, power 
was also distributed throughout the network. For example, in 
East Germany the obviously powerful actors – high-level 
officials – enrolled doping as a method to produce success. 
However, athletes were also found to be powerful since they 
were the ones who represented East Germany, leading to a vast 
extension of the actor-network motivated by the perceived 
need to monitor the actions of travelling athletes. More 
recently, athletes have been empowered greatly owing to their 
ability to enrol the international human rights courts to 
intercede on their behalf and fight for compensation. Similarly, 
in the case of Hawk-Eye in cricket, as described in Chapter 6, 
while umpires have the power to interpret the replays shown 
by Hawk-Eye, high-level officials also have the power to utilise 
it to monitor the umpires’ skills. 
At a societal level, I found the concept of the oligopticon 
to be useful as a way of examining how organisations enact 
power. The idea of the oligopticon as a central point of 
command that works through networked connections 
encompasses Foucault’s (1977) theory of institutions using a 
central point of surveillance to ensure the correct behaviour, 
along with Deleuze’s (1992) notion that we have moved away 
from institutional surveillance through physical forms to a 
flatter, more dispersed, networked arrangement. For example, 
in the case of WADA, there are two committees who run the 
organisation, but these committees are only able to remain in 
control as long as their connections to various parts of the 
network, such as drug testers, police organisations and the 
athlete passport programme, remain intact. 
Stability 
One of the interests of ANT theorists is in identifying how 
some actor-networks come to stabilise while others unravel or 
remain stable for only short periods of time. Chapter 
7 examined two contrasting cases. The chapter argued that the 
Olympic Games can be considered a stable actor-network since 
it entails a number of features that make them immediately 
identifiable as the Olympic Games. This network is so stable 
that it is argued to be immutable and a global assemblage, in 
that the same form is able to remain intact even though the 
games move internationally. By contrast, the case of the 
America’s Cup found that this sporting event is extremely 
unstable because the rules change with each cup and there is a 
constant search to find a globally appealing form. The chapter 
argued that in both these cases technology plays a role in 
facilitating stability. In the case of the Olympic Games, 
broadcasting technology ensures that a stable television event 
called the Olympic Games occurs, while in the America’s Cup 
broadcasting technology is employed in order to attempt to 
emulate this level of stability. 
Latour’s (1991) argument that stabilisation occurs 
through non-humans was also illustrated in the case of doping 
through a discussion of inscriptions. The actor-network of 
doping includes a range of non-human and human actants that 
ensure that doping remains a condemned yet policed practice, 
particularly through the presence of inscriptions. For example, 
WADA’s Anti-Doping Code acts as an inscription that 
transforms a variety of substances and practices from being 
allowed by athletes to being banned, with banning including a 
distinct set of surveillance practices to identify the use of the 
substances. As such, it is the inscriptions that produce ‘banned’ 
substances, and when combined with the internet, inscriptions 
allow the free circulation of this information. The circulation of 
inscriptions thus stabilises anti-doping practices in ensuring 
that all athletes have access to the necessary information about 
which substances and practices have been transformed into 
‘banned’ ones. 
Local and global 
In focusing on following the networks, and acknowledging 
processes such as circulation, ANT essentially rejects any 
boundary between what is often termed the local and global, 
or micro and macro (Latour, 1995, 1999a; Law, 1992). Several of 
the cases examined in this book illustrate the ANT argument 
that a network can be global, while also being ‘continuously 
local’ (Latour, 1996, p. 67). For example, in the case of the 
swimsuit, factors that may be termed ‘global’ such as 
international sponsorship arrangements were found to 
influence the enrolment of particular suits, but at the same time 
it was found that, at the apparent ‘micro’ level, different bodies 
assembled very differently with the swimsuits, producing 
varied results. Yet these two factors were also strongly 
connected through the way that the ability for a body to 
assemble well with the swimsuit and record fast times affected 
the kind of sponsorship agreement that might be offered. These 
examples demonstrate how identifying an actant as local or 
global is not a useful exercise in an ANT study, since following 
the network extensively always leads to interconnections 
between the local and global. 
Ending the network 
This book is an incomplete description of the use of technology 
in a range of sports. It is incomplete because, as Law (1992) 
argues, it is impossible to describe every detail of a world. All 
that can be hoped for is a set of accounts that maps the 
moments when sport and technologies intersect. This book 
therefore contains different accounts from different parts of 
sport, during training, competition and broadcasting, that 
examine the range of reasons and ways that technologies are 
enrolled, or not enrolled, into sporting practice. 
Lee and Stenner (1999) and Strathern (1996) note how a 
network has no specific end. There is no closure of the 
components of a network, and therefore the researcher is left 
uncertain where to end her research. Latour’s (2005) answer 
to this is to stop when the participants stop or when the 
demands of the inscription being written are completed. This 
book describes times when the participants have been very 
definite in arguing and agreeing that a certain point is the end 
of the network. However, the book could have continued by 
looking at a range of other cases and examples, with the 
networks being followed much further. But, as Strathern (1996) 
notes, the creation of any network must exclude, and at this 
point the demands of the inscription are completed. The goal 
of this book has been to provide a range of accounts of sport 
and technology and to provide readers with some 
methodological and theoretical ideas for examining our 
increasingly complex socio-technical world. 
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